

# THE ETHICS OF PROGRESS

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# THE ETHICS OF PROGRESS

OR

The Theory and the Practice by which  
Civilization Proceeds

BY

*Deitcher*  
CHARLES F. DOLE

AUTHOR OF "THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY," THE INGERSOLL LECTURE  
OF 1906 ON "IMMORTALITY" AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, ETC.

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## PREFACE

THERE was never a time when the foundations of ethics seemed so obscure as they seem to many thinking people to-day. Strange theories of conduct find currency and win disciples. Moral principles which once seemed fixed are called in question. The moral questions at issue and the problems before civilized man take on a new scale of immensity and seriousness.

The design of this book is to set forth a simple, philosophical, and inspiring vital principle, which governs all ethical questions, and ensures the development of noble, useful, and happy character.

The treatment touches the great issues of human life, the significance of conscience, the problem of evil, the supposed antagonism between freedom and necessity. The effort is made to treat such questions without any theological or metaphysical prepossessions, but simply from the study of the facts of consciousness.

The main object of the book is practical. The author desires especially to help men in the art of the good life. While he does not believe that the true is the same as the useful, he believes that the true and the useful are at last one. The good theory, therefore, shows itself good only so far as it is practical. The closing chapters take up various modern ethical problems and ask point by point: Does our



ruling principle hold good? A paper on the "Ethics of Speculation" in the *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1907, illustrates at the same time the author's point of view and his method of approach, with regard to the great subjects which the book discusses.

One fact further may serve to attract the reader. While the author discovers in his theory of ethics the lines of an eminently religious philosophy, and believes that the practise of this theory is essentially the practise of a great religion, yet the application of his thought seems to be valid for any agnostic or "humanist" who desires to realize the highest values in life.

The substance of the book was given in a course of lectures before the Brooklyn Institute in the season of 1906-7.

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# THE ETHICS OF PROGRESS





# PART I

## ETHICS AND EVOLUTION

### CHAPTER I

#### THE NEW CONDITIONS OF ETHICAL STUDY

WE have before us under the name of ethics the most interesting and profound of all the subjects which concern human welfare. It involves our philosophy of life; it touches every question of religion; it also presides over the details of each man's daily conduct. There is no science so practical as ethics. Its facts are gathered from every field of human experience. Its traditions and precedents come down from the earliest times. Its laws rule the household, control trade and commerce, and bind men in States. Its ever new and fresh problems challenge the highest and best trained minds of the thinkers, the poets, the jurists, the legislators, and the men of affairs of each generation. These problems were never so fascinating and complicated as they are to-day.

The object of my enquiry in this book is to seek to discover what kind of ethics befits and corresponds to the needs and social relations of civilized men. Ethics is the science of human conduct. As a science, it must meet the demands of our intelligence. It must harmonize with other sciences and help to make our thought of the Universe congruous and complete. Have we a kind of ethics which can satisfy the minds of thoughtful, educated, and civilized men?

We demand of our ethical theory that it shall not

only meet the reasonable conditions of thought, but that it shall also work out into, and inspire, rational and beautiful conduct. What sort of conduct suits the enlarging requirements of a true and happy civilization? Civilization has been described as the art of living together in human society. What fundamental principles, if obeyed, will establish the domestic, the industrial, the economic, the communal or civic, the international relations of a civilized world? What persuasive motives will appeal to men's consciences in such a world, will determine and moralize their personal habits, will ennoble their individual character, and even induce social enthusiasm? We want a theory of ethics whose formulas shall hold good for such actual questions as men are asking every day about riches and poverty, about land and monopolies, about marriage and divorce and the family, about the use of the alcoholic drinks, about war, about backward races.

This is not all. It is idle merely to talk about what men ought to do in a thoroughly civilized world. The most favored nations are not civilized yet. Without going to India or China, Christendom is still full of people who, in their thought and practice, in their customs and inherited traditions, are only emerging from barbarism. We need not only an ethical theory which might suit the men of a Golden Age, but also a kind of ethics which we can use at once in this very inchoate society in which we live. It must not be merely a fine Stoic philosophy good only for the few; it must be democratic.

Moreover, the world is becoming conscious of its barbarism, as it never was before, dissatisfied with

it, ashamed of it, at times quite disheartened on account of it. There is need of a theory of ethics which shall somewhat explain and interpret moral evil and unhappiness, and, while explaining, give new courage and hope. In short, the ethics of civilization must touch the springs of the human will; it must stir men's hearts. May it not be found to be one with the essence of religion?

We are living in a period of tremendous ethical change and confusion. The world seems to be undergoing some such change as that which comes over the youth who, going out of the house of his childhood, confronts the rush and turmoil of the life of a great city. Let us fairly face the facts which make this period notable.

In the first place the ends of the earth have been rapidly brought together in the last hundred years. China and Japan have become nearer neighbors to the United States than England was a few decades ago. War, commerce, travel and science have penetrated into the remote valleys of Europe and Asia, and have suddenly awakened their half-slumbering populations, and presented to their eyes the sight of strange flags, and costumes, different religions, new manners and morals. In Hindustan, in Egypt, in Japan, in Europe and America, the old order, both moral and religious, is threatened, if not already undermined. The new teachings of physical science have clashed with time-honored superstitions and have challenged every historic form of religion, either to overwhelming readjustment or to death. Successive waves of peaceful and industrial immigration, more vast than the ancient processions of the Goths and

the Huns, have swept over the seas, and broken in upon the sleeping lands of North and South America, Australia and the Islands of the Pacific, upon distant Siberia and Manchuria, and are altering the geography of the world. Coming to live under new skies, mixing with new and alien populations, adapting themselves to changed social environments, institutions and laws, losing the old moorings and habitudes of generations, the new immigrants have brought irresistible disturbances of belief and practice into the countries where they have wandered.

In New York, in Chicago, in Boston, the old Puritanism of New England or Scotland stands at bay in the face of strange and nameless immoralities brought together from every capital of the old world, survivals of Rome and Babylon. There is an indecency, both in the slums and in the palaces of a great city, worse than that of savages; for the savage has his immemorial code of rules, while thousands of men and women in modern cities have lost or forgotten not only the religion but the morality of their forefathers. Grant, if you will, that most men mean well and are kindly disposed; but lacking convictions and losing religion they become more or less irresponsible. The fact is, men are making experiments in ethics, and in religion, too, as they make experiments in science and trade. They discover to their surprise how many different schemes, codes and rival standards of conduct are somewhere, at least, held respectable. Ingenious new pleas and excuses are published, sophisticating men's native ideas of right and wrong. For what barbarism cannot even the preachers of religion make out a case, pro-

vided it stands with the prestige of wealth and numbers?

I hope to show in the end that this prevailing moral confusion is a phase of progress, but this fact does not appear on the surface. There have been other times when a cry of fear has gone up from the conservators of morality over the "wickedness" of their world. But a new and subtle form of peril appears to-day. It concerns the standards of morality; it touches the minds, not merely of careless and childish people, but also of moral and thoughtful persons. The early and common thought of ethics, associated more or less intimately with every religion, has been a rigorous, unchangeable, and absolute moral code decreed from heaven. Men have habitually written over ethics, as over their religion, the words: "As it was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be." This idea has prevailed especially in the name of Christianity. In the current and traditional Christian thought a complete scheme of moral teachings is supposed to be drawn from the Bible. "How is it written?" men have been accustomed to ask. They have thought that whatever the Bible forbade was wrong for all men and in all times, and whatever the Bible failed explicitly to condemn was permissible.

The Nineteenth Century, with its tremendous doctrine of evolution altering all the physical sciences, made no exemption, in the application of its new teaching, in favor of morals and religion. Religions grow and change and pass on into higher forms, or else, if they cannot fit the new needs of the new generation, they pass away, like the early Saurian creatures. The ethical standards of any age or race

are likewise, evidently, the index of the degree and quality of its civilization. The study of ethics can never again be any mere rabbinical or exegetical exercise upon a divine code, Mosaic or Christian. It is more profound and stimulating. It consists, like other sciences, in tracing the underlying laws which govern moral movement and growth; it compels us to observe the facts of moral health and of moral disease; the trained imagination leaps from that which is now to the vision of what ought to be. Ethics is not a science of mere "statics," as if man's moral nature were ever at rest or had attained its perfection; it is rather a science of vital "dynamics," showing the forces at work which build up a civilized society.

The profoundest question in ethics touches the ground of authority upon which the individual or society proceeds to think and to act. The criticism of the Bibles of the world has forced everyone to raise this question of authority anew. Who is to pronounce what is right? Our Bible is not the kind of book which our forefathers imagined. A Bible is the result of a growth; it is the literature of a people who thought upon righteousness and religion; it embodies the experiences of a procession of devout and earnest souls. It contains their rules of life, their legislation, their aspirations and ideals; it bears a prophecy of the times to come, when man's highest prayers for justice and human welfare shall be realized in the institutions of society. Such a Bible is not less precious for the fact of its human growth; but it ceases straightway to be specifically authoritative for all times, and least of all upon those details



of conduct which make the problems of each new generation.

There are, indeed, certain general principles, such as the rules of justice, of truth, and of mercy, which are contained in all the Bibles, which arise generally out of men's daily experience, and may be called universal. But the demand for authority concerns the practical questions about the application of the principles. The ethical need is greatest where authorities differ, where Bibles are not explicit, or even are silent, where the conscience of only the few has yet felt the presence of a new commandment. Ethical problems consist largely in the application of universal principles, already commonly admitted, to new and altered circumstances, or to new phases of human life as it grows more sensitive from age to age. Ethics is like mechanics in this respect. The modern engineer has to deal with forms of force and new enterprises which even the builders of the Pyramids never contemplated. The text books, the plans or maps, the rules and methods of the ancient engineers or astronomers were never intended for the construction of the Panama Canal or for the investigation of double stars. In the same way we must frankly admit that the Bibles with which we begin the new century were never intended to determine the details of modern ethics.

Moreover, modern skepticism goes to the roots of things. Men ask whether the so-called universal principles—justice, mercy, truth—are always and everywhere binding? We hear strange theories about a supposed egoistic "superman" who cares for none of these things. If ancient authority fades, if there



is no supernatural authority to which men may have recourse, what valid urgency can be brought upon the unwilling mind? Upon this point more than anywhere else turns the enormous difference between the old-world view of ethical theory and the modern thought.

This change of ethical view-point does not come because men have been consciously thinking and investigating, so much as because they have been living and acting. Practical necessities and even economies have compelled the reconsideration of the ethics of the code and the book. It was largely the pressure of practical life that brought men up against the question of slavery. They found a certain discomfort in buying and selling their fellow-Christians, not infrequently of their own flesh and blood. The business became incongruous with the conditions of modern life and with the institutions of popular government. A new sensitiveness of conscience was developed which could not be put to sleep. So with the problem of intemperance. How could the men of the Bible, who had never seen a pint of distilled alcohol, have any clear answer for modern people who want to enact a prohibitory law? Does anyone seriously suppose that Jesus, who is credited in one of the New Testament stories with having actually changed water into wine, had the slightest sense of the modern problem of the use and control of alcoholic drinks in a modern city? We have new conditions of life that raise an interrogation mark over a way that was once held to be safe enough. Drunkenness, a matter of course for a barbarous people,

becomes an unbearable nuisance in the streets of a crowded town.

Take another question of the last century. What is the modern citizen's relation to the State, when for example, his State makes unjust laws to catch slaves or to treat Chinamen with indignity? The writers of authoritative Bibles had no conception of a democratic government in which citizens are at the same time law-makers, and subject to their own laws.

Moreover, we have waked up to see that, as a matter of fact, whatever men's professions of devotion may have been to the teachings of Moses or of Jesus, only a bare fraction have ever actually endeavored to square their conduct with the moral code contained in the sacred books of their religion. How many Jews or Christians have ever declined to take interest money because it is forbidden in the Bible? How many Christians believe that there is only one just cause of divorce from a cruel, brutal, or beastly husband? Or, how many non-resistant Christians range themselves with Tolstoi and the Quakers? Evidently the world is not moored to any single ethical anchorage ground. Our ship is fairly launched on an ocean. Have we a compass, and are we steering a course? Are there sun and stars over us, by which, however distant, we may make out our direction? We have to show that we have an ethical theory which takes all this change of the basis of authority into account and, in fact, presupposes it.

## CHAPTER II

### THE MATERIAL OF ETHICAL STUDY

THE material which we are set to observe in the physical sciences is wholly external to our minds. We classify it under the abstract and mysterious term of matter. We describe it under various forms, colors, sounds and sensations with which it impresses itself on our senses. We apply elaborate instruments to observe, measure and weigh it. We distinguish behind its manifold changes the play of what we name motion or force,—another mystery. We can even make out a case that all the matter in the world is simply the manifestation, in myriad forms, of force or will. However this may be, the mind is impressed with the fact of a world outside of itself, but with which its existence is involved, which seems to consist of what we call matter, and through its continued motion to reveal the working of force.

The study of ethical subjects proceeds with a different order of material. It is not altogether outside of ourselves. It is also within our own minds or consciousness. We have, indeed, to deal with sights, sounds, motions, blows perhaps, the actions of other men like ourselves. We use our senses wherewith to translate men's gestures and movements, their looks, the tones of their voices, the glance of their eyes, but we are as sure as we can be of any fact that,

behind the acts, the glances, the gestures of each man whom we see lies the working of a quite invisible mind, precisely like the mind of which each one is conscious in himself.

The material of ethical investigation, then, does not consist merely in such conduct as we observe through the use of our senses in watching the people about us. It consists also in all manner of feelings, affections, sentiments, thoughts, convictions, memories, the substance of our inward or personal life. Our study is one of more or less self-consciousness. We watch the conduct of others, and observe their outward treatment of us, for a purpose beyond the mere sensation of pain or pleasure which their conduct immediately happens to convey. We want to know, also, how they feel toward us; we want to know what their conduct means; why they treated us as they did and not otherwise. We need to know how to treat them in return. Our happiness, our existence, all that makes life worth living, depends on the conduct of the people with whom we are in daily contact, on multitudes also beyond our sight,—but whose acts may change the course of civilization. It is not enough to know what they are doing; it is necessary to surmise what they intend, what they desire, what ideals are in their minds. The study of ethics is the study of nothing less profound than the depths and heights of human nature. What is man? What is he capable of? What changes may be wrought in him through culture? How may the forces playing through him, physical and spiritual, be turned to more fruitful use for the welfare of all men?

Not observation alone, but reflection based up-

on experience also throws light on these searching questions. We surmise that all men have a common nature. We are persuaded that they respond to common motives and urgencies. What the individual may become under certain conditions, we think multitudes likewise tend to become with the same conditions, whether favorable or injurious. What moves us, we discover, tends (other things being equal) to move other men. History, literature, oratory, poetry, religion, all contribute their part to the study of the vast realm of ethical material.

There are various characters that we attribute to people, inferred more or less accurately from their actions, and known also by self-consciousness in ourselves. We call men just, truthful, generous, or else mean, cruel, unfair, and other such terms. We judge them as good or bad by these characterizations. We describe qualities which lie in the invisible region of men's personality. These qualities emerge into a vast complexity of ethical products and ideals. There is never, however, any difficulty in knowing a thoroughly just man when he appears. Even a child will often entertain a high ideal of justice. Goodness has its own way of shining forth. Depravity carries its own ill odor. All the material for ethical enquiry has its proper and obvious marks for identification and classification, as real, though somewhat subtle, as the material upon which a chemist or geologist works.

Behind the surface of men's conduct we distinguish in general three different attitudes in which they stand to one another. Their mood or attitude or

mode of contact is far more to us than their acts or words. One attitude is that of antagonism, or dislike, or at least suspicion. There may be race hatred, class jealousy, personal antipathy or prejudice. It may be baseless or it may have roots in tribal tradition and history. It may have come to be quite unreasonable. But it has to be reckoned with and accounted for, and in case humane relations are desired, it must somehow be cleared away. How to overcome repulsions and enmities is one of the most practical of all questions which men have to consider. No problem in electrical or mechanical science is so important. The fact is that hardly anyone is so unnatural and inhumane as not to be willing to keep the law and order of his own society or group. The trouble comes in being obliged to keep the order and rules prescribed by another set or group of men, not one's own fellows. The work of democracy, and its faith, is to be able to convert all men to allegiance to the common order, suitable for all men.

A second attitude in which men stand to each other is indifference. Men daily look others in the face for whom they do not care. They rub against their fellows in the streets, as if they were all so many posts. They do not even dislike one another. They live as if the others, their neighbors on the same street, it may be, did not exist. They may even buy and sell with one another, and be devoid of personal and human feeling. In many cases, this prevailing indifference rises into a mood of slumbering and half-conscious superiority. The employer imagines himself to be of finer clay than the crowd of new immi-



grants who crowd into his mines from Hungary. The university student belongs to a superior world to the uneducated multitude. The Englishman in India has his own caste line which divides him both from the people over whom he rules and the common soldiers who came out in the same ship with him. Here, then, is an attitude which, without being antagonistic at all, may even divide men of the same tongue, the same religion, the same national flag, as if a gulf ran between them. The most advanced of the great religions of the world proclaims a universal rule of love. The most searching problem of religion is how to teach love in any valid sense of the word to men whose habitual attitude is indifference or self-complacent pride. Outside of all religion the problem of the statesman is practically the same, namely, how to bind in enduring forms of union, respect and co-operation the separate strata of society, wherein now men and women hardly recognize each other. The problem at least is how to prevent this perilous and inhuman separateness from passing over, under some slight excitement, into positive hatred and injury.

The third attitude in which men stand to one another is friendliness or good will. This is evidently the normal attitude. The natural tendency always is, as fast as men know each other, or wherever they work for a common cause, to discover in one another the ethical marks of more or less worth, and to respect and like one another accordingly. "I do not know," said a teacher of considerable experience, "that I ever have met a really bad boy." Here was a case where the attitude of kindliness or humanity on the part of the teacher operated to bring out a



response of the same kind from his boys. In a general way, we may premise that the ideal ethical life would be one in which men of all races, traditions and religions met each other in the attitude of humanity.

The attitude of a man is related to his character, as just, pure, true, or the reverse; but his attitude is a somewhat different order of fact from his character. Thus a man may possess various virtues, such as courage, faithfulness, a clean life, and yet be full of suspicions and hatreds. The veriest Ishmael may possess high personal virtues. A man may give scrupulously honest measure to a customer whom he despises. An English judge or resident may be the soul of integrity in a land which he would like never to see again. On the other hand men of very coarse habits will be models of devoted hospitality to utter strangers.

The attitude of a man seems to be largely a matter of social disposition. The social temper may even be an open door to peculiar temptations, to loose living, to complacency towards injustice, and may urge a man to go with the crowd to do evil. Nevertheless, the social temper, as we shall see, lies at the basis of moral education. That our fellows shall approve us, shall be friendly to us, shall act with us, is at the root of our happiness. That the largest possible number of men shall be honest, faithful, generous, brave, kindly, is the condition upon which human life, and especially civilized life, proceeds. The material of ethics is thus the material out of which human society builds itself.

The study of ethics is simply the highest form of the study of human nature. No one has to travel

across seas or to burrow in the earth for material to investigate. It lies all about him and within him. No psychologist in his laboratory has special advantage over his fellows, who observe men on the street, in shops, and in courtrooms. The professional student is even likely to be swayed with undue interest toward the bypaths of external and physical phenomena, so as not to do justice to the fruitful field of self-consciousness where the main facts of the ethical life emerge. As with all practical management of human affairs, from the tiny home to a great government, as with the successful conduct of the high art of friendship, so in the study of ethics, what counts most is wealth of observation and richness of experience; also, most likely, a sense of the great human ends in personal welfare, happiness and social efficiency to be secured through the elevation of beautiful standards and the inspiration of noble motives. In other words, the surmise or suggestion naturally follows here, that among the conditions of the successful study of ethics a certain ethical disposition on the part of the enquirer may be essential. This is like saying that for the best study of the sense of sight an excellent normal eye is demanded, or for the study of music a good ear and a sense of harmonies. So, for ethical study one ought to have a strong predisposition toward the most humane social life. A selfish or overbearing or contemptuous observer would naturally stand at a serious disadvantage.

## CHAPTER III

### TWO RIVAL THEORIES

Two master theories of ethics, representing opposite philosophies, have long been before the world. They express different tendencies of the human mind. One theory considers man as an outgrowth of Nature; he is regarded as the creature or resultant of circumstances; his conduct is dominated by his material or physical environment; the springs of his action are reached and played upon through the senses; his interests, his pleasures, his fears, his ambitions for power, wealth and influence are his ruling motives. Show him at every point what makes for his own happiness,—in short views, if he is ignorant,—in longer views, if he is more intelligent,—and his morals will correspond. In short, each man is here in this world for what he can get and enjoy. This is his nature, as true, though in more subtle form, of the refined and educated, as it is obviously true, in coarse and sensual forms, of gross and barbarous men.

Such, briefly, is the epicurean or utilitarian theory of ethics. It is related to what is known as the economic view of history. It is often associated with a materialistic philosophy, but it is not incompatible with certain kinds of religion. There are religions which doubtless make their appeal, either to the selfishness or the fears of their votaries. A religion may offer selfish gods who seek their own glory, who administer future rewards and punishments like oriental

potentates, and make miraculous interpositions in behalf of their favorites. The utilitarian theory fits such a religion. It may also profess a doctrine of the freedom of the will, or again, it may be the theory of necessitarianism. Its characteristic emphasis in all cases is the same, namely, its assertion that the grand and persuasive motive of ethics in each individual is his own happiness or welfare,—if not in a narrow and animal sense, then in a large and high sense.

It must be frankly confessed that the opponents of the utilitarian school of ethics have hitherto scarcely succeeded in giving a clear and consistent account of their own thought. It is easy, however, to show what their emphasis and the tendency of their thinking has been. They have held that there is something infinitely more than happiness, in whatever sense you use the word. Truth and righteousness, spelled with divine and capital letters, they teach, are more precious than the happiness of all the men in the world. The urgency of conscience is imperative and inexorable, while every instinct and desire for pleasure may be and often ought to be frustrated. A man had better die in doing a just act than live through a millennium of pleasures purchased by disobedience. To be happy is one thing; to be "blessed" is another and far worthier object of life. The fact is, we are told, aside from and quite above the titillation of the senses, there is the most real of all realms,—the kingdom of the ideal things. Here are the poet's and artist's visions of beauty; here lies "the City of Light" which the prophets and reformers of all ages have foretold; here is the divine plan

of everything that ought to be,—the infinite possibilities of the perfection of all human relationships. Here, then, not outside, but within a man, is the supreme source of all ethics.

To the practical questions: What must a man do in the midst of the tangled skein of this earthly life? Shall he not do simply what his most exalted sense of advantage or utility dictates? Can he not at least be content with trying to seek what seems to him “the greatest good of the greatest number?” No, answer the idealists. He can never be content unless he does whatever is right. Let him do what the shining ideals require. Let him do, not even what is good for the multitude for to-day or to-morrow, but what is eternally good,—what is good, therefore, for all men. In some such general way as this, speak all the clarion voices of the opponents of the utilitarian ethics.

You might suppose that these idealists, with their conviction of a realm of absolute truth, beauty, and goodness, must, perforce, hold to some form of religion. You might even suppose that they would agree in believing in some precise form of revelation, through which the vision of the divine and absolute facts could be assured. On the contrary, some of the staunchest of the idealist teachers are almost, if not quite, agnostics, with regard to the problems of religion, such as prayer, providence, and immortality. The greatest of the idealists in all times have indeed depended upon no authority of external revelation; they have affirmed that every man may see for himself the beautiful laws and the commanding visions of that moral and spiritual realm to which,

they have urged, all men rightly belong. Thus Jesus characteristically says to his ordinary hearers: "Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?"

You might think that the idealists would surely be of one mind upon the vexed questions of freedom and necessity. But cross-sections divide them like their antagonists upon various questions of philosophy, as well as religion. Neither are they at all agreed, either in the report which they make of their visions of the absolute goodness, or in determining practical rules of conduct for themselves or other men.

I believe that the time has come when we may be able to discriminate the elements of enduring truth which are contained in both of the current rival theories of ethics. It is certainly impressive that each theory considered by itself corresponds to well-known facts of common experience. It is true that men are always asking: What shall we get? What will promote our welfare as men? It is equally true that there is an element in human nature which, on occasion, throws all considerations of expediency, at least of personal or temporary interest, to the winds and yields itself to some invisible force of moral gravitation, which involves as its immediate results more or less of cost and pain, and whose final results in human welfare, however they may enter into men's hopes, are altogether beyond any explicit demonstration. I believe that the facts of ethical experience, when brought together and carefully studied, build up into a theory of conduct wherein there is a comprehensive harmony and no discrepancy between the two views which have usually been thought opposed

to one another. I mean that the true theory of ethics must frankly acknowledge everything which the extreme utilitarians have tried to say. Meanwhile, the idealists and absolutists in ethics, while holding fast to all the facts of man's higher moments of moral experience, must concede certain important modifications of their thought, whereby in the end the whole range of ethical consciousness may be included in unity. Never, indeed, can there be satisfactory ethical theory or practice, so long as two groups of respectable minds are obliged to dispute with one another about the foundations upon which human conduct rests.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE SELFISH WORLD AND THE SOCIAL WORLD

WE are apt to use the word selfishness in a loose sense, without asking just what we mean by it. We must now define it with some care. It is the instinct in man, as in all creatures, which seeks to get, to draw to itself, to appropriate. It makes self the center of its existence and all things else subsidiary to its own advantage. As the earth seemed the center of the universe to the primitive astronomy, so self appears to the primitive man. In proportion as he becomes intelligent, so his desires grow. To get things,—clothes, ornaments, money, lands, to get praise, favor, and power, to obtain all forms of happiness, to make acquisition the end and aim of life,—this is selfishness. It is not necessarily an evil thing.

No one surely cares to deny that this is and always has been a selfish world. Even its prevailing religions have appealed to men's selfishness. Prayers and devotions have been offered mostly at least for the benefit of the worshipers. Christianity has appealed through hundreds of years to men's hopes or their fears. At all events, men have so understood its appeal. "We have left all and followed thee. What then shall we have?" asked Jesus' disciples. The ethics of the world, as a rule, have necessarily been the ethics of selfishness. Human laws make one continual appeal to men's interests and especially their fears. It has even been a common apprehension

among the men who have doubted the validity of religion, that if the dread of a future judgment were taken away, or the fear of hell removed, mankind might relapse into lawlessness. Even superstition was a prophylactic, men have urged, since its rewards and punishments stirred the selfish multitudes to obey the laws.

Mass together the hundreds of millions of men on the earth. How many of them can you depend on, in the face of strong desires or passions, to do right, purely and simply because it is right? Give them complete exemption from any personal consequences, or from all fear of punishment, in case they do wrong, then subject them to the stress of severe temptation,—how many of them will do right because right seems to them an absolute good? What idealist will claim that these would be more than a small “remnant?” Let us grant that men’s average conduct is controlled by selfish motives.

We are not blaspheming our common human nature when we say that this is a selfish world. We mean,—what all enlightened people to-day know,—that humanity takes its rise, both for the individual and the race, in animal conditions. Each individual child grows up out of such conditions. We never blame the child because it is selfish. This is only to say that it is still a young animal. We do not dream yet of preaching to the child about altruism, about ideals or the absolute. If we say that he must do right, we picture to him as clearly as we can the nature of the consequences of good or bad conduct. Why should we blame childhood for the conditions which constitute childhood? We may as well blame early man

for his ignorance as to blame him for being selfish. In body and mind he is that which his primitive ancestry made him. The selfishness is of the animal nature. To get and to keep, to satisfy his desires, to express passion, is a primary and instinctive command. Let us disabuse our minds of the idea that the selfishness of the animal man is reprehensible or wicked, or that we ought to be surprised if it survives in us. We might as well be surprised that we have bodies and physical appetites. Neither let us imagine that we shall ever rise to the heights of ethical beauty and truth, unless we likewise descend in our enquiry to the depths of our natures, and recognize the common soil in which the roots of human life are bedded.

Selfishness, however, is only one fact in the primitive human nature. There is also a social element even in animal life. It is doubtless one of the primitive conditions of existence. Kropotkin and others have acquainted us with very remarkable instances to illustrate the working of the law of this social instinct. It bids the individual creature take any and all risks of annihilation, when the need arises, for the sake of progeny, or for the defense of the hive or the herd. The timid mother bird suddenly becomes a fierce fighter, reckless of life; the dog, as if some inscrutable inspiration seized him, will plunge into the waves to rescue not only his master, but even some one of his master's race whom he has never seen before. The selfish instinct sends the savage out to hunt or to rob his neighbor; in the pursuit of his selfish ends he is cruel and unscrupulous. The social instinct in the same man bids him give all he has to his hungry

tribesmen; it may even possess him to take in a helpless stranger and divide with him his last morsel of food.

We understand nothing about ethics till we learn to take into account not only the selfishness of the child or the primitive man, but also the characteristic social nature present in wild animals and gleaming out from the eyes of quite young children. The few simple laws of early men,—against murder, against theft, against adultery,—do not merely represent the selfish side of human nature. They were not made because each selfish man, fearful of his neighbor's hate or greed, in cold blood established a contract with the others and added the fitting sanction of oaths and punishments. The early laws seem to have come out of the growing social sense among men. As a certain subtle sympathy and comradeship binds the creatures of any group of the higher animals, so that they do not appear to wish to hurt one another, much more this social instinct binds the men of a family or a clan together. There was never a time (barring the momentary insanity of mob excitement) when any considerable number of men wished to break the laws and to injure their fellows. Not fear or favor, not rewards or punishments, but the instinctive sense of a common good and a common necessity have restrained and subjected selfishness. This fact is as obvious among Maories or Malays as among men of the Aryan races. In every period the man of normal development, the ordinary man of his generation, has had enough of this social feeling or humanity to perceive that there were points and areas from which his selfishness, rushing forth to

get or enjoy for himself, was quite ruled away. Not external authority, but a law of his own being, namely, this social law, thus sets itself up against the law of the brute. If throughout the course of history men have appeared with little or no sense of this social law, or in whom this instinctive regard for the common good was lacking, such men have been held by their fellows as abnormal. We call them brutes and not men.

This is to say that sympathy is a very primitive trait in human nature. The man without any sympathy, we say, is not quite human. Now sympathy is at the heart of ethics.

There are men who say that force is behind all law. They imagine that society would go to destruction in the absence of the show of force. They are nervous at the suggestion of anarchism, as if it meant moral chaos. This is the fear of the aristocrat, who does not know the common nature, the same in all ranks. Would the aristocrat himself break the laws, if he were given exemption? And is it because he is an anarchist at heart that he distrusts everyone else? He ought to know that vast areas of population on our planet are hardly policed at all, yet men are restrained from doing injury to one another by the simple social forces of custom and sympathy. He ought to recall the beautiful stories of the kindly reception of the early voyagers to the American Continent, before the native courtesy of the aborigines had been abused by the greed and cruelty of the white men.

We have found two motives at work, the selfish or individualistic, and the social, both acting to create

an ethical world. We must not make the mistake of setting these two motives over against one another as antagonistic. The two forces play together, if not over the whole field of human conduct, at least over the larger part of it, in far closer harmony than men thoughtlessly suppose. Every new corporation, every Trust, every Labor Union, every new combination of States under a common government is a proof that the most enlightened selfishness moves and must move on the more and more closely drawn lines of the vast co-operative commonwealth of humanity.

It is often said that business is selfish, like the struggle of beasts to trample each other down. On the contrary, there would hardly be any business except for the social instinct in men. Who goes to trade with an enemy? We trade with our neighbors and friends. Or if we trade with enemies, they soon cease to be unfriendly. We choose to buy and sell with humane and not with inhuman people. Good fellowship and sympathy make a part of a merchant's capital. Why do we say "the good will of a business?" Few men in actual business would prefer to wrong their customers. Men mostly enjoy doing one another a service. This social instinct, related to sympathy, must not be confounded with the selfish or acquisitive impulse. But the two motives, evidently, are inextricably interwoven in the course of ordinary business. However selfish men's actions appear, the most eager and enterprising of them are constrained to do social service even in the pursuit of their selfishness. No man can possibly live to himself.

The converse of this is equally true. The social



sense, the social acts urged upon animals and men, doubtless inure, as a rule and in the long run, to the advantage of the individual, who, indeed, could not exist otherwise. We do not imagine that the bees ever reason out why it is worth while to build a city together, or why obedience to the rules of the hive and a scheme of common defense are for the interest of each individual bee. The social instinct, like a mighty urgency, compels them to work to the common advantage. It is given, however, to thinking man to see, if he likes, what social co-operation means. He can plausibly translate his social sense into terms of individual advantage. He can even ask himself, "What must I do in order to get the utmost selfish gratification out of my life?" And he can find good reason to answer, "I must do to others what I wish them to do for me." If it is true to say that "Honesty is the best policy," it may be urged that the Golden Rule, which is really another form of the practical Confucian doctrine of "reciprocity," is the most complete expression of individual or utilitarian advantage.

If these things are so, why may it not prove that selfishness, with its instinct for advantage or utility, being a natural, primitive impulse, and not in any way blameworthy in its origin, will be found to play the part of the ancient Greek "pedagogue" or servant, who leads the growing child to something higher than selfishness? This is exactly the promise which our study offers. Suppose, in the development of man, individuals appear whose sense of the social good actually overrides their animal passions and appetites and their personal ambitions; suppose



they find their own welfare and pleasure in their emphasis of the social advantage, being now more social than selfish. We shall easily show that human history is unaccountable except for the appearance of such men. Neither will it be hard to show that true and normal human development moves in the direction of this, and no other kind of manhood.

## CHAPTER V

### SELFISHNESS AT ITS BEST, OR HEDONISM

LET us not be too fast, or so dogmatic as to assert at once that there is anything higher than selfishness. If selfishness and the social sense are both working human motives, and if they act reciprocally; if enlightened selfishness is bound over "to keep the peace," and if the social sense inures to the good of the individual, and if the two principles are not contradictory, may it not be that we can give such an extension to the meaning of selfishness as to make this the master motive in life and the social sense subordinate to it? This would presumably give us a valid philosophy of conduct. All that would be necessary to this theory would be to educate the primitive selfish instinct and to make it intelligent.

Let us frankly try this key to the riddle of human life and see how much we can do with it. We will take the most refined and enlightened self-interest of civilized men, and discover whether this can perhaps serve as a sound philosophical basis for a universal theory of ethics. Let it account if it may for all the facts of the moral consciousness. We will try as hard as we can to make it suffice for our purpose, without going on a larger quest.

We have already admitted that selfishness, so far from being antagonistic to the social sense, may run harmoniously with it. Let us imagine a man, well

born and well educated, who proposes to get as much happiness as he can out of this life. Such a man will draw all manner of close social ties around him. He will establish a home and possess himself of wife and children. He will find a more intense kind of happiness in sharing the happiness of his friends. He would be a brute and not a man if he did not enjoy the sight of cheerful and happy people about him. What decent modern man can bear to see poverty, distress, squalor, sores and suffering—Lazarus sitting in his rags at the man's own door? Humanity constrains selfishness for its own sake and its own pleasure to alleviate suffering, to endow hospitals, to send the sanitary engineer to let light into the terrible slums of New York and London. Let no man take credit to himself because he gives his dollars for charity, or because on occasion he turns from the gains of trade to throw a vote for municipal reform. He is not intelligent if it does not please him to give some of his money and time for his own city, for the well-being of his clerks, his workmen, his neighbors. As the tide of man's own happiness runs fuller by entering into the happiness of his children, so the man's happiness is wider still by entering into the larger flow of the welfare of his fellows, of his nation, of humanity.

Moreover, it is the prerogative of man to be able to live beyond himself in the lives of men across the seas. There is a distinct and appropriate pleasure that belongs to this wider relation. The man who desires the utmost happiness in this world can not afford to leave this kind of pleasure out. Common humanity makes it a pleasure for men in America

to send their gifts to the sufferers from massacres in Armenia and from famine in India. There are thousands of people to whom it is harder to say No than to give at least a little to these calls of human distress. Their own lives are confessedly richer because of the ties which bind them to orphan children or to unknown starving men and women on the other side of the earth.

We are reminded also that human happiness is composed of various denominations of value, rising like a hierarchy one above the other. This is a fundamental fact which we shall have frequent occasion to recall. There is the pleasure of physical comfort, of warmth and rest, of the appetites, as of food and drink; there is the more intellectual pleasure of music and beauty, of scenery and art, of sunshine and starlight, of the mountains and the sea, of flowers and the forest; there is the pleasure of knowledge, of discovery, of books; there is the finer pleasure of society and friendship. Shall we not add, even at this stage of our study, the mighty emotions of reverence, the stirrings of the depths of the soul at the thoughts of an infinite realm, at aspirations, hopes and possibilities almost beyond the power of words to utter? Certain it is that there are those quite agnostic in their philosophy, skeptical of the reality of anything which answers to these sublime experiences, who, however, are forced to concede that man would not be wholly man who did not indulge them. Real or unreal, they must be accounted for. Even selfishness, at its best, must not cut itself off from these heights of human experience. Even selfishness, unless when defeated it goes over to pessimism, must have some sort of

heaven toward which to climb in its scale of pleasurable though temporary values.

Let no one imagine that he does justice to the utilitarian theory of ethics if he only gives a low sense to the word *utility*. Human utility is not in merely building houses and planting fields, in trade and iron ships, in the arts which supply or defend man's body. There are utilities also for the mind and for the affections. Whatever adds richness or intensity to human joy belongs with these higher utilities. Ethics and religion are utilities as well as science, literature, and art, provided they likewise increase the sum of human well-being. What will you discover that has not use, at least, for some part of man's complex nature? The man of exalted selfishness, while he asks what he ought to do in order to get the lower and common pleasures and utilities, must also ask how to obtain the delights or utilities of the mind and the heart. To be a man in the best sense of the word is to be something more than an animal. It is not for us here to say why this is so, but only to observe the fact.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ETHICS OF REFINED SELFISHNESS

LET us now see what the ethics that spring from enlightened selfishness will do for us. The ethics of selfishness will be the rules or conditions by which, living in society with other men, one may not only get as much as possible of the things which he needs for his material comfort, but the utmost satisfaction also in the higher ranges of life, by which the civilized man is lifted above the animal. Thus even in his selfishness there will be a principle of sacrifice, or at least of selection, compelling him to barter or exchange or give up the pleasure of a lower sort in favor of a more refined kind of pleasure. Thus, whoever desires the pleasures of sound bodily and mental health, must pay the price of sobriety and self-control. Whoever desires the pleasures of human society, must pay a price in the terms of some conformity, not always personally convenient or agreeable, to social usages. He must also pay the price of moral conformity to such ordinary rules of justice, chastity and kindness as are evidently essential to decent social existence, whether in the family or the state. He will like to be a man of good reputation, and he must pay the cost of reputation in terms of fair conduct. It is here, as we have already suggested, that enlightened selfishness will find its advantage in keeping the Golden Rule.

I believe that you will not at first find any fault,

see any special lapse, or distinguish any difference to mark enlightened selfishness from what we will provisionally call unselfishness. In ninety-nine moments of conduct out of a hundred you may see no such difference. Thus our hero of refined selfishness will be, at his best, a thoughtful and tender husband and father. He will keep the natural laws of the household. Being humane, he will be charitable accordingly. Enjoying the favor of his neighbors, he will do the courteous things which inspire favor. Loving to win the praise of his fellows, he will show proper public spirit toward civic and national interests which concern his own people. You may depend upon him to contribute time and means for your schools and colleges. We are not supposing a man whose selfishness is cold and calculating. Few such men exist. We are supposing a normal man with warm blood in his veins, with sympathies and affections. Our single proviso is that the main object of his life must be the common and natural basal instinct, to get as much satisfaction and happiness for himself as he can. We may well wish that millions of men were to-day as intelligent and humane in their selfishness as this man whom we have imagined. We are supposing no impossible character. Many men, while fair-minded, kindly, obedient to law, public-spirited, will frankly avow that self-interest governs the general scheme of their life. They do not see how they can help being selfish. The elemental forces make them so.

Let us now watch the life of which we have been speaking at its highest moments. Let us put the man of refined selfishness on trial and see how he will be-



have in certain critical emergencies. Most of his acts, we confess, seem like projectiles thrown up from the earth's surface to fall back again where they came from. But there are certain acts wherein, as if by some interior and mightier force, gravitation is overcome; these acts rise clearly above the atmosphere of the individual selfishness and seem now to belong to a new mode of motion to which human selfishness itself is subsidiary. Here, for example, the man looks from the safe shore upon a sinking wreck; or he stands before a burning building. Human lives are at risk, perhaps it may be the lives of utter strangers. Does any man of normal nature stand and ask what will be his own advantage, if he takes his life in his hand for the work of rescue? No. It is as if a wave of elemental passion seized and lifted him out of all thought of himself and the results of his act. Does anyone say that the man seeks the praise of his fellows for his chivalrous deed? In the highest moments of life this consideration does not probably enter the man's mind. His love, or at least his sympathy, rules his conduct. If by any ingenuity such conduct can be described as that of a selfish man, you have now begun to read a new meaning into the word *selfish*. For here is the conduct of a man who is not seeking to get, or to appropriate, or to make self the center of his world. It is the conduct for the moment of one who goes out of himself and forgets himself and only seeks the good of others.

Jesus' characteristic story of the Good Samaritan occurs to us here. Say, if you please, that such a man identifies himself with others, that he extends the content of his own being, and annexes first his own chil-

dren, then his neighbors, and then the men of his own race, and then, finally, all men as the subjects of his personality. Our point is that selfishness ceases to be selfish and rises into a new term, as soon as it begins to take in family, and kinship, and the whole human race. Do you say that the man in giving his life does what he pleases or chooses to do, or else he would not do it? Then, we reply, there are times when he freely pleases and chooses not to be selfish. The most enlightened and refined theory of selfishness does not account for the highest acts of a man's life, which often in fact threaten self-destruction.

The kind of acts which we have now in mind are not so uncommon as many suppose. They gleam out every day from the simple annals of the poor. Is it because of calculation of reciprocity that weary men and women go to watch every night by the bedsides of the sick and dying in ten thousand humble homes? Very few of these willing watchers ever think of reciprocity; their sympathy and humanity carry them quite out of themselves in beautiful self-forgetfulness. The same principle works when volunteers enlist at the call of the State. As President Eliot of Harvard University said at the time of the Spanish war, the youth do not count the cost. They may even be thoughtless whether the call of the nation is righteous or not. A wave of generous feeling, moral, or patriotic, or religious, lifts a whole people at times, as the tide lifts a fleet of ships. This is not to deny that in men's complex nature subtle selfish ambitions for rank and honor and reward do not frequently blend with the larger common motion which possesses

the multitude. We simply affirm that in all great popular movements there are those who never even ask themselves, what shall we get, but only what can we give, or what can we do? Not to recognize this order of facts is not to know human nature, or its history. We have a power or phenomenon here, like the natural change by which water is converted into steam. The steam arises from water, but this fact does not permit us to say that water is steam. So unselfishness may arise out of the field of selfish motives, but it ceases to be selfish.

Moreover, this class of moral phenomena of which we speak is doubtless becoming more frequent as mankind grows civilized. This is as true with the individual as with the race. Here runs the movement of human development. The grown man is growing the wrong way, if, as the years pass, more and more of his acts do not transcend the limits of his selfishness. Wider and closer interests bind him to his fellows. The development of his sympathies requires of him more frequently to give up his own pleasure on occasion for the welfare of others, as well as to learn how to find his pleasure in the effort to enrich or to elevate other lives. All the better if a John Howard or a Joseph Tuckerman or a Chas. L. Brace finds this effort to be a pleasure! It is surely not a selfish or a self-seeking pleasure. Selfishness does not explain it. It is a self-forgetting and non-egotistic pleasure which goes out of itself to seek the good of others. Moreover, it is not confined to great and exceptional lives. It is a pleasure which children often know. There is no need to call it "altruism," as if it were a foreign thing. Its beauty is that it is normal or natural.

See now what follows. The development of the race seems to follow the lines of the best development of its most normal men. There were never so many social forces working as there are to-day, to urge men and women everywhere to rise out of their narrowness, individualism and selfishness, and to secure common benefits for all—for children unborn, for unknown men on other continents. The family tie may seem in many cases to be weakened; tribal and local bounds are obliterated. But were there ever so many men in this world ready to offer their means or their lives for humanity? Were there ever so many, despite all lapses toward barbarism, who rally to the cry of justice and liberty? We have almost a new cry in the world, namely, the demand for the utmost equality of opportunity for every poor man's child. Multitudes are ready to respond to this most unselfish demand. Tell us in what golden age there were more golden deeds than in the past hundred years! But golden deeds are precisely the deeds which transcend selfishness. There is a long procession of men and women whose lives cannot possibly be translated into the terms of a selfish world. Whatever men's theory of Jesus may be, his name stands for a quality of life which lifts itself altogether above the range of even the most refined and enlightened self-seeking. We admire Jesus none the less, when we say that the willingness to do what he did for truth or for humanity is a not unusual test of character. We expect this of a certain order of men, and we find them among the humblest as well as among the notable.

We have suggested here at least a provisional an-

swer to the question, whether or not the world is growing better. It is an answer that we need in order to have courage and patience in the best ethical effort. It is an answer that accords with the dominating thought of a world in process of evolution. Our answer does not befit the thought of an animal or materialistic world, but a moral or spiritual world. The world is doubtless growing out of animalism and selfishness into the conditions of friendliness and unity. Let me instance a single illustration of this fact: At a recent meeting of the American Medical Association in Boston there was a display of the marvelous instruments for the use of the modern surgeon. Compare these admirable tools, created in the name of mercy, with the collection of instruments which the old city of Nuremburg still shows, invented on purpose to torture men. The intelligence, the ingenuity, the power, which men once used for the expression of their hate, their bigotry, their suspicion and jealousy, now run in increasing volume for the purpose of social and humane services. When before in human history could or would an Emperor, in the midst of a life and death struggle with another power, have written, as the Emperor of Japan wrote at the outset of the war with Russia, "The foe that strikes thee,—for thy country's sake—strike him with all thy might, but while thou strikest, forget not still to love him!" Here is a new note in the ethics of the world.

## CHAPTER VII

### A CRITICAL QUESTION

WE have so far seemed easily to distinguish two classes of moral actions. We recognize them in our own experience; we observe them generally among men. One class of actions is obviously self-regarding. The man's aim in these acts is to get and keep advantage and happiness. This end, sought in civilized society with enlightened intelligence by healthy and normal men, would certainly produce in the main virtuous conduct. It requires industry, temperance, obedience to the laws of the land, essential justice and truthfulness, mercy and humanity. We have seen, however, that this class of conduct is always rising into another and quite different range of moral actions. As an occasional spark upon the trolley shows the presence of an invisible force, so utterly generous and self-forgetful acts in the life of man gleam out of his habitual self-seeking, as if to testify to an unseen power—something other than selfishness—from which he can never escape. We have observed that these two classes of actions sometimes appear to be opposed to each other. The social act threatens to sacrifice the man's individual interests, or even his life. He must put aside his health as a pawn in the quest for truth; he must risk his fortune as the price of his integrity; he may be called to let his own children die for the sake of his country, or to starve, like



the Liverpool cotton weavers in the time of the Civil War, for the sake of freeing negro slaves.

We have so far supposed that in these supreme moments of human sympathy the man was simply lifted out of himself, as if by a common and mightier passion, which, being a normal man, he could not resist. Now the most wonderful fact in man's life is the play of his consciousness. A man cannot be satisfied merely to be lifted out of himself, though to the most noble deeds. He is bound as a man sooner or later to bring his action to the bar of his conscious intelligence and to ask whether he deliberately approves and chooses such action. Will he admit this kind of action as the principle of his life? Here is a new kind of question. It is the characteristic of the man who grows in his manhood, that he must meet this question. When an issue arises between the self-seeking course and the advantage or welfare of others, and when, at least to your short sight, these two courses seem to point contrary ways, which course will you take? Deliberating in the dark hours of night, uncertain of consequences, which risk do you, a merchant, perhaps, or a manufacturer, propose to take,—the risk of the utter loss of your property, or an injustice to humanity? Such crises come to ministers, to editors, to teachers, to men in political life, to men in all occupations. On one side seems to stand your own happiness; on the other side is the welfare of other men. The issue in such a case seems to be between your own present good, which you can see, and a future good, not your own, which you can only hope for, but may never know.

Let us face this question squarely. Let us not com-



plicate it, as men often have, by promising the man who lets its own good go some heavenly reward beyond this world. It is the nature of the moral conflicts which we are considering, that at the time of real issue no one can guarantee the promise of future reward. There would be no issue, or conflict, or risk, if shining angels stood by the man to insure him that the greatest gain for himself lay in the same path with the greatest good of humanity. The man may indeed have a deep faith that in the end his own good and the good of all men are one. But the times of moral conflict are those when this faith itself is obscured. What, I ask, will you do when you thus face those moral crises which come in even the noblest and most far-seeing lives—the Gethsemanes out of which men rise with renewed vigor, or else drop to sordidness and shame?

Watch carefully, now, the motion of your consciousness. Here is the animal nature, with its hoarse demand to get and to keep. And here, also within, is a social, and, as it were, universal, nature, bidding you give and lose and die, if need be, for the sake of the whole. The issue is not one of equal and opposite or alternating forces, one of which may be obeyed to-day and the other given trial to-morrow. One or the other is the supreme and victorious force to which the second is merely subservient. Neither is the question for this moment only, or for this single act; it is an everlasting question. If once only you approve and choose the voice which bids you risk or lose your life for justice or truth or the larger good of humanity, you must always make the same choice. Your choice establishes a law or principle.

Suppose, now, you venture to choose your own gain or advantage, as against the voice which bids you abandon your own pleasure. A very strange psychical event happens. You seem instantly to have done yourself a violence; you are less a man than you were before, as if power had gone out of you. It is as if the needle had lost something of its sensitiveness to the presence of the magnet. No man ever deliberately made this kind of choice without experiencing this warning sense of a moral loss. The man becomes straightway less a man.

Take now the other course; move actually against what seems your own advantage, face the ultimate risk, and again you discover the most remarkable psychical experience. Whereas before there was discord and conflict, now there is a satisfying sense of rest, satisfaction and harmony. The needle touches the magnet and feels the thrill of the omnipotent electrical life.

Moreover, in this typical act of choice, consciousness seems to show that the man in the growth of his manhood has now reached the lines of a new stage of experience. In fact, the more mature the man is, the more overwhelming is this higher force (we can call it nothing else) which bids him merge his life, as it were, in a species of universal life. In early childhood there is but one force urging him; as he grows, the new urgency shows itself more and more frequently, but without necessarily coming at once to his consciousness with any sense of conflict. His dawning manhood is marked by his sight of the rising issue and the choice.

Religion and ethics touch each other here. All the

history of religions is full of a dim perception that the life of the man reaches, or ought to reach, out of the egotistic and individual interests—good enough for the animal and the child—into the range of the things universal, worthy to match and nurture human intelligence. The more the man and the less the child, the less of the animal in the man, the more imperative and overpowering becomes this pressure to grow, to march, to climb, to aspire, to take all ventures, to forsake the egotistic order of life in the thought of a grander life to which the individual belongs.

Moreover, the class of actions, few though they may appear in proportion to all the rest, wherein men take deliberate and conscious risks of their own loss or destruction for the sake of some undefined larger good, are precisely the deeds by which the world gets on and grows more civilized. But the curious fact is that this form of gain, which constitutes the ethical wealth of the world, has been accumulated and must generally be so accumulated in spite of and not on account of the prevalent popular or social demand. The hero, the martyr, the reformer, the prophet, the discoverer, does not move as the world expects, but otherwise, and mostly alone and unaided. The great deeds that mark humanity proceed against the course of human prejudice. It is as if the world gave warning to its teachers and saviors not to speak or act except at their own risk. The great deeds and words always transcend the range of the average demand, and can hardly be accounted for on the ground of any popular pressure in their favor.

There is a principle of constancy in nature working

to the mere conservation of species; there is also a principle of variation whereby from time to time new developments or forms of life are made to appear. So in the realm of ethics, there is the conservatism of habitual usage, in obedience to which men find obvious and almost continual advantage for themselves as well as for others; but there is also a singular principle of moral variation through which individuals, facing the risk of unpopularity and social ostracism, make new departures, lifting the whole race at last to follow their steps. Perhaps every higher moral standard since the days of primeval barbarism has involved some such critical venture, proceeding at first in the teeth of popular disfavor, opposition, or peril. The stories of Moses, Isaiah, Socrates, and all the noble line of human benefactors, illustrate this point.

“Who, rowing hard against the stream,  
Saw distant Gates of Eden gleam  
And did not dream it was a dream.”

Our point here is that if such men as these saw at times distant Eden's gleam, they had to struggle in their hazard against the stream of all selfish advantage. The very condition of their seeing the gleam was that they were ready to risk everything and life itself.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE ULTIMATE MYSTERY

So far we are not explaining the facts, we are only stating them as simply, though unconventionally, as possible. Does anyone object that we rest too much weight upon the moral phenomena of picked and exceptional lives, whereas average human lives in the mass are less than normal? The answer is simple. We rightly judge of what Nature is after, not merely in watching the processes, but even more in discovering the fruits. A single ripe apple tells us more about the apple tree than many baskets of green apples; a single complete crystal than a bottle full of the muddy mixture out of which the crystals shaped themselves. So a mature and all-round man is worth more in our study of moral ends and values than a whole tribe of savages. But we have not studied the normal man only; we have not for a moment forgotten the facts of the childish stages through which man climbs to his full estate. Neither have we forgotten the average man on the street, as one sees what he is capable of doing at his loftiest moments.

It is time to ask a searching question. Why is it that there is a universal tendency, instinct or urgency among men, and even among children, commanding them to prefer a general good, even though distant, to a great and immediate personal good? We call this urgency the sense of *ought*, or conscience. It does not appeal merely to our emotions, it carries also

an intellectual judgment. It is most powerful in the most supreme moments of human life, and when every faculty is keyed up to concert pitch. It is not very well understood; it prevails under various names, as, for example, Right, the Truth, Duty. It even at times quite overrides the requirements and observances of current religions, as when Prometheus in the name of outraged justice defies august gods; or when brave souls have again and again set aside a popular faith and taken the chances of earthly excommunication and eternal perdition for the sake of humanity or truth. There have always been men whom no hope of reward or fear of punishment here or hereafter could persuade to bow the knee to a god whom they could not altogether respect. On the other hand this sense of an almighty *ought* has very often been identified with religion, as when the ancient Hebrew writer cries, "Though he slay me yet will I trust in him."

In all these cases there is a sense of good beyond and above every private or individual advantage,—a kind of good to which the individual must yield himself up. What does this sublime sense of a higher good mean? Grant that we can make a plausible explanation for nine-tenths or more of men's habitual, moral, and social actions on a selfish basis. We can assume for such action that this is a purely material world. But we challenge anyone to find explanation on any selfish basis, however refined, or in the thought of a merely material world, although with the most ample definition of the mystery of matter, for that sense of ought which commands us to do right "in scorn of consequence," to prefer the more or less remote good of others to our own selfish advantage, to bow before



ideal standards of Duty, Justice, Truth, to suffer every private loss at the behest of our love or our humanity.

It is indeed very suggestive and quite wonderful that in this world as it now is things should somehow work together, so that, on the whole, the individual good tallies in the main with the good of all. It is suggestive and marvelous that the social sense, even in animals, should be born in such a world; that animals should instinctively be moved to act and suffer for one another. But it is quite startling, when we find in the New Testament a selfish priest enunciating the law that "it is good for one man to die for the people." This law that works against selfishness is evidently in the heart of Nature.

Grant that, so far as man shares the animal life, his moral actions are governed by animal and material instincts. Nevertheless, as man, he thinks and deliberates concerning duties, he feels ideal motives, he chooses and approves at times what he is not able to do. At his best he puts aside food and drink, passion and appetites, he counts not his own life dear to him, while he lets this tide of the moral imperative bear him where it may. Here, as nowhere else, his life finds unexpected rest and content. This sense of *ought*, this feeling of moral values and differences, this range of ideal things, cannot be translated into material terms.

Put this in the most concrete form: Suppose two of us are on a raft, which can only support one person. In a material world the stronger one pushes the other into the water. It is no merely material world when the stronger man deliberately gives up his place on



the raft. Why should he do this? What makes the *ought* more holy than the eager natural desire to live.

Again, to put perhaps a more difficult situation, you have opportunity, doing as others do, to mulct the public by a gigantic manipulation of stocks. What prevents you, and ought to prevent you? We know no materialistic reason why you should not get what you can. Few will blame you for this. Most men, selfish themselves as yet, will praise your skill and envy your success. It is not a merely material world in which you put the bridle on your selfishness and remain poor. Why should a man remain poor, except that he is a man and not an animal? What is it that makes him a man, except that he possesses a nature which, growing out of selfishness and animalism, has entered into possession of thoughts, qualities, motives, which, as distinguished from all things material, must henceforth be called ideal and spiritual?

Men talk about the "greatest good of the greatest number." We ought to do what this bids, they admit. But why? Why should not the greatest number look out for their own good, while I look after mine? Here is no material law, but a law of another realm. This "ought" is engraved in our nature and in the history of man.

Here is the man who loves truth. He gives his whole life, like Mr. Huxley, to finding truth and uttering it. He would go to the stake rather than deny it. He would not take the hope of immortality as the price of believing a lie. I see no cause for this sentiment toward truth in a merely material or selfish world. It transcends any fair description of hedon-

ism. What is there permanent in truth, if the world itself is only phenomenal? Why should an animal take himself or truth so seriously as to die for it, in a world where, on the hypothesis, truth itself will presently have vanished? This deep sentiment for truth is not worthy of intelligence unless men's intelligence, in choosing to follow it, belongs to a realm of reality.

Here is the familiar Christ story of one who died for humanity. The beauty of it is that it is a typical story. It has ceased long ago to be rare for a man to die for his friends, or even for his enemies. What explains such kind of death? Why is it that you cannot buy or bribe or frighten a man from a course of conduct which he proposes himself as "right" or as "duty?" No popular pressure against him makes any difference to such a man. Yet the most intellectual and least fanatical of men have shared with simple minds what must be literally called an infinite sense of the value of duty. We may give no name for this mystery. It is as deep as life. Nothing is more real. No necessity is so imperative.

We have sought in this section to find the sources out of which the ethical life of man springs. We may state the outcome of our enquiry somewhat as follows: The great tap root of all human conduct doubtless goes down to the primeval animal desires for life, food, shelter, comfort, welfare, pleasures, happiness. These desires are inwrought into the constitution of man. A man's conduct is conditioned by his desires to do whatever will yield him various kinds of satisfactions. This is his nature.

Man cannot, however, live alone. He is essentially

a social being. The more human he becomes the more his desires are socialized. The society of the family, the village, the nation, and, finally, of all human kind, modifies his desires, controls his passions, and commands his conduct. His conduct becomes the resultant of the self-centered forces working along with all kinds of social motives. New desires spring into being, for companionship, for sympathy and aid, for co-operation in his enterprises, for praise, honors, reputation and fame, for the high joys of friendship, conversation, and love. Selfishness ceases to describe the conduct of the man whose satisfaction comes to consist in the welfare of his friends or fellows. Moral conduct, beginning in selfish or even animal desires, grows, in an atmosphere of warm social feeling, into what seems the opposite of selfishness—into generosity, devotion, disinterestedness, unselfishness. And yet these great social qualities are themselves the outgrowth of the common human nature. They, too, fulfill natural desires.

Man can actually see most of the objects of his desires. He feels the motives that mostly sway him,—hungers, passions, ambitions, enmities, loves. But life is always more than his horizon contains. In the higher ranges of his life it is the hardest of all to define the values that surround and sway his conduct. Things that he cannot see,—honor, loyalty, faith, hope,—forever urge him, more or less, according to the quality of his manhood. It is as if he were the offspring and participant of a larger life than the life of the existing human society. It is as if tides of unseen life moved him as the gravitation of distant bodies sways the earth. It is as if he were

made to do not merely his personal will, but a universal will.

In other words, there is more in human conduct than anyone can explain by reference merely to the history either of the individual or the race. There is also a direction in which conduct tends to move. The power that guides its movement, like the power that guides the stars, is beyond the eye of man. What constitutes life? What directs the course of evolution? What makes every page of new history unlike any page that ever before was unrolled? What brings forth new species of creatures? What educes genius, art, poetry, out of the dull ranks of the toilers? What inspires new laws and codes, new and higher standards of action, fresh outbursts of moral endeavor? What is the secret of the age-long hope of all the prophets that justice shall some day rule the earth? The deepest source of ethics is in the ultimate nature of life itself, the universal power, of which all visible things are merely the symbols. The power that made the atoms, that made the crystals, that made conscious forms of life, the same power made the moral nature of man, himself the child of the universe.

I am bound to suggest the fact of the ultimate mystery of the causing Life as underlying all the phenomena of ethical growth. The question of origins meets us in every direction where we venture to think. Where does life begin? Where do we come from? Whence arise matter and motion? We may or may not take the answer of religion to these questions. Some hesitate to make any answer. Some think that it is enough to accept the facts which constitute life without asking further questions. While I believe that

these questions of the origins of life, and especially of the moral life, are irrepressible, and that they tend to a religious philosophy of the universe, the course of the thought in the following chapters in no way depends upon any set of philosophical or religious prepossessions. Our thought will be found, I trust, to be harmonious from the point of view of a civilized religion. But for the purposes of our study we do not need to presuppose any religion. Grant, for the time, that the ethical life is simply the effort of man to order his conduct toward his fellows in such a way as to adjust himself to the complex social conditions of the family, the neighborhood, the village or the city, the state, the nation, and the brotherhood of mankind, or in other words, "to live and to let live," and to help others to live. The question now before us touches the principles by the use of which we may attain the maximum of personal and social satisfaction. Can we discover a clear guiding rule of ethical action and growth?

## PART II

### THE DOCTRINE OF GOOD WILL

#### CHAPTER I

##### WHAT HAPPINESS IS

IN the foregoing pages we have taken account of the primitive self-regarding instinct in every creature to feed and please itself, and to satisfy its desires. We have found no fault as yet with this selfish instinct, good in itself and needful to life. We have taken account of the social sense or sympathy, present more or less in all intelligent creatures, constituting a higher form of their enjoyment, contributing to their individual power for acquisition and defense, broadening the field of the individual consciousness and establishing a larger and more precious self. We have discovered a species of harmony between this social sense and the original selfishness. The most enlightened selfishness is bound to be socially active.

We have also found a force, working in all men at their highest moments, and specially in the noblest men, which seems to command and almost compel their minds in the interests of what we call duties or ideals. We are not claiming that there is anything at all mystical or supernatural in this kind of ethical force, though its existence has doubtless given color to a supernatural theory to account for it. It is no more or less supernatural or mystical than love or



thought or the sense of beauty. Its characteristic is that the man who yields to it may be and often is entirely in the dark as to the consequences of his act. He trusts in an unseen or remote good: he puts all his chances of personal good at risk for it: he accepts pain or obloquy. His intelligence or judgment also own it as master and never quarrel with it, when once its mandate is plain. This inward force, binding a man in the way of duty, is as evident and as recognizable a form of motion in a man as any force that exists. It is not for a moment to be confused either with selfishness or with the social sense, at least in any ordinary use of these words. It is inter-related, however, with both of these profound factors of life. At its best, it is perfectly harmonious with them, as it is with the intellect, and not antagonistic to them. We propose now to show what the law of this harmony is, and incidentally to find a name for the most human and personal of all the forces that play together to make man's life.

We shall proceed in the straightest way to our end if we make a study of the facts, the contents, and the nature of happiness. Let us briefly define happiness as satisfaction, and this in the largest possible form. As the body is happy and well whose every nerve is fed and filled with bounding life, so the happy man is he the demands of whose whole nature are met and sustained. Happiness in this sense is dependent upon the various values which enter into the man's nature. He may be well fed on his bodily side, and he may be hungry for affection and sympathy, or for the visions of art and beauty, or for knowledge and wisdom, or for the approval of his conscience, for the conscious-



ness of inward integrity, or for the great thoughts, and infinite trust, hope, love, that make religion.

We have observed that values in the terms of satisfaction evidently rise in a hierarchy. The man may be happy, though half starved in body, in whose soul thorough affectional or ethical or spiritual satisfaction prevails. To know the secret of happiness we must know the dominating value in man's nature, and we mean here, not in exceptional men, but in the normal man. What sort of satisfaction is there, which, if it comes to a man, will go furthest to meet all his demands, will nourish him most, will make him strongest and happiest and most completely a man? Everyone needs to know the answer to this question.

We are at once forced to grapple with the question of the relation of happiness to duty. Is human happiness somehow incongruous with duty? Many of the noblest teachers of ethical theory have here admitted a grievous misapprehension, if not a fatal contradiction. Yes, they have confessed, happiness and righteousness are apt to travel on different, if not opposite, roads. Does not the instinct of happiness, they ask, bid a man get and enjoy all that he can? Does not conscience lift up her voice to protest against getting and enjoying? Does it not tear a man away from his pleasures, as in the old story of William of Orange, to go, for the sake of posterity, on her stern and costly quest for some unknown good, which the man who obeys must die without seeing? Does not duty preach to men a forbidding and terrible doctrine of sacrifice? And is not sacrifice eternally at war with happiness?

Others quite mystify us by telling us that happiness

is not for this world, but is a future reward for renouncing happiness here. Religion, and especially Christianity, has often taught this solemn law of renunciation. It gives up this world as, on the whole, a sorrowful and miserable world. This life, they say, is a failure as regards happiness. Thus Paulsen, a distinguished German writer on Ethics, makes sorrow the characteristic note of Christianity. Men have interpreted the Christ life into terms of disappointment and tragedy.

Or, again, if we call the universe a school, this room of the school of life, where we are now, it is said, is a place of drudgery and discipline. We must do the things here that we dislike. But those who say this still make happiness the end of human existence: they only put it off into an indefinite realm. They set up a dualism, in this life, between virtue and happiness. They mark a contrast between this life which we know and another life which we can only hope to know. They make virtue and duty taskmasters here. The conditions, the prevailing emphasis, and the significance of this life, are supposed to be different from all that constitutes life hereafter. Real life, then, is not here and now. Life is somewhere else. Surely this is a strange teaching in the name of religion! Is not this God's world, or, at least, a rational world? If it is not, and if happiness and real life are to be found only elsewhere, how sure may we be that there is any true life? Has God happiness Himself, and has He created a race of beings to dwell in a world where happiness does not extend? No wonder that men doubt a religion which tells them of such a God as this? What sort of a God is it, who, being happy

Himself, does not seek to flood His creation with happiness?

Again, some say that there is a quality higher than happiness. This is "blessedness." Man was not, perhaps, intended to be happy, but he may do better: he may be blessed. Thus, the poor, the meek, the sorrowful, the mourners, the persecuted and oppressed may be "blessed," while they cannot be happy. Is not this merely playing with words? Blessed is only a more quaint form in which to say *happy*. Is God blessed? Then He is happy. Are the pure in heart blessed? Then they too are happy. Is it more blessed to give than to receive? If this is true, it is happier to give than to get. We find no help in our enquiry by saying "blessed" rather than happy. The unusual word indeed causes perplexity, as if we were speaking of some supernatural or non-natural kind of happiness. The only useful suggestion which we can take with us from the survey of the various names for happiness is that which we have already granted, namely, that there are doubtless different forms, grades, and qualities of happiness. The happiness of a mature man is higher and richer than the happiness of a child. Let us, however, keep the old human word happiness for even a Christ.

The overwhelming presumption remains, all dogmatic prejudices to the contrary, that happiness or well-being, so far from being contrary to virtue or duty, must be one with it. If this is a good world and not a very bad world, or a hell, ethics must be the conditions which guard and secure human well-being, that is, happiness. Conscience must be regarded as a life force and not destructive of life. If a

good God exists at all, happiness must be as truly important for His creatures as it is for God Himself. A happy God and an unhappy world are a contradiction. This would be a failure of God's happiness. Or, again, if there is a law of evolution, it must work toward the evolution of happiness, or evolution would be a failure. Aside from any theory of religion, so far as the pressure of life is toward nicer and more complete adjustments between a creature and its environment, happiness or well-being is the result of such an adjustment. The better the adjustment, both inward and outward, in material things and toward human relations, the greater is the happiness or satisfaction. This law governs in ethics as elsewhere.

We shall speak later of sacrifice. Whatever it means, it cannot mean the loss of real happiness. We may even discover that it is a name for a certain effort toward a greater happiness. If now this is a reasonable world, not to say a divine world, those must always have been on the right track of thought who have contended that ethics and happiness are not opposed, but harmonious with each other.

We have said that happiness is some form of satisfaction. Life brings all manner of appetites, desires, and urgencies. We are happy in so far as these hungers and urgencies are met and fulfilled. A man is perfectly happy, for the moment, when every desire in him is satisfied.

Watch life carefully now and note wherein its fullness consists. It is rhythmical like everything in Nature. It consists in income and outgo, in inspiration and expiration. It is never in getting only, but it is also in expression. There must always be a free circu-

lation of the life currents inward and outward, or else the life stagnates and perishes.

Where is the emphasis or *ictus* of this vital rhythm? The secret of happiness is in knowing this. A detached saying of Jesus, quoted by Paul, often thought to be merely a bit of harmless sentiment, or an impracticable ideal, proves to be the law, both of ethics and happiness, binding them as forever inseparable. The word is, it is more blessed,—or more exactly—it is happier, to give than to receive. The discovery of this simple law of the vital emphasis is as remarkable for the science of life as the statement of Kepler's laws or Newton's splendid generalization from the sight of the falling apple is essential to science. The beauty of the moral axiom is that it is founded in secure biological principles, and finds illustration and parable throughout the whole course of man's life.

It is important, for example, that you fill every air cell of your lungs with oxygen. How will you do this? Will you first draw in all the air you can? No. You will not thus fill every tiniest cell in the deepest corners of your lungs. The vital emphasis is the opposite way. Exhale every atom of air in your lungs, and thus you shall be filled. Or better, spend energy, run, climb, shout, and the more you give out, the more abundantly you shall receive. So likewise with regard to food and drink. Do not take pains in advance to get and to eat, but be hungry first, be exhausted, spend tissue and open free all the doors of the bodily circulation, and thus when the time comes to eat, you shall be fed and every tired muscle shall have renovation. If you must get in order to give, it is even more important that you must give in order to get. This is the law of the bodily

health, in preserving which you cannot safely seek to get more than you give. Toward the other way lies dyspepsia, obesity, and death.

Moreover, there is an appropriate satisfaction which belongs in the outgoing as well as the incoming tide of the rhythmical life. Do you think that the child or the animal only enjoys what he eats and drinks, the gratification of the self-seeking appetites? Then you have never observed children or animals. Their joy and life, more even than in taking rest or food, consist in ceaseless activities. The butterfly enjoys his random flight. The birds enjoy pouring out their song. The children in their sports almost forget that they have hunger. Every living creature enjoys the expression of his life, just as if the universal life were uttering itself in him. This is a fact which the pessimists never seem to take into account.

This is the more true as the creatures rise in the scale of intelligence. The bees are never toiling like slaves; they doubtless are glad in the building of their wonderful hives, the beavers likewise in their dams and houses; the creatures which make nests for themselves, sing and play as they work. All these find satisfaction, that is happiness, not merely in getting and holding, but even more obviously in doing, in constructing, in expending energy, in pouring out life. Anyone may observe that the dominating note in nature, wherever you listen, is joy. Wherever life culminates or comes to a height it tends to express itself in song or beauty. The emphasis is thus in the outgo.

We doubtless often misunderstand the emotions of animals. On the animal level there is even in battle a joy that dulls pain, quite forgetful of hurts and



wounds, regardless of death. It is in the exercise and outgo of power and skill. It is in the excitement of costly victory. There is nothing to be deprecated in this fierce struggle of animal force, at least so long as it goes on upon the animal level.

Even the weaker creatures, I suspect, are not so wretched as we may suppose in being hunted and chased. Have you never seen the squirrel from his safe vantage ground play with the stronger cat or dog, and, being master of the situation, take his daring ventures close to the danger line? Why may not the hare likewise enjoy the exercise of his speed, as well as the fox his cunning? The weaker creature often has the glad reaction of success. There is mirth in nature and rush of tumultuous life, and when the end comes, as a rule, there is short shrift and little pain. For pain is mostly the cost of living and not of dying.

Sophisticated minds get away from nature and become mere critics and spectators instead of participants of life. Over-sensitive people, somewhat invalid and morbid, are forever wasting their sympathies upon the sufferings of the world. They mass all the volume of pain, they deal by wholesale in the tragedies of existence, they brood over the details of the stories of evil. Why do they not mass also the rush and joy of living things? Why do they not estimate the multitude of existences, both animal and human, which, if they do not indeed reach to high levels of satisfaction, yet doubtless win a clear net gain out of the struggle which constitutes life? Why do they insist upon measuring the success of any creature by its income, as if income were all that makes life worth living?

The law is that life or satisfaction is more in the



outgo than in the income, in doing than in getting, in expression of life power than in values received. If anyone still doubts this on the lower plane, let us now rise to the higher forms of life. It is doubtless good to receive, but at every point it is a higher and deeper satisfaction to give than to receive. Gratifying as it is to receive information and knowledge, it is higher joy to teach than it is to be taught. It is an enjoyment to see pictures, but even indifferent painters get a greater enjoyment in painting for themselves than in seeing other men's paintings. It is a pleasure to hear music; it must be a greater pleasure to be able to pour out one's whole soul in music. To exercise skill, to make beautiful things, to construct poems, cathedrals, cities, nations,—food and drink and money and personal pleasures have all paled before the mighty satisfactions which masterful men have found in expressing the divine power, beauty and art, inspired in them. The vulgar epicure with his dinners and his baths is not to be set in comparison with Michel Angelo, Beethoven, or Bismarck. The one at the most has the tiny flow of the animal life; the other turns on, and uses, and pours through himself the mighty flow of the divine and universal intelligence. What else is it in him?

Does someone now raise the skeptical question, whether man in his highest endeavors of skill and art is not working in order to get pay, honors, and fame, or some sort of ultimate compensation? I think better than this even of the dog that dives after sticks to bring to its master. The dog delights in being used, in running, and swimming. He needs to know only his master's approbation, a word, a gesture, a smile of

comradeship. So, much more, of man. He does not, at his best, bid for wages; he asks the least possible encouragement in pay or honors; he loves to do things, to achieve, to accomplish, to struggle in order to reach his ideals. He wants to be used; he wants "the wages of going on and not to die," or be useless. What real man would not choose to be "the power behind the throne," unknown and unthanked, than merely to sit on the throne!

We see this to be true as soon as anyone misplaces the emphasis of life and begins to claim his compensation,—“What shall I get?” Now and henceforth satisfaction for that man ceases; egotism, vanity and arrogance lift up their preposterous appraisement; skill, art, life wane, the moment a man turns his genius from its natural outflow in expression, in construction, in accomplishment, and employs it to get and keep pay for himself.

There is a pathetic story of the two aspirants for the honor of the invention of the sulphuric ether. Both of these men broke the law of their genius, entered into vexatious and wearisome struggles in litigation, to get pay and reward for themselves, and then became barren and unfruitful. This is not the grown man's way. Elisha Gray, for example, and Amos E. Dolbear, two of the pioneers and inventors of the telephone, leaving the great prize in the hands of a rival, wasting no tears over their rival's success, simply go on to produce and invent and to pour out all the life in them in bright flashes of thought, happy and fruitful to the end, to use Marcus Aurelius' parable, “as a vine bears its grapes in its season.” And this is life, satisfaction and happiness.

## CHAPTER II

### THE HIGHEST KIND OF HAPPINESS

WE have learned that physical force is transferable from one mode of motion into another and more refined form, from the force of the waterfall into electrical heat and light. Something like this is true with the force of human life. It is forever translatable, as it finds expression in human activity, into higher and more subtle, but even more effective and satisfying modes of motion. It is a crude form of pleasure to fight and get justice; it is greater pleasure and far more satisfying to do justice. It is a crude pleasure to speak your mind bluntly. It is a greater pleasure, as it is the exercise of a higher intelligence, to speak the same truth with helpful tact. Not merely to feel and appreciate righteous acts and to seek to get them done by others, but to do righteousness oneself is a great reward, as it is also one of the highest forms of activity. To see a man at the height of his righteous activity is as if one saw the gleam of a divine life pouring through the personality of the man, as the electrical force pours over a live wire. The quest for truth in itself is a joyous activity. The joy consists in outgo even more than in actual income. As Lessing said, if he must choose between truth held fast in his hand and the search for truth, he would choose not to possess it. For truth held fast is finite only, and the joy of it is brief, but the going after truth is an infinite quest, and its joy is perennial.

What now is the most exalted and real form of life and activity? It is evidently good will, the social life of humanity. In its highest terms of light and heat we call it love. In the pure outflow of good will there is the most natural and the most gladsome activity. Pleasing as it is to receive the marks of good will, the esteem, praise, and love of men, this pleasure soon palls. Whoever tries mainly to get love, fails, breaking the universal law of the circulation of life. It is just the opposite with the giving or expressing of good will. This kind of pleasure never ceases. Whoever seeks to utter all the humanity in him, whoever lets his life go out into friendly thoughts, words and deeds, does not merely get love in return; he does better, he finds constant life and satisfaction in the outflow of his good will. It is the nature of life that it must be expressed and kept in circulation. The highest happiness thus consists in the expression of the highest form of life, namely, good will.

See how all other forms of life and expression lead up to and culminate in this mode of life. As the man grows to be more than the animal, each new and more intellectual or spiritual form of life craves acknowledgment and demands to be used and satisfied, or, failing of satisfaction, sets up disturbance, disease and unhappiness. No man is truly a man whose humanity, that is, whose good will, fails to have free use and flow in his life. Here is the short and simple explanation of a large part of the unhappiness of the world. For good will is the mode of adjustment of a man to his human environment; unhappiness is the symptom of maladjustment.

Not only this, but the higher forms of life override

and subordinate and command to their purpose the lower and more animal forms. Thus the life of art, skill, and intelligence overrides the physical appetites and uses them. Hunger and thirst, rest, sleep, ease and comfort are made to wait upon and to obey the necessities of the mind, which rules them all. So, even more marvelously, the life power of good will and love, whenever brought into play, bends to its purposes everything beneath it. As the master contractor expresses his mind, his courage, his patience in the face of the rock, and bores his way under the earth and compasses quicksands and torrents, and delights in bringing all the powers of nature into obedience, so the man of good will imprints his humanity in the face of obstacles and opposition. He turns disappointments, losses, sorrows, to his purpose, and becomes more irresistible in the strength of his goodness. Yes, notably even sorrow and pain enter into his deep satisfaction in exercising the highest of all the powers of the universe. Paul expressed it, when he said, "as sorrowful yet always rejoicing," and also, "I rejoice even in my infirmities." In fact, no man knows the richness of love who has not at times found out what it is to put out heavy expense for his love's sake. No one knows what patriotism is, who has not learned in some shape of cost to understand that it is sweet to die for one's country. I mean literally that this divine life power of good will can never be satisfied unless it is poured out, and accomplishes something; and when it meets with resistance, it gathers itself in a new joy of forceful endeavor,—a higher form of the earlier and crude "joy of battle"—and delights to give all that it possesses. This is its nature, and thus it has flow and

circulation as if the infinite ocean of life were behind it.

We may venture here upon what may seem to some readers to be pure speculation. But it is forced upon our minds. It is absolutely in harmony with all that we have heretofore said. It may prove eventually helpful and even necessary to the fulfillment of our thought. All manner of facts and considerations, moving together, lead us to be sure that we are on the track of a universal law of happiness, good wherever mind is. As we may reckon the motion of a star by knowing a few points in its orbit, as we may study in our laboratory how matter behaves in the fires of the sun, so, likewise, as we discover what happiness is, both in little children and also in the noblest men, we can hope to reach the law of the happiness of the universe toward which all forces urge.

They used to say that God's happiness was in getting and receiving, just as the ignorant and selfish are in the habit of rating their own pleasures. God, they thought, liked to see men kneeling before Him and offering gifts, as if He were an ancient Pharaoh. But the happiness of God (as surely as God exists) we now see, must be like the best happiness of all His creatures. With Him as with us it is better and happier to give than to get. It is higher and more intellectual; it is the exercise of richer power; God's gladness then, we believe, is in uttering Himself in His world, in showing forth His thought, His beauty, His truth, and, above all, His good will. The life of God, as it seems, is everywhere displayed in color, in manifold form, in jewels and flowers, in far-reaching laws of motion and matter, in long series of ever-



climbing waves of development, in the history of a make ready for "the manifestation of the sons of God." What else can we think of the story of the universe? And here at last is God's life in the souls of the men of good will, urging as ever, and pressing forward and lifting humanity toward the delectable mountains. To show forth good will or love, of which all human love is the sample and type, is the joy of God. What other reasonable idea can we get of the meaning of the universe!

Moreover, we are beginning to catch the note that the universal good will, which makes man and expresses itself in men, must contain all the vital human elements. It has contentment and it has mirth and it has sorrow too, or suffering-with, or it would be less divine in God than in man. Yes, we may believe that God expresses His own sorrow in all real sorrow of ours. And this sorrow, so far from being an imperfection, is part of His life, even as our love carries this same sacred thread and is not less but greater therefor.

Here, then—so runs our conception—is the divine life, like a vast reservoir to which all lives trace their source as the planets belong to the sun. To feel God's power in our bodies, tingling at our finger tips, is happiness. It is not our power; we are the trustees to use it. The law is to pour it out and express it. To feel God's thought in our minds, surcharging them, is likewise happiness. It comes from Him; it is not ours, the law of thought is to pour it out; so it keeps its flow. To feel the stirrings of the moral sense in our souls, to yield to the new motion, to express and do justice, this, too, is a sharing of the happiness of God. Our happiness is like His. To feel



the flow of good will in us, to do the deeds of good will, this is to be happy like God; for the life of the child derives from the life of the father. Our natures are like His nature. In short the universe is one in Him and in us.

Is it not now clear that duty and happiness are not alien but of one substance? Is it not clear, too, that happiness at its best is not selfishness at all? Selfishness is to be self-centered. The emphasis and essence of happiness consist in going out of the self. The happiness of the most ideal being that we can conceive consists in good will. Neither can it be wrong to love happiness if God loves it; and since its ultimate end is the welfare of His universe, the single point of caution is that we should desire the highest happiness.

Does it not also look as if men had confused their minds in their teaching about sacrifice? Sacrifice is not the accurate term to employ. What they mean by sacrifice is the joyous outgoing of life. This law of sacrifice is the fundamental or universal law of expression. It is no sacrifice when the boy goes hungry for the sake of his sports, when the Arctic explorer goes with zest to the frozen wastes, when the mother suffers or even dies for her child, when the patriot risks all for his country, William Lloyd Garrison for the cause of the slave, Dr. Lazear bitten by the fatal mosquito, with his free choice, for the sake of the new medical science, ten thousand humble lovers of liberty or justice or truth for the sake of the common humanity. This is not sacrifice, but the outpouring and willing movement of life. To do anything else or less, for such men would be actual unhappiness and loss.

## CHAPTER III

### THE IDEAL MAN AND THE IDEAL SOCIETY

LET us now present to our minds the picture of the happiest possible man. He will also be, by the nature of our definition of happiness, the most perfect ethical man. He will be the man in whom life, through all its normal channels of inflow and outgo, has the most ample circulation and expression. There will be most of all that which constitutes "the divine life" in this man, whom, using the language of religion, we may well call "a son of God." Moreover, the ideal is equally plain if we use no language of religion. In other words, the best of the whole universe is in this man's life, as the material of the universe is in his body.

See, first, what the modern educated man has to use of the power of the universe. He supplements his own slight physical strength with the use of practically unlimited forces. He draws on all the resources of the world, on all its fruits and products. He avails himself of a species of omnipresence and goes wherever swift ships or cars may carry him. He multiplies the ordinary sight of his eyes by skillful instruments, herein merely copying the processes of nature, and enables himself to watch the works of the possible inhabitants of the planet Mars, and to study the motions of distant suns. He lengthens the carrying power of the human voice and talks with his friends

thousands of miles away. He flashes his messages across the seas and around the globe.

His mind also is the inheritor of the wisdom, the art and the literature of all ages. Vast libraries are at his command. Investigators and students toil for and with him, and he shares their results. His intelligence is exercised with magnificent questions. What is the scheme, the thought, and the purpose of the universe? What are its secrets? More and more it is given to the individual mind to copy and enter into the unfolding wonders of creation. More than this, the mind of man reshapes and utters and answers back with admiration in manifold forms and new combinations, what the universe shows him. God paints. His thought in colors; man also paints. God builds and man builds too. God's music is in the ocean and the forests. Man also makes his music, following the marvelous laws of harmony. What man yet begins to express all sides of the universal nature which he inherits? What man who fairly uses his intellect ever comes within sight, to the last days of his life, of any limit to the visions of possibilities of the things in which mind forever bursts forth into expression! Everywhere, indeed, mystery encircles him, but it is no longer so much a mystery of darkness as of light.

In one sense there is no perfect man. No one ever attains. New possibilities of larger life and utterance continually arise. In another and limited sense that man is perfect, and that mind is perfect, which grows to the uttermost, and is always pouring itself out, like the poet Sophocles, like Goethe, like James Martineau. The highest quality of man has a species of infinity or Godlikeness. Where does this Godlikeness fail to

reach? He has a species of omniscience. Into what corner of the world does his mind not seek to go! He uses omnipotence for his grand ends. Little as he is, his greatness is all the more marvelous. For he certainly reveals the nature of the universal life. Why, then, should not man draw on the infinite good will of the universe as he draws on and uses every other power? This is what he is actually learning to do.

Wordsworth gives us a famous picture of the man whom we are imagining in his "Happy Warrior." Moral, affectional, reverential, spiritual activities overflow in every direction, and go forth on their beneficent mission. They grow without ceasing; they are never denied even fuller utterance. Who is the man who possesses the largest good will and loves most? All human experience shows that he is the happiest man. That he bears a law of cost and has to suffer on occasion for the sake of truth or humanity does not lessen, but actually in the end deepens his satisfaction. Thus, however we begin, we find the same hierarchy of values ascending to love, the one innermost prize of life. The man of perfect good will uses everything,—power, beauty, art, intellect, to do the works of good will. He holds the key to understand all things. For through all things the eternal good will is made manifest.

The true proportions of life now become apparent. In a large sense all things are good; all appetites, tastes and instincts, both physical and sensuous, have their use. There is nothing vile. How much and how far shall they be indulged? Just so much and so far as they subserve, nurture and enrich the higher modes

of the man's life. Shall he eat and drink to satiety? No. For this means an impoverishment and withdrawal of the power of his mind; while temperance and self-control mean larger and higher life. Which shall he choose; wisdom or money? But wisdom itself is the condition of the winning and the enjoying of wealth. Which shall he prefer, learning or love? But learning itself, like wealth, ceases to have any significance when you leave love out of the world. Better know less, and yet express what you know in good will, than to know more and let your humanity suffer a loss, or never to use for love's sake what you know. The law is plain; it has ten thousand illustrations. We appeal to common experience. When are you happiest? In the hours of your highest good will. Who are the most contented of men? Those whose good will flows most freely.

So much for the individual ideal of the happiest man, who will be also the man of good will, that is, the most ethical man. For the man of constant good will desires nothing but the social good. Let us now seek the highest social ideal. What is, indeed, the greatest good of the greatest number? What is the happiest imaginable world, that kingdom of God, which men have dreamed of for thousands of years? We look the wrong way, if we think it is a world crowded with well-fed populations, living in palaces, sailing steam yachts, clothed in purple and silk. These things at best are only emblems, the externals of happiness. There might be plenty to eat for everyone, and yet there might be little sympathy or humanity. There are already communities where plenty exists among men of the narrowest sympathies. The out-

ward or material things, as fast as they appear, create a demand for certain moral and spiritual forms of well-being to match them.

The happy world in truth is like the happy individual. It follows the same lines of natural development. Its "pattern is in heaven," that is, it depends upon an ideal conception. It is, however, a thoroughly natural and practical ideal, proceeding out of experience. Its pattern is suggested by the plainest facts which we may observe touching success in this present world—success in individuals, success in families and homes, the highest success yet reached in the most favored civilized communities, the common success, already visible, toward the completion of which the democratic theory of the nation is the highest endeavor. The happy or perfect society in all its various patterns, both actual and ideal, is shown to be that in which its people are learning to live together with the utmost and heartiest expression of the life of good will to each and all. This ideal covers health, power, art, skill, intelligence, and humanity. The happy people do not live merely to get, but they live to utter and to accomplish their visions of social well-being. To feel the circulation of the common life, to sympathize in common endeavors, to bear a hand in the realization of grand common ends, is happiness. To say this, means that men are already learning to be people of good will.

Here is to be discovered the real poverty of the present world. It is a sign of new life and of a growing sensitiveness that we suffer from the ills of the world. We suffer sympathetically, as men never suffered before. The trouble is not merely that a few



are rich and the rest live only on a pittance. This fact is the symbol of the worst poverty. Our poverty consists in the fact that only the few begin to develop, or use, or utter the normal richness of human life. President Eliot has spoken eloquently of the joy of honorable toil. He is quite right in his contention that to the normal and healthy being, under right conditions, work naturally passes over and up into the terms of gladness, of rhythm and song, of beauty and art. The rudest laborers will often sing at their work. Show a man that his service is effective, that he hits the mark, stir him to see that while he is getting on himself he is also making his neighbors richer and happier, and he naturally loves to accomplish such work. Mankind never before now had such resources for enabling the worker to take pleasure in his work. Mankind never needed less than it needs now to require the work of slaves, the bare monotony of machines, or the drudgery of hirelings. Civilization means nothing less than a social order in which everyone may have the satisfaction of expressing his humanity, that is, his good will, in every detail of his work.

The mischief is that we still set men in multitudes to servile conditions. The many toil, but only the few understand the significance of their toil, or how to do that which gives them joy in the doing. Everywhere, there are tastes and instincts in men and women, intellectual, artistic, scientific, social, for which we have not learned to find either education or opportunity. Or, again, these instincts find as yet only gross and sensual expression. Everywhere men, though freed from nominal slavery, yet work drudgingly, counting



their hours in the spirit of slaves, unable to use their leisure as free men. There is no lawful work done under the sun through which the spirit of good will, once admitted, may not utter itself and find its wholesome and transforming joy. But the few only know this. The modern world, with its dead hand of vested rights, holding fast under private or corporate forms of monopoly the best lands in Christendom, has not found out yet how to give its laborers hope and gladness.

Even the well-to-do people hardly know how well off they are. The well-paid salesman, and the merchant in his gilded office, think that they are only buying and selling for themselves. Men are poor in happiness when they work, however successfully, without any good will. No church has yet converted men to believe that all human labor is the social service of humanity. The church hardly knows its own lesson, that wrong conduct is conduct in which no good will utters itself. Man will do the same work with a new heart, yes, and a new conscience, when to his skill and intelligence he adds, in every office and shop, the power of his humanity. The rigorous, beneficent law of the world is that a man can never be happy while he only seeks to be rich. His happiness lies in his good will to make the whole world rich. Since few know this as yet, few therefore are happy. Few of the prosperous know it, and the prosperous therefore are often the pessimists. Few of the social reformers yet quite understand the end and aim of all reforms. Is it a rich and prosperous world? Yes, but incidentally only. It is a world of opportunity for every child in it to grow and to utter the highest life which is in

him; it is a world whose men and women are bound together in the fast ties of an ample humanity. It is a world whose social, political, industrial and economic institutions and systems are founded no longer in selfishness, but in a universal good will. Be sure that social progress is not worth working for which is satisfied with the most just schemes of acquisition or distribution, and does not move toward the education of a noble and generous order of manhood. In fact, the just schemes are processes in such education.

It hardly needs to be said that the individual and the social welfare, so far from being antagonistic, must be one and the same. The end and aim of all social endeavor is at last the welfare of the individual; for there can be no social happiness apart from the happiness of all the individuals who make up human society. On the other hand, the law of the world is that no individual can ever attain his growth as a man, enjoy true happiness, or even exercise thorough righteousness, and be in ethical good health, whose highest joy is not found to be in good will. In short, in order to have life, you must share and give life. This is the welfare at once of each one and of all.

Finally, it may be objected that all this is too much like a dream for an age in which armed camps, big guns and battleships are the distinguishing marks of its civilization. But it is no mere dream that society is still evolving into different and better conditions. This is the actual trend of a secular movement to be traced through hundreds of years. It is already a familiar thought that mankind, while maintaining the trappings and traditions of warfare, has substantially passed from a military period into a vast and growing

industrial organization of the world. The average expectations of men are concerned with industry and commerce and not with war. The economic necessities of mankind are drawing all nations into closer ties, and with fuller international acquaintance, tend to make war intolerable. In fact, the favorite justification of armaments—a pitifully mistaken one—is that a nation must have protection in its industrial superiority. At any rate, the fact remains, that we live in an industrial age. This is specially true of the United States, which has never been so safe from any aggression on the part of other peoples as in those decades when its army and navy were smallest.

The next natural development of industrial civilization must be in line with the marvelous political growth of democratic ideas. Democracy is essentially a co-operation of mankind in their efforts after happiness and welfare. The keynote of democracy is good will. Industry and commerce are as surely bound to be organized with reference to the welfare of all who work together, as political institutions are bound to develop in the direction of mutuality of interests and the recognition of the manhood of the individual. The push of all the social forces goes this way.

In each period of human development it easily becomes the fashion to do the things, and take up the habitudes, which belong to the type of life which governs society at that time. It is easy and natural to be a soldier when military service is expected of all the men of one's own group or nation. It is equally easy and natural to be a railroad engineer, or a factory worker, or a miner, or a telegraph operator, when all

one's fellows are so engaged. It is easy for merely industrial workers to measure all values in the terms of dollars. It will be equally easy and natural in a period of more mature and developed humanity to think of social and human values and to govern the conduct of really democratic politics and industry by the law of good will. Good will is only a higher form of Nature. Men will take satisfaction in obeying its rule.

## CHAPTER IV

### WHY WE SAY "GOOD WILL"

WE have used the words "good will" so often that the question may have already arisen as to just what we mean by it, and why we prefer it to "love," the more common term in an ideal system of ethics.

In the first place, the word *love* stands usually for a sentiment or mode of feeling. We cannot command it. The other person either wins our love, or if he does not make us love him, if he is not to us lovable, no amount of persuasion, no compulsion, no sense of duty, no force of conscience, can bring the feeling of love. We can no more love to order than we can be hungry or thirsty to order. This is right too. Love is precious, and, like all precious things, it depends upon conditions of cost. It goes out to what seems worthy or lovable, and not to unworthy and hateful things. In this sense we cannot love enemies, supposing that we are unfortunate enough to have them. We cannot love people whom we have not seen, except by a flight of imagination, or by the fiction of idealizing them. We cannot love, each and severally, all the fifteen hundred millions of people on the earth.

Again, love is a good and necessary word to keep for our intimate use, to express our natural feeling toward our near and true friends, our parents and our children, our heroes and saints. It implies a certain passion toward them, it involves a peculiar kind of pleasure in their presence or their conversa-

tion, or in the thought of them when absent. We require another word to express truthfully our feeling, however kindly or hospitable it may be, for those outside the circle of our intimacy. If it be said that there ought not to be any inner or exclusive circle, we reply that Nature draws it for us. She draws it by virtue of our tastes, our ideals, our sympathies, and even more by a subtle charm of influence or atmosphere which certain persons possess, at least for us, though others may not feel it. Moreover, we know that the recognition of, and susceptibility to, this fact of intimacy is compatible with the largest type of humanity, and is to be found in the noblest men and women. The story of "the beloved disciple" illustrates how our ideal of the most lofty and generous character admits toward its favorites a special form of love, which the most sensitive and generous may not and cannot feel toward, for example, the coarse, the sensual, the dull and unthoughtful, the egotistic, and the selfish. They may be pitied, but they must become different from what they now are in order to be loved as intimates. Thus, if anyone loves the mean and the cruel, the hypocrites and oppressors, such love must be for an ideal of what they ought to be, and not for what they are. Did Jesus love Judas or Herod as he loved Peter and John?

Now, good will is not a mere sentiment dependent upon the character or the attractiveness of its object. It is what it is named, a kindly will. It is an attitude, or a temper. We can command the attitude, we can change our temper; we can stop in a moment from treating a man as an enemy or an alien, a brute or a machine, and begin to treat him as a man, or as we



should like to be treated. It is not said in the story of the Good Samaritan that he fell in love with the wounded stranger, but merely that "he had compassion on him." The priest who passed by on the other side was not to blame for his not loving the man, but because he showed no good will or humanity to him. We call good will then the key to the theory of ethics, because it is always practicable, as love is not. I can turn on my good will, or behave toward anyone with good will, just as I can turn my body around from one course to another, from the shadow to the sunshine. I can treat the beggar who comes to my door with good will, even while I may be bound to refuse him alms. I can treat the thief with good will, even when I help to shut him up from stealing any more.

Moreover, good will is a universal law, self-evident, wherever human beings or any other sentient beings live together. We need only to state it here. We shall elucidate, illustrate, and apply it later. The law is to show good will to all persons and all beings, and at all times. The law is to turn our good side or good self toward all, and never our mean or lower self toward anyone. As sunshine falls on all, both upon the evil and the good, so our good will ought to fall on all. Why not? We have hinted that this is the law of man's highest happiness and efficiency. To act then in the mood of good will is to act at our best, and with every power and faculty at its maximum, while at the same time the action of each part is subordinated and unified under one controlling purpose.

It goes without saying that this is no blind law. It proceeds in the path of intelligence. Its use arises

from its reasonableness. It is one with wisdom or philosophy, and, in all practical matters, with what we call common sense. We shall hope to show later that there is no event in which the expression of good will is not the most rational and practical action. It will be found to combine proper seriousness and the native sense of humor, essential to a generous and gladsome life.

We have used the term "good will." The emphasis here, if not on both words alike, is on the will. This is the driving power of the world and the center of personality. All modes of force may perhaps be considered as forms of the one central and most spiritual force—will. The whole universe seems to be the creation and expression of will. As it is impossible to conceive of blind or unintelligent will, so it is inconceivable to think of a bad or ill-will at the heart of things, or of a divided will. The only intelligible conception of the universal will is as good. This is the only workable conception. At any rate, this is the highest conception of the will of a mature and civilized man. Good will is the noblest and mightiest form of power. The men of good will are the mightiest persons. A galaxy of noble and powerful characters at once occurs to the mind. The access of good will always raises a man to his highest power. Other things being equal, the man with good will is the superior man, and the man of self-will or ill-will the inferior in every form of exertion.

This emphasis upon the will raises our ideal altogether above the level of mere "good nature," or "goodness." To say that a man feels kindly or means well is to say little. To affirm that the man

wills well is to say an altogether different thing. To will means motion and effort and devotion. It determines the man's ruling purpose. Where he wills, he goes with "heart and soul and mind and strength,"—at least as long as he continues to will.

It is on account of this emphasis upon the fact of will or force that we prefer not to employ the word benevolence. Benovelence originally meant a good will, but it has lost its virility. We associate it with mere kindness or geniality. The millionaire founder of a great university may be benevolent in his giving of money, while the essential fault in his character may be that he lacks a good will. His benevolence is only a phase or one side of him. The fact that impresses us is not his benevolence but his overweening self-will. Does a man of good will ever seek to write his own name upon millions of dollars of the commonwealth or the nation?

Good will, moreover, at its highest reaches passes over into all the grace and beauty and gladness of love. It is our nature to love wherever we spend ourselves. The effort of good will is to lift its objects to be worthy of love. The artist comes to love the things which he paints, even the trees and the flowers, as if a mystic presence were disclosed in them. The skilled mechanic comes to feel a sort of affection for his handiwork, as if it were personified. Much more is this true in respect to human relations. The teacher grows to love even her "bad boys," in whose developing character she has invested her good will. The good physician grows to feel an affection for his patients. The settlement worker finds gleams of loveliness among all kinds and conditions of men. You

may not at once be able to love an enemy. But show even an enemy good will, and you can never tell when love may not begin to grow between you and him.

In the law or principle of good will we seem thus to have a safe key to open all the problems of ethics, and, at the same time, to serve as an inspiration to every form of noble personal conduct. Be a man of good will, show your good will continually, and you will do right as a matter of natural consequence.

## CHAPTER V

### RELIGION AND ETHICS

WE have suggested that ethics is at one with religion, or, in other words, that the only valid and workable ethics, good for all situations and equal for every strain, will be found to be religious. It may be well at this point to make our meaning quite clear, and to show the important distinction between religious and irreligious ethics.

In using the word religion, we speak of the profoundest facts, which we have only to interpret and understand. The scientific imagination, as Mr. Tyn-  
dal has forcibly remarked, works with facts and not with fancies or dreams. Here is the world of matter, as we are wont to call it. We are clothed in it; it is everywhere. What makes it? What does it signify? Why do we dare, all first appearances to the contrary, to conceive it as one and not many? Why do we insist upon thinking all its changing phenomena into the terms of a Universe? What is this mystery of matter, whose shifting forms combine to tell us the story of unity? More and more matter eludes our search. We cannot put our fingers upon it. All that men ever said of the vagueness and elusiveness of "spirit" holds true of matter. We know it by what it does, but we know positively nothing else about it. It translates into feelings, modes of consciousness, words, thoughts, ideas. No bond holds

it, but mind alone doubtless holds and possesses it. Even the mind of man, with its feeble grasp, stretches to the stars and seizes the wonderful sense of a whole. Every atom of matter is accountable to the mind.

Here is the fact of force, another mystery and invisible. We feel it in ourselves, as we are conscious of our bodies. We use it, as we turn on electricity in our chambers. We recognize it playing in the wind and in the waves of the sea. We respond to and react against its mighty gravitation. We have long ago ceased to think of many forces, or of antagonistic and warring forms of force. We dare to say that it is one force and its forms and manifestations are harmonious. Every force springs from the one primal source. What is life itself but force, or force but a form of the one life?

We watch and study the manifold appearances of life in its gradations or phases of development, one rising above another, chemical, animalcular, vegetable, vertebrate, human, the life of consciousness, the life of intellect. There is still higher life, more costly and more finely developed. It is the life of moral goodness, it is the life of friendship and love. Can there be any sort of doubt that when the Universe presents the form of true, reverent, gracious, generous manhood and womanhood, here is a form of life to which the most beautiful crystal, the mightiest waterfall, or the blazing comet, offers no comparison? Here, in fact, in one supreme form, every other kind of power and life is made to culminate. Here is the mysterious clothing of matter doing service to thought and will, here is a being holding the consciousness of



the whole Universe in himself, and here, too, is a being whom, as goodness shines out of his eyes, all men with one consent admire, approve and love. Such is the man of good will, the heir of the ages, the incarnation of all that the Universe has to reveal and bestow. And yet, marvelous as this man is, he is not so marvelous as are the mysterious possibilities which reside in him; since no man knows or ever can know, "it doth not yet appear, what he shall be."

Moreover, we trace the course of history as far back as the secrets of the rocks will reveal. We see one continuous course through which precisely this species of goodness has come to be dominant. All lower types have come and passed on toward the making perfect this grandest of all human types. The man of pride, the man of hate, the man of war, the man of scheming ambition—all these successive forms of seeming human success disappear before the man of good will, as the clumsy megatheriums gave way before the grace, the beauty, the speed, the growing intelligence of the animals which heralded and accompanied the advent of man.

There is no greater mark or proof of the ethical progress of mankind than the simple fact that we do not need to-day to describe the man of good will. Three or four thousand years ago the prophets of that age might have been compelled to describe him. Few, perhaps, would have recognized him or thought him possible. Now myriads bow before the name of one who typifies the highest form of human life. Whatever view one takes of Christianity, this is an interesting fact. Even while barbarous themselves, men yet know the higher type, and confess it to be

their ideal. Better yet, a long and growing procession of true-hearted men and women have more or less adequately carried this type of the life of good will to the knowledge of millions. New biographies each year set this type forth. No one ever considered it who could doubt for a moment that here is the best and highest manifestation of the universe. No pessimist ever saw this type at its best without being obliged to modify or withdraw his pessimism. No lover of pleasure ever saw this type of life in a Washington or Lincoln or Emerson, and did not have to admit that here was something other than selfishness. Here is virile force, intellect, beauty, courage, sincerity, truth, devotion, peace, and gladness, found in the unity of good will.

It is easy, of course, to raise captious questions, as, for example, what right we have to set a standard of value, and how we can be sure that our valuation is correct. But for all practical purposes, in the realm of thought as well as in the realm of action, men generally accept our standard. Only in the mood of the most profound skepticism would anyone deny that a good man is of infinitely more consequence than an equal weight of earth or gold.

Now one thing is certain about this supreme and beautiful form of life. It did not and could not make itself, any more than a crystal or a pearl made itself. It simply reveals through itself the grander life of the universe whose product it is. This is what Matthew Arnold meant when he wrote with utter confidence of "the Power not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." He saw the law by which all things in history go together to the production of goodness,

and of the order of goodness to which his own noble father, Dr. Arnold of Rugby, belonged. Close as Matthew Arnold was, in the greatest period of modern doubt, to the border land of agnosticism, he never could get away from the facts of his father's life, or from the splendid traditions of vital religion. If in man there is power, beauty, order, law, justice, good will, love, it is because all these are forms of the one Universe life. As surely as they are seen in men, who are merely the copy of the reality, so surely do they "their great original proclaim." As you know the tree by its fruits, so you see what the Universe itself, in its innermost heart, is like. Does not this seem a reasonable conclusion?

We hasten on to our conception of the supreme life of the world. The world, at its highest and best, forces this conception upon us. The infinite life of the world, clothed and expressed through, and radiant in, its verdure and color of matter, is one. Its power, its beauty, its thought and order, its justice and truth, are one. Its one essence is good will or love, its highest of names. If we suffer these great words to suggest to us, at least, provisionally, the idea of a real person, we do not mean person in the sense of limitation. The word "person" serves rather to unify the most complete attributes of being, namely, consciousness, will, love. These being unified, seem to constitute true personality. Such is the modern conception of God. We do not arrive at this thought, as men once tried to do, by subtracting all attributes away and calling that which was left God. We take the positive way. We add all worth and virtue. God is all reality. This is no a-priori

reasoning. It is the deduction from the most significant facts of life.

And man is God's child. The human person answers back in all essential characteristics to the infinite person. They must correspond. The universe, in all its ethical and spiritual fruitage, is that which the life of God constitutes it. You thus know God through knowing man at his highest. It is a deep philosophical truth that "man is made in His likeness." There is nothing irreverent in this; since the great characteristics of man are doubtless universal and of an infinite value. As his body is made of the stuff that shines in the stars, so his thought and his goodness, his will and his love, are of the invisible life which makes the stars shine. Modern religion, the inheritance from all the men of good will who have ever lived, bequeathed to all such men who now live, taught of all science, takes this conception as the guide to its thinking and its conduct. It views man as the child of God. Its single ethical law is, to live as children of God. This law is the same, even if the man who tries it and puts it into practice does not venture to use the words of religion, or the name of God. The rule still holds good, that one can set for himself no higher, more inspiring, persuasive, or practicable rule of action than to live as men would instinctively live who hold themselves to be the children of God!

We purpose now to take this sublime and broad conception of religion as our clue and guide to the understanding of the science of ethics. We will not force it. We will use it as a working theory or hypothesis, and try to see if it meets the facts of life and an-

swers our questions. We will see if it enables us, as a true theory ought, to harmonize and unify certain apparently contradictory facts and principles in human conduct. It simply affirms that, as on our physical side we are in the grip of tremendous world forces and laws, so also on the conscious and personal side of our lives we are moved and swayed and led by the laws and conditions and forces of an infinite and universal life of which we are the offspring. Ethics in this view is the conduct which befits those who live in accordance with nature,—not brute or animal nature, not the lowest range of nature, but nature in the highest and most intelligent sense. We shall show that the life of good will is thus closest in accord with nature.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE

WE need now to fit the foregoing considerations into the most concrete form. The religious view of the world is essentially that of a structure or universe. Everything has a place in the unity. True, it is a vital and evolving structure and not mechanical. Every life, like every grain of sand, is comprehended in the master mind; in other words, it belongs to an intelligible order or plan. It matters not at first whether the creature is conscious or not of this fact of structural significance. The brute creatures do not need to be conscious of it. It is the characteristic of man, and of man alone, and only of man at a certain stage of his development, that he may enter into this conception of a universe, and of himself as a sharer and even a maker and builder in it. The civilized man is more and more a creator of his own world. The more structural he sees it to be, the better builder he becomes. The higher and finer his purpose and the more beneficent his spirit, the better he builds and creates. The man who builds best of all is he who conceives, not of his own state alone, but of all peoples of the world as organized together into an orderly and harmonious commonwealth of nations. This is the actual work of the modern statesman, following here in the footsteps of the guiding facts. Every human life has its contribution to make



toward the working out of this ideal. Every life properly belongs to this great order.

Practical religion consists in the conduct befitting a good universe. Religion here becomes one with ethics. The religious man not only thinks and feels as the citizen of a universe, but he behaves like a citizen. Even if he thinks nothing about it, or possibly imagines that he has no religion, he is still for all practical purposes a religious man, so far as the spirit of a good universe possesses him, and his conduct corresponds to this idea.

Irreligion, on the other hand, is essentially anarchical. The irreligious man is not he who denies some dogma or opinion, least of all who dispenses with certain conventions and ceremonies, or goes to no church, but rather the man who has no sense of belonging to a universe, no thought of a binding structure to which he owes his allegiance. In other words, the good man fits into all manner of human relationships, to which he adjusts himself in order to render them more complete. On the other hand, a man is "bad" or morally worthless, so far as he fails to fit into and strengthen the social structure of mankind.

The principle of religion is in every household, or else there is no genuine family life. The child is "getting religion" who catches the consciousness of the unity of the home to which he belongs, for which he learns to be willing to lay down his life. Religion in the home is one with the loyalty and devotion of its members. Even the guest enters into this religion of the family life, so far as for the time he holds himself as belonging to its unity and behaves accord-

ingly. Else, he is in it only as a fly is in the honeycomb.

There is the same religion in a village or city. The foreigner may be present, indeed, and may observe all the laws, and yet never feel for one moment the sense of belonging to the social structure of the town. There are men by his side, the real citizens, who would die for it. You might not at once know them apart from the drones in the hive, who exist merely for what they can draw out of the commonwealth. Religion marks the difference between the one set of men and the other. Religion translates here into fidelity and public spirit. The men of civic religion can be depended upon to do whatever the well-being of the common civic structure demands.

There are men in business whose religion expresses itself in their trustworthiness. They are here to perform a function, like the little nerves or muscles in the body. There are others who do a species of predatory business, almost as if they were parasites upon the body of society. This parasitism is irreligion. The irreligious man seeks only to get for himself, whereas he should normally act as a member of the social organism. Doubtless, indeed, the universe uses him as it uses the dust, as it uses insect pests, as it uses the fever and the plague. But the man is not yet a man who is willing only to play the part of dust, or a pest, of "matter out of place," when it is man's true nature to enter, as it were, into the structure of the diamond, or into the beauty of the ripe wheat. In short, selfishness or self-will, no less than ill-will, is irreligion, while devotion, honor, loyalty, constancy are the actual marks of practical and universal religion. Who-

ever is true to his part as a constituent member, follows the law of religion, that is, he behaves as a citizen of an ethical universe. The Hebrew prophetic writings, the greatest of ancient religious teachings, and the most telling passages in the New Testament lay their emphasis on this kind of religion: "What doth the Lord require but to do justly?"

Moreover, the soul of this devotion or obedience, which constitutes the universal religion, is willingness. Two kinds or grades of ethics here differentiate themselves. There are those who obey because they must, from fear, or in hope of favor or reward. They obey like felons in the states' prison, or mercenaries in an army. There are always those who, seeing this kind of obedience, and knowing how cheap it is, maintain that there is no other kind of ethics. Every man, they say, has his price. Keep a watch over men, it is said, or they will cheat you. Increase the police force in the great city, add to the army and navy. Men even say this in the name of certain kinds of religion. Preach to men, they tell us, a doctrine of fear. Set an eternal hell before men's eyes, and a certain type of conventional conduct grows out of this doctrine. But all this kind of ethics, though possibly better than absolute anarchy, fails of reality. It always threatens to dissolve. Its compelling sense of obligation is not yet within the man, but outside of him. The man does not deserve to be called a real person who obeys out of fear.

On the other hand, a real person has structural unity within himself. Genuine goodness flows naturally out of obedience to the inner law of good will. The man who sees himself like an atom of the shin-

ing structure of a gem, or like the active corpuscle of a living body, desires nothing so much as to do his part, to keep the crystal clear, to make the body strong. This is what he exists for. The good wife does not obey the law of chastity because there are jails and punishments, but because she loves her husband. The good child does not obey his father because he fears the rod, but because he loves to help his father in his work. The true-hearted merchant, Peter Cooper, for instance, loving to be honorable, has no temptation to deal falsely. The patriot wills to die for his country. The prophet or preacher tells the truth because, like Luther at Worms, he cannot do otherwise. This is only to say that all virtue in every act and word is free willingness. It is the expression of an inward life which runs because it must. All the travail of the world seems to go to produce this type of willing and cheerful goodness. And no goodness has yet got beyond the mere scaffolding that would not choose to stand firm, though all men withheld their favor and storms of opposition burst upon it. Neither is this serene strength surprising, when we recollect that we are dealing with the most mighty and universal form of force. Supreme above all the powers that be, rises good will, invincible in good men as in God. Goodness is no weakling needing to be protected and nursed!

These things proceed out of a study of the facts of life. The religious interpretation grows out of them because it seems to be in them. But the main emphasis that I care to make is upon the facts. Go with our interpretation of the facts or not. Still it holds true that we are inextricably bound to a type of ethics

which tallies with the thought of a universe and with nothing else. The best conduct has a universal quality, as befitting citizens of a universe.

We say "universe" rather than "world" for a purpose. It might be objected that we know nothing but this world, and indeed this present phase of its existence. It may be thought that in some other world, or in some future period here, justice might change; other and different laws and morals might become valid. Nevertheless, we cannot conceive any world in any time where good will would cease to be valid, or where ill-will or self-will would become beautiful. Wherever any form of social life is, good will must be the universal spring out of which all rules, usages, and customs proceed.

The modern democracy builds upon this idea. It is slowly and surely coming into sight. The democracy is not a form of government in which one party, by virtue of numbers and greater power, forces a minority to obey its laws. It is hardly safe, indeed, to use the word government, as if one party commanded and the others only obeyed. A democracy rests upon willingness. Less and less do its members need to see the show of force. Not bayonets but public opinion persuades men. So far as democracy ever has seemed to fail, as in ancient Athens, it has been because people had not yet developed humanity enough to live together as fellows. They trusted in force and not in persuasion. So far as democracy is coming into its own, it is because men are learning lessons of good will toward one another.

We cannot make it too plain that modern ethics, not for the few only, but for the many, is the con-

duct of the builders of a universe, co-workers with God. We cannot emphasize too strongly that this is willing conduct, and however costly at times (for all things obey a law of cost), is cheerful and glad-some conduct, as befits not slaves, but the children of the universe. Our ethics also holds good, whether or not we accept the religious philosophy upon which it seems to rest. The main question is: Do we hold ourselves to be the citizens of a universe? Do we live and work on the lines of intelligence and structure? Ethics is the conduct that fits the thought of structure, organism, and unity. We shall return later and reiterate the guiding principle of our study, as we have occasion to explain and interpret the great familiar words and terms of ethical science.

We ought now to see how to answer the question, what is the distinction between ethics and religion? The answer is that religion is a man's thought about the universe, and about the causing power behind it, and especially his feeling, as of fear, awe, reverence, admiration, or peace and satisfaction, toward the universe and the mysterious Life that shines through it. But ethics is social conduct; at its best it is the kind of conduct that corresponds to an orderly thought of the universe, and specially to the idea of a good power that constitutes it. Set forth the highest thought of the universe; cherish the noblest loyalty to it; then translate this thought and this feeling into the most friendly and effective action of an intelligent good will, and your results will be the best ethics. Produce the same conduct, however, if you can, without any thought or feeling about the universe, and it will none the less be worthy ethics.



## CHAPTER VII

### A SUGGESTION ABOUT EVIL

THE phenomena of evil conduct finally force themselves upon our attention. If good will proceeds out of the compelling life of the universe, where do ill-will, self-will, hate, lust, bigotry, cruelty, persecution, and all sorts of moral mischief, come from? Must we conceive a monster God of evil to match the idea of a ruling and indwelling beneficence? We shall have occasion later to take up certain concrete forms of this vast question. We can only hint at the manner of the solution, as it meets us here.

The master thought of evolution seems to suggest the simple and natural answer to our question. Good will is surely the norm or the goal of moral effort and progress. Evil is that which falls short of the norm; it is the incident to the process of growth; it is relative and never absolute; it is self-destructive, or else it passes over and upward, and ceases to be evil, as the tide of a fuller life comes in. Thus we have seen that on the animal plane there is no moral evil, as there are no ideals. Moral evil marks a disparity, and stands for a comparison. There is no evil till the sight of the ideal has come. The sense of evil is a tribute to the ideal good. It signifies that light has come into the world. As it is light that makes shadows possible, so it is goodness that makes moral evil possible. No other *deus ex machina* is called for.

There is thus no desire or appetite out of which moral mischief arises that is not in itself a good. The mischief is that the hunger, the thirst, the passion, in the child, the savage, the ignorant, the untrained, plays the part of a blind force off its track, simply for want of control by the guiding and unifying good will. The mischief itself, the pain caused to others and reacting on the person himself, becomes an urgency calling for the greater growth of good will. As ignorance, with its consequences of mischief, calls for intelligence and wisdom, so moral evil, wherever we see it, means that good will is wanting, and thus becomes a call for greater good will.

The cure of darkness is the light. The cure of moral evil is in fresh access of good will. All abroad men are struggling with one another; they are jealous; they hate each other and sometimes fight; they wrong each other and are cruel to women and children; employers and workmen are massed in camps, suspicious of each other. All this is the painful, costly process of a world that is evolving out of animal conditions, where once no pure good will at all existed. The sense of the struggle, the pain and the cost, the wantonness of strife, the wreckage of war, the waste of cut-throat competition, the arrogance of monopoly, the futility of selfishness, is the prayer of the world, as it comes into sight of its ideals, for justice, peace, friendliness, co-operation. Ill-will and self-will, the natural conditions of brutes, become more and more impossible as men rise to humanity.

My wish here is merely to suggest the lines of our treatment of the problem of sin. They may seem

quite radical, but they appear to be congruous with what the facts of evolution teach us in every other department of man's life. All development presupposes effort, strain, imperfections, temporary failures, seeming waste, vast cost. Show us only the process and we are disheartened. But show us a sight of the finished work, one view of the flower, one taste of the ripened fruit, and we cry, It is well. The child or the savage is a long way from the mature man, but even the Almighty Intelligence can find no nobler or more glorious way of making the man than out of the little child.

# PART III

## CONSCIENCE AND THE RIGHT

### CHAPTER I

#### WHAT IS CONSCIENCE?

GOOD and gifted men long ago saw that there is no absolute and infallible outward moral authority. They discovered within themselves an inner or spiritual force, which they likened to a voice or a monitor. Thus Hebrew prophets thought that they heard the commands of God through dreams or through angels, setting traditions and conventions aside, and requiring new, radical and perilous courses of conduct. Thus Socrates held that a divinity was with him who bade him do what perhaps no one else in Athens would have thought or dared to do; to speak and teach unpopular doctrines, and presently to go courageously to death on the simple prompting of this mystic voice.

The word conscience has come into common use to cover the mysterious fact of an instinct, or force, an urgency, a pressure, a voice (call it what you will), that binds a man over to the way of duty and resists disobedience. We all own to the fact of conscience, little as we may ever have asked what it really is. Let a man only do what his conscience bids, we say, and he will not err. He must, even on occasion, test the outward authority, the laws, the

Bible, the commands of his church, by this inner light, and if issue arises, his conscience shall direct him. Is this quite true at all times?

Dr. Channing and Theodore Parker are said once to have discussed the nature of conscience. Parker was at first inclined to call it an infallible voice, or guide. But Channing easily showed that it is not in the nature of man to possess any kind of infallibility.

See the difficulties which meet us on the threshold of our enquiry about conscience. It was Abraham's conscience that commanded him to offer his only son as a sacrifice to his God. It was the voice of conscience (was it not?) that bade Jephthah put his daughter to death in the performance of a foolish vow? Conscience, in David and Solomon, at least permitted them to take as many wives as they chose. Conscience sent Paul to Damascus to persecute and kill the very men whom conscience presently commanded him to join and to die for. Conscience bade Hindoo mothers throw their babies into the Ganges, and widows to cast themselves upon funeral pyres to die, and men to lie prostrate before the car of Juggernaut. Conscience stood silent and looked on at the fires of the Inquisition, and not infrequently lighted the fires. Protestants and Catholics faced each other in battle for conscience's sake. Conscientious men sent Anne Hutchinson into exile, and hung witches. General Lee and Stonewall Jackson, as well as Governor Andrew, and General Sherman, were men of conscience. At what age of the world has not the voice of conscience contradicted some other voice of conscience? Where, then, is the infallible guide?

The truth is, conscience is not, as many have hastily

imagined, a simple faculty; it is extremely complex; it is as complex as the man himself. There are certainly three great elements which in various degrees enter into it. The first of these is sympathy, or the social sense. The syllable *con* points to this fact. *Con* is "with"; it expresses a relationship. The first fact at the dawn of morality is that the child lives with others. There are selves just like himself in the house, the cave, or the tepee. They are hurt as he is hurt, and pleased as he is pleased. Their frowns, their displeasure, and their approbation stir his feeling of kinship. The family relation constitutes a new and larger selfhood for every child. What hurts a brother hurts him. It is the beginning of conscience when the child perceives that he has grieved his mother, or injured his little sister. Grief or pain is social and disturbing. It is transferable. It passes over by reaction, from the person who is hurt to the person who causes the hurt. It sets up at least a faint warning against the child doing again the thing which caused grief to his sister or mother. In other words, conscience is just simple consciousness or awareness of having done something unsocial,—against the feeling of others. There is here involved a sense of resistance or friction.

The unsocial, hurtful, or disturbing act works like a disease. It creates a point of irritation, and irritation spreads from one cell to another. The question cannot be put away, "Who started this ailment?" However innocent the member of the family group may have been of any intent to cause distress, yet the fact of the pain that he has caused to others tends to give him unrest and set up counterirritation in him, till the mischief, whatever it is, ceases.



A whole group of ever-widening relationships presently appears, in each of which there is the susceptibility to mutual distress, irritation, and counterirritation. There is a species of larger selfhood by which the member of the clan or the tribe, or, again, of the village or the state, of the set or trade or race, feels hurt when a fellow is hurt, and especially when the social hurt is traced back to him as the cause. No one with any social sense can be quite unaware or at ease when the question, "Who did it?" points to him as the center of mischief. Suppose he has run his ship on the rocks, has set fire to the town, or betrayed the flag. It is not human not to be hurt or pained in having to bear the odium or shame of the act. This holds true whether harm was intended or not, preventable or not, justifiable or not, free or not of any hurtful intent. The consciousness inextricably involved in every new social relationship sets up its warning and makes a hindrance against doing unsocial things. This is the root of conscience.

We hear much of late about the "social conscience." Is there any other conscience? Conscience and morality have to do with conduct. Could there be moral conduct if only one being existed? Conduct, again, contains the significant syllable *con*, which means "with." Surely there can be no private or merely individualistic virtue. To be clean, to be pure, to be honorable, are all ideas which echo the consciousness of a world where someone else cares whether or not one is clean and pure and honorable. If one cares to imagine what the morality might be of the last solitary man on our planet, it would be the survival of habits which either implied the fellow feelings

and judgments of other men, or else bespoke a faith that at least God, or "the souls of the just," still knew and cared whether or not a man debased himself to become a beast.

Someone, however, may ask, Does not conscience command obedience to truth and right? And are not truth and right above every consideration of what other social beings may think or feel? Is it, then, a social sense with which conscience harasses us in acting against the everlasting laws? I have only to say here that truth and right certainly belong, and are always dimly felt to belong, to a larger relationship of which we men are shareholders. We have a sense, as if, not only the home, the city, the common flag, the earth and the race of men were ours, but the structure of the universe were ours also. It is a deep and subtle sense that all the lesser relationships are based on truth and right as the universal foundation. Truth and right are ours because they belong to all men. They are ours to-day, because they are ours and all men's forever. They seem to be cosmic in their nature. To violate truth and right, we feel, is somehow to lift up our puny hands against the framework of our world. What meaning have truth and right, except as we come to learn that they concern or safeguard the lives of all reasonable beings who live together? This is to urge that truth and right belong to the warp and woof of our social relations. We shall easily make this clearer at later points in our study.

The second element in conscience is intelligence or reason. Vital to conscience as the reason is, it has been strangely overlooked. It ought to have been

significant that a part of the word conscience spells science, that is, knowledge. In other words, conscience is not merely to feel, it is to know. Why have men neglected this fact? Probably because we still suffer from the ancient prejudice which regarded any strong, and especially a sudden, emotion,—the prick of moral pain or uneasiness, the feeling of moral constraint,—as supernatural, whether from God or from some demon; while sober thought, deliberation, judgment, attention were supposed to be only human. But we are learning that all is divine, or nothing is. Where, we ask, do force, or thought, or life, come from, unless out of the fountains of being? If anything is of God, then the reason is His, and we are herein in our slow way partakers of the thought of the universe.

Watch now and see what thought or knowledge has to do with the action of the conscience. At every new step in the growth of our intelligence we discover a fresh range of consequences, good or bad, which flow out of our actions. We are bound to reason more or less about the significance of these consequences. The child does not know at first that slamming doors and loud noises hurt his mother. The average frontiersman, perhaps the average citizen, is slow in learning to see why smuggling is wrong. The Appalachian mountaineer does not, by nature, see what reason there is in stopping or taxing his distillery. It costs education, imagination, change of popular habits to take in the complicated rights and duties of civilized life. New and difficult questions are arising every day about public nuisances, maintained for private profit, about the preservation of fish and game, about the ownership of the streams which different

groups of men want for their reservoirs, or their mills, or for irrigating their lands, about access to beautiful places on the shore or in the mountains. "Have I not a right," each man instinctively asks, "to do what I like with my own?" till the man is made to see, sometimes by the stress of a quarrel or feud, sometimes again by the hand of the law, and normally more and more by the exercise of his reason, that others also have rights; in short, that no one has any right which is at the loss or injury of his neighbors. All this is the subject of intelligence, the faculty in us which asks, "Why?" and cannot rest without an answer.

The truth is, if we may return for a moment to the teaching of a previous chapter, that the man's own happiness is lessened if he does what injures the rest. More wonderful yet, the opportunity to renounce a supposed private right in favor of a larger good is the call for a larger outflow and exercise of good will through himself; So that the act of self-control or self-surrender comes at last to be a new source of happiness. The man thus defeats his own chance of happiness by refusing the duty. True as this is, it requires the exercise of the reason or of intelligence, to see it. Many "educated" men do not yet see this.

To acknowledge the paramount law of the good of the whole is itself a supreme exercise of the intelligence. No barbarous man owns it. We each come at it by steps, as it constantly requires and takes on new applications. What! men say in America, must we do that which is advantageous for Chinamen as well as for Americans? Or, must we try to vote, not merely for the interests of our own section—New England, or

the South,—but for that which is best for the whole United States? How many thousands of persons in all the world yet clearly perceive that human society is structural and organic; that as each individual expects to have the advantages of society, he stands bound to do his part, as if he were a lynchpin in a roof, a brick in the wall of a house, or a vital cell in the body? How many, who call themselves Christians, yet clearly see what they are supposed to profess every time they repeat the Golden Rule or read the parable of the Good Samaritan; namely, that society is as wide as the world, that Chinamen and Boers and Englishmen and Americans, Anglo-Saxons and Negroes, are indeed members of one family! And yet, if this fundamental statement is not true, it is hard too see on what basis we can construct any rational body of ethics, or have faith in any religion. Indeed our law covers the animal world and all sentient beings. We are found to be kind to animals. There is no creature toward which we need to express hate or ill-will. We surmise that all things have their place in a Universe.

Moreover, the intelligence is constantly at work to correct the bias of mere feeling or prejudice, to set aside childish or savage habits, customs, and sanctions, to resist popular clamor or passion, to construct new laws. The intelligence is the unifying faculty. Call it a divine voice, if you will, that arrested the hand of Abraham, as he was about to slay his son. It was the voice of his intelligence, altering the bloody rites of his tribe in favor of a more humane usage. The old story serves to set forth the interplay between blind feeling on the one hand, enforcing an outworn

practice or law, and the intelligence on the other hand, creating its peculiar form of inward uneasiness at the new sense of a moral discord.

Feeling or sympathy simply bids us do or not do. It exists in the form of prejudice. It certainly often urges in favor of actual right, and it also urges in favor of whatever the individual thinks right,—in favor, therefore, of whatever custom and usage declare to be right. It bids a man blindly follow a custom of the validity of which he has never stopped to enquire. Conscience, as a mode of feeling, thus, doubtless, commands a devout Methodist child to eschew the theatres and dancing. The intelligence, on the contrary, wakes us up to ask, Why is the custom, the prohibition or the taboo necessary? Is it a good and useful custom? Does the taboo serve or thwart human progress. If the supposed sin proved to do no harm to men, can it be wrong henceforth to violate the old commandment that made it sin? This was the kernel of Jesus' criticism upon the extreme Sabbath law of His time.

It was not, therefore, really the true voice of conscience that bade men fight to uphold property in slaves. It was the voice of their passion and prejudice, which thousands of fairly good Southern men had never used their reason to discriminate from the command of duty. The bitter issue of the American Civil War arose out of men's ignorance, on both sides, of the wider relationships which were working to make slavery inhuman. It was not conscience, but only one factor of conscience, which forbade men, whether in Judea or in Puritan New England, from rescuing a brother's ox or ass on the Sabbath Day. There was never a



conflict of conscience with the reason. The conflict was between a feeling, a single element of conscience, which worked in the dark, and reason bringing in light. At men's best, and when light has fairly come, the social sense and the reason are one.

The highest movement of the intelligence is the flight of imagination. The imagination opens new vistas of consciousness. It permits us to see through other's eyes, it adds other's modes of thought to our thinking; it even puts us in the place of children, or savages, or of the creatures of the animal world. It helps us to see ourselves as others see us. It is intimately related to the faculty of conscience. Much of the cruelty, the oppression, the injustice of the world arises out of dullness of imagination. Men wrong one another because they do not know how human, that is, how like themselves, the people of another color or religion or caste are. Awaken and train men's imagination and you reach new powers of conscience. Train a child's imagination, and you immediately help him to be righteous. Once show the reason why any act is hurtful to others, though the others are over the seas, and the social sense or feeling straightway begins to press and make uneasiness, till you cease from that act. Show even that the act promises to hurt the lives of men unborn, and a feeling of wrongfulness awakens against it. Show that an act is good for all men everywhere, and the sense of "ought" urges us to have a share in such an act. So wonderfully the intelligence, leaping on the wings of the imagination, guides the feeling or consciousness, and the feeling creates its inexorable restlessness till the man obeys. Thus intelligence and feel-

ing move together, as if they came from God. They behave exactly as they would be presumed to behave in a divine or ethical world. For they seem surely not to be of man, but of the Power which makes man.

There is yet another factor in conscience. It is what we call will,—the most mysterious of all facts. It is the most spiritual name by which we call the innermost life. That a man knows his duty, that he sees the relations of his acts, is not enough. His assent to the most rational proposition may not signify one step toward a moral result. Neither is it enough that he has a feeling of urgency pressing him toward a righteous act, and making him unhappy while he leaves it undone. The feeling and the intelligence must surge up into a motion of will, creating a choice or decision. The man's will, guided by the lamp of his reason, directs and commands feeling, and even sets a lower feeling aside in favor of a nobler feeling. In other words the whole man must act, who never does act, except as it is his will to act.

See how true this is. Suppose that a man is only swayed by an emotion, now of love and again of hate? Suppose he merely yields to the force of habit, or to the cry of the crowd in the social group around him? Suppose fear or favor sweeps him along? This is not personal action. This is constraint, even when it compels the man to do right, or when a great majority happens to urge him to go with them. The man must will, or choose what he does, of his own motion, or it is not his act. In short his will alone makes his action "conscientious."

What is this mystery of the will? It means that

the man does that which it pleases or satisfies him to do. He does what he chooses. He would rather, on the whole, do this than anything else. The action may indeed be hard, especially at the start; he may have to overcome resistance and inertia in doing the act. It may be at first like lifting a weight. Nevertheless the man, when he wills, has a sense that his act for that time and for him is the best or most satisfying of all possible acts. In doing it he has sooner or later the distinct pleasure of the motion or expression of life pouring through him. There is in it at the best a certain abandon, as of letting himself go with a movement larger than his own, as if he had turned on a universal force. It is as if, in willing to do a right action, a man pressed a lever letting free an electric current. This means that the sense of satisfaction in the act has now overcome restraint and resistance.

We have said that happiness, which is itself a sort of harmony, consists especially in the expression or outgo of life force. This happiness is in every true act of will, as distinguished from constrained action. Such action of will underlies conscience. There is not only social feeling in the first movements of conscience, causing restlessness at the apprehension of a wrong, there is also more or less of an incoming tide of will, which makes pain in us, unless we let it go forth. It flows from the innermost fountains of being. It is that in which we seem to be most intimately sharers and partakers of the life of the universe. It gives us content to be poured forth into action and discontent at being held back.

We need to note this fact carefully. We certainly

do not create our will any more than we create thought or any other form of life. It is simply our highest endowment, in the exercise of which we become most Godlike. It exists, indeed, in all creatures. It is to be seen in the spring of the tiger, whose whole nature rushes thus into activity. It is seen in partial or exaggerated form in the self-will of a Napoleon, in whom the moral and spiritual nature is suppressed or paralyzed. It is only complete in the ideal man of our vision, whose will it is to love "with heart and soul and mind and strength." We all approximate very nearly, however, to this completeness, when we are at our best. We shall have occasion to return to this fact later, when we come to the consideration of freedom and moral evil.

We come now upon the lines of our thought in the foregoing chapters. I have said much of good will. We have conceived of it as the supreme and innermost nature of God, or the highest form of the life of the universe. We do not think of it as something merely genial and indulgent. It is the most active and efficient of all kinds of force. Watch the man in whom the life force of the world rushes most swiftly to the execution of the purposes of God. What he is here for is to do the deeds of goodness; he is here to construct and accomplish, to receive and reflect and distribute the utmost light and life.

See now the perfect unity of the action of conscience. At a man's best the social sense or sympathy is satisfied; the intelligence is also satisfied, and the good will goes forth as the messenger of God. The whole man is there and God, or the ruling Nature, is there. The act becomes harmonious and beautiful.

Why is it that England has worshiped for a thousand years the memory of King Alfred? Whether historically correct or not, he has come to be the ideal man of conscience. He feels with his people. Every wrong which they suffer touches him as his own. He pursues also intelligent ends; he is above degrading superstitions. He seems in the scope of his mind to be a man of the world of all times. Moreover, he is a man of action and will, whom strong youth might almost worship. There is nothing which he chooses so much as the life of ceaseless effort. Joy seems to attend his work, as joy ought when the whole man acts. This king is haloed in story as the man of infinite good will. When we find such a man, we discover what real and full personality is. He is like God in the unity of his attributes. The glory of England, and of America also, is that our national histories have been measurably dominated by lovers of justice, lovers of liberty, lovers of men.

## CHAPTER II

### THE TRAGEDIES OF CONSCIENCE

PERHAPS the reader may have begun to ask certain questions. How shall we explain the divided will and the feeble conscience? Here is the man who, in doing right, still irresolutely desires the tempting rewards of injustice, and, lacking imagination to see what his just action means, is dissatisfied and restless. Perhaps he only did right because he had not the courage to steal. He is not all there or whole-hearted in his act. Here is the man who resolves, on the whole, to do an act upon which his reason or judgment is not settled. Perhaps his feelings are arrayed against his judgment, as when a father thinks himself bound to punish his child. Perhaps his desires and ambitions press one way, and the duty to tell an unpopular truth points the other way. The man desires incompatible things, and failing to see fully the larger unity of good which the performance of duty will bring both for him and for others, he is restless and lacks whole-heartedness in the act of his will, even when he does right. Conceit, vanity, pride and egotism tend to check the force of the will and hence to frustrate the movement of conscience.

To take another kind of case, what shall we say in the story of the young Robert Louis Stevenson, when his sincere thought about religion brings the tragedy of a collision with his father and mother? Here is feeling against feeling, and inward pain. What unity



is there here? And this is a typical case. Life is full of such tragedies. The most conscientious suffer the most keenly from them. They were, perhaps, never so frequent as in the present generation. The whole civilized world has been trying the experiment of individualism. This means that each man has been more or less free to break away from the thoughts, the religion, and also from the customs and morals, of his family or his race.

The hint to the answer of these enigmas and anomalies is in the thought of conscience as a growing, and not a completed faculty of our nature. Society is in process of motion toward closer forms of organization. Individualism is a step upward in the progress of civilization before individuals become wholly or consistently social. There is an ideal unity which in the depths of our heart we have faith in, even while we are only struggling toward it. By and by, we believe, the differences between the men of the new and the men of the old generation, between the men of progress and the men of tradition, will find solution and harmony. The new moral standard, as for example, about marriage or the making of money, will be found to include what was real in the older tradition. Meanwhile every kind of secession or variance from the main trunk of society, however necessary or righteous it may be, involves growing pains both for the individual and for society.

The history of the world is full of experiences that teach us faith in ethical progress. Though the convert to the new thought, the apostle of the new duty, the witness to the new mode of religion, seems for the time to go alone against the face of the multitude and

to hurt and resist his own friends, his trust is that he is with and not against the welfare of the world and that the future will justify his conduct. In spite of his distress, he is able to feel a species of rest and unity, as if he were acting at the behest of the Master of Life, and could not do otherwise. His sorrow, for example, in hurting the feelings of his elders, at last is also taken up into the unity of his act and the unity of his personality. To return to Stevenson's case, he was able through the guiding principle of his sincerity to overcome and assimilate the antagonisms which for the time caused him pain, so that his life at last emerges into a noble and satisfying unity.

But, you say, suppose the individual is wrong, and that time does not justify his act or his thought. Did not even the good Sir Thomas More try his hand at persecution, like the admirable Emperor Marcus Aurelius before him? How shall expansionists on the one hand, or anti-imperialists on the other, fare better than the mighty men of former times, one party or other of whom made their pathetic mistakes! For who can claim that his own course alone is right in a world where all are learners together? The philosophical answer to this is simple and sufficient. It is as if we belonged to a body of pickets and scouts. Who will find the best possible path? It is here, cries one. It is here, answers another. It is well that parties are seeking to the right and to the left. It is well that some must set up at dire cost their danger signals of warning not to follow them farther. The issue of life is to discover, or else to create, the best possible path. Life is the science of building this roadway wherein the coming generations may walk. Each age

must construct its section, or else failing this, must set up its red flag, "Dangerous passing." This faith makes us content, even when we know the possibility of our being mistaken. All the same must we march to do our uttermost, and speak the truth as we see the truth, and do the duty which reveals itself to us. Even through our possible error the light of good will shall shine forth. We may differ on many points; it is always and increasingly possible, however men differ, to be one in good will toward each other. This fact cannot be too clearly emphasized.

There is a constant lesson of modesty involved in all growth and learning. How can a man do his uttermost, follow where truth seems to lead, fear no hardship, speak out his sincerest thought, do the next immediate duty that life brings to him, and yet, throughout all, keep his heart pure, march with his eyes open, be hospitable to every word of new truth, whencesoever it comes, be ready to halt or to move on, to retrace his steps or to take up a new way, as the command of duty bids? How shall he, even in and through his possible error, see to it that the light of good will shines out of his life? To endeavor to do this may well keep a man modest.

Good will is a life force, and, like all vital forces, it shows itself in innumerable forms, with all shades of difference between them. No two men's lives, however good, are alike. No man can safely imitate another. The problem is under all circumstances to express the utmost good will, in other words, the most abundant life. To seek to work out this problem is the proper business of the all-round and mature man; it develops him to be a citizen of the universe, not

infallible or puffed up in his own conceit, but loving truth more than he loves his own life, and the welfare of men more than he loves honor or earthly gains. Give us a race of men educated both to be modest and to obey, each man helping his fellow, and mankind will hardly march in opposite ways any longer; men will hardly make very dangerous errors; the voice of the people will come near to being the veritable voice of God.

## CHAPTER III

### RIGHT AND WRONG

WE may gather a hint out of the anomalies and tragedies of conscience as to what makes a thing right or wrong. Evidently it does not make an act wrong that it causes friction or pain. It may cause pain and discomfort to repair or enlarge one's house, but the change may be amply worth while. So in the case of every social reform, or in the choice of a new and higher ethical standard, there will be sure to be at first some disturbance and discomfort.

Shall we say that the motive, if base or selfish, makes an act wrong? The base motive may make the man wrong who acts from it, but it does not necessarily make the act wrong. The base man out of his selfishness often performs a good act. It is a good act to found a university, even if you have to suppose that the founder only sought thereby to get or to keep respectable standing in society. In fact an act by itself can hardly have a moral character. All that we can say of acts in themselves is that they are useful, or helpful, or fitting. The same act may be good at one time and bad at another, as, for example, the giving of alms. A base motive cannot make it a bad act, when it helps to feed a little child. A good motive cannot make it a good act, if it encourages mendicancy.

There is a sense, however, in which we say that an act expresses the character of the man. In this sense,

a high, or at least a social and friendly motive, in other words, a good will, is necessary to produce a good act. Intelligence also is equally necessary, or the best motive may, for want of intelligent direction, do harm and not good. A steersman with the best of motives, who had never studied the entrance to the harbor, would be useless. A mayor with the highest desire for the public welfare, who had no business efficiency, would be a bad mayor. A good act, then, is a complex resultant of various factors. That thing alone is quite right which has right motive, right spirit, full intelligence, and right social effect. And yet in a crude way we say that a thing is right in which the man does the best he knows how. It is subjectively right, though objectively, or in effect, it may be wrong. So, likewise, the thing is not right, even when its effect may be socially useful, which a man does under duress, or by accident, or without good will. This is like the act of the slaves who yet helped to build the Parthenon.

We sometimes hear the expression, "The public conscience." This means that often a group of people,—but not by any means all,—are awakened as if with one sentiment, to some abuse or wrong affecting the common welfare. They act, as the biologists tell us, like the white corpuscles in the blood, which rush to meet a disease or repair a hurt. Thus a new public conscience gains headway against the unscrupulousness of corporate wealth. Thus a public or social conscience is stirred over the commonly accepted legal rights of individuals to possess themselves of an egregious share of the lands of a people.

Here arises a new and wholesale species of social tragedies. New divisions and parties appear among



friends and neighbors. Not all well-meaning men see the new issue. Not all who see it are ready to give their good will to effect necessary changes in their own customs of trade. On the other hand the public conscience, which demands a new adjustment of laws and customs to put an end to a supposed grievance, is apt to be intolerant, arrogant, fanatical, unsympathetic, and, therefore, socially ineffective. It may lack good will altogether, or, even when it possesses good will, it has none to spare for those who differ from its judgment. All the more does the accumulating volume of human experience urge the universal demand for a larger and more effective good will. Even the enactment of necessary reform fails to be a good act, unless, behind the votes which usher it in, runs the current of wholesome social feeling to win and persuade, rather than to convict, to compel, or to punish those who differ.

We say that there are three elements which, acting together, go to make ideal conduct, the feelings or sympathies, the intelligence, and the will. In good will these are all one. Not a part of the man acts, but the whole man acts.

This is the normal tendency, also, of social action. The sympathies of the community, that is, of the people who compose it, the intelligence of the community and the definite will of the community are at one in the best social action. This is the actual case in regard to many public questions. They are settled to the general agreement of all. It is a settled fact that society cannot abide lynch law or duelling. It is a settled fact that society must educate all its children. It is a settled fact that all men shall be free. Other articles of agreement are already in the way of passing from the

field of irritating contention into the realm of general good will. Who shall say that the growing humanity of the world is not going to demand not merely liberty for all men, but also a reasonable opportunity for all peoples, including the most backward races, to enter into the rightful heritage of mankind and to enjoy those educational, artistic and humane forms of happiness which so far only the few favored ones have possessed? Already the public conscience shapes itself in the direction of this fuller democracy. The law of life is that the act of sharing the best things with one's fellows constitutes a new source of happiness to those who exercise it.

## CHAPTER IV

### A SIDE LIGHT UPON CONSCIENCE

CONSCIENCE is closely analogous to the æsthetic instinct or faculty. There is first only a vague feeling for beauty, for art or music. The child takes pleasure in very simple lines or figures; the savage traces rude but really beautiful natural patterns on his weapons or his pottery. He is hardly conscious how beautiful they are, more than the birds are conscious of the grace of their motions. The barbarian satisfies his ear with shrill pipes or reeds. He does not yet think about the proportions of his lines or understand musical harmonies. He is insensitive to discords. Music and art come upon him like an inspiration. You may as well say, as he once said, that the gods teach the arts. For man surely never created anything; he only invented or discovered what was wrapped up in Nature.

What grand leaps the informing intelligence in man had to make before he built the pyramids or composed symphonies. What marvelous mathematical demonstrations served to hang the Brooklyn Bridge in air! Always the feeling for art and the guiding intelligence acted and reacted on one another. The intelligence corrected errors, exposed crudities or discords, and led the way to new and more complex ranges of artistic development. Nicer and stronger artistic feeling followed and grew at every new step of human experience.

Will is also in art as it is in ethics. It is not enough to feel for beauty; it is not enough to conceive artistic ideals. Will,—the energy of life,—must always burst forth to make the ideal thing real. Not he who enjoyed art, or he who judged and criticised art, ever made art, but he who willed beauty into statues, temples, cathedrals, poems, and songs. And men learned what beauty is, as they poured their lives forth to achieve beautiful things.

There is a kind of pain attendant upon discords and incongruity; it corresponds on the negative side to the pleasure that goes with harmony and fitness. It is the stirring and pressure of the compelling nature as it tends to order things together into unity. All sentient creatures perhaps share something of this two-fold capacity for pleasure or pain, at the sights and sounds, either harmonious or discordant, of the outward world.

All this is a parable of the deeper facts of the realm of moral conduct. The moral realm is likewise governed and conditioned by its appropriate pains and pleasures. Fitting action or conduct in ourselves or in others pleases us. Unsocial, hurtful, unbecoming conduct gives us a sting of pain. Moral disease befalls us when our act fails to fit into place.

Art again illustrates what ethics is in the fact of its marvelous gradations of development and degrees of success, from the crude forms of the cave men up to the ideal visions of genius. The artistic sense is like conscience in the varying shades of satisfaction or of disharmony of which it is capable, from the full joy of the whole man in seeing and doing beautiful work down to the abortive struggles of schoolboys painfully taking their drawing lessons with divided will, desir-

ing to be at their play, and also under constraint of duty to fulfill the requirements of the school.

No artist ever yet was infallible in his judgments or in the execution of his ideas. Did he do his best? Did he follow the highest which he knew? Did he scorn to prostitute his art? Did he choose to starve rather than paint ignoble pictures for money? Did his artistic soul grow? Did he move toward eternal ideals founded in the order of the universe?

So we ask of all men in the realm of morals as we ask of the good artist: Does the man obey his conscience, and "do the right as he sees the right"? Does he use all the light of his intelligence to correct and guide his feelings? Does he follow the highest ideals? Does he scorn to do immoral, that is, unsocial, work? Does he choose to die rather than betray his humanity? In fine, is he, not a dreamer about right, or an idle sentimentalist, but a mighty and virile doer of right? Such is the man of conscience and good will.

We see by this time what the infallible conscience would be. Given all the facts of any moral situation, given clear and enlightened intelligence, given a social sense or sympathy warm and full, given the urgent flow of good will in the man's life, and he will see right and do right like God Himself. This is ethical harmony, or, in the language of religion, "fellowship with God." As at least a temporary condition this is not so rare among men as it may seem. The difficulty is in making it continuous or permanent.

Obviously a man completely enjoys this harmony only at his best. But he always tends to enjoy it. The enjoyment of it is the fulfillment of his nature, as with any art or skill. The more he grows in the fullness of

his manhood, in his imagination, in his sympathies, in his humanity, in the heartiness of his good will, the more such happiness falls to him. The very contrast of the discord, when he falls away from the ethical standard, serves to accent and define the clear laws of life in obeying which happiness comes.

Nature is forever playing on man to make a moral artist of him. This is the most democratic of all urgencies. Perhaps only the few may be painters or singers. It is in the power of the many to be artists and poets of justice, modesty, and mercy. As all the people of Athens in the golden age of the city became critics of beauty, so all people have it in them to be both critics and doers of goodness. This is involved in the growing closeness of social relations. As the good emperor said, "We are made for one another." This means that we are made to fit one another. Conscience is the sense that directs the social adjustment. Good will is the essence of this adjustment. The highest and the most satisfying thing that any man needs to know is that he is doing a social service. The time is coming when men will be able to interpret all honest enterprises into the harmonizing terms of such service.



## CHAPTER V

### THE DEEPER FACTS OF CONSCIENCE

CONSCIENCE does not merely touch acts or conduct, and make us uneasy with reference to what we will and do. It goes deeper. What kind of a man am I? Am I selfish and unsocial? Or, are my feelings, instincts and ambitions right and worthy? Do I love men or hate them? Am I envious of their success? Do I look down on men and despise them as my inferiors? The men of good will sing in unison. Do I sing in accord with them? The men of good will build and co-operate together. Do I love nothing so much as to stand in their service? They are hospitable to truth. Am I open-minded? Here is a new kind of judgment, searching downward from my acts to the self out of which my acts proceed.

I did not indeed make my nature; I simply received it. I may have been selfish from birth. I may have inherited a stock of animal appetites and egotism. I may have had at the start a feeble or divided will. However I began, even if I see not how I was to blame for a faulty nature, the fact remains that I have now come into sight of the ideals of a true manhood, which forever make me dissatisfied with my present self. There is a gap between the man that I ought to be and the man that I am, between my ideal self and my actual self. The gap pains me like a discord in music, or as if the whole instrument were discovered out of tune.

There is nothing in this deeper judgment of conscience out of line with the facts of growth on other sides of our nature. Thus, the little child has at first no shame or pain in being feeble. But the boy who finds out that he is weak, suffers shame. It is because he aspires to be strong, like a man. The ignorant have no shame in their ignorance. It is the awakening of their intelligence, the sight of ideals of knowledge and wisdom, which brings wholesome unrest and pain at finding out their ignorance. Are you ashamed of being ignorant? Then you are in the way of knowing something. Thank God for that sense of shame. Thank God, likewise, if you suffer pain at finding out your selfishness. Better suffer too much than not enough, till you vow to die rather than remain in your selfishness. It is as if you had learned how good it is to be clean. You cannot henceforth bear not to be clean. So when once you see what it is to be a true man, "pure in heart," you cannot bear to "blind your soul with clay."

In the deeper sense conscience judges, not the man's acts, but the man's self, disposes at once of long codes of Pharisaic rules, and pierces through all processes of jesuitry and sophistication. Get the man right and his acts will be right. Is the man beneficent, brave, obedient, friendly, modest, and teachable, to be depended on to do whatever you show him to be best? This is the man of good will, the ethical and social man. You will no more find bitter apples on a good tree, than you will find unjust, cruel, or unsocial acts proceeding from a man of good will.

We see this daily in personal instances. Here, for example, are two of the richest men in the world.

One of them is generally judged with harshness, the other with kindliness. Why this difference? For both have exploited the wealth of the world with more or less ruthlessness. Both have been concerned in conduct that, even if not condemned as wrong in the time of their activity, is now coming to be regarded as outrageous. Both give millions for education and other good causes. The reason for the difference is that one of these men is regarded (whether fairly or not we will not say) as having himself reprobated the evil practices by which success came to him, and as being now devoted to the use of his wealth for the public good. The other man is thought (perhaps unjustly) to be the same selfish, grasping, avaricious and unscrupulous seeker of lucre as he has been through his long life. Thus, to be accounted even measurably a man of good or social will serves to redeem a man in the public estimation from the record of a more or less dubious past. Let a man be essentially right-minded, and we can forgive him occasional wrong acts. Let him be essentially selfish, and it is hard to thank him very warmly for occasional right acts.

It simplifies life immensely to recognize the distinction, essential to all sound ethics, between being and doing. It is as if you watched a man reaching a new stage in his growth. Heretofore he has followed rules, till rules have become a labyrinth of perplexity. Who can keep numerous rules in mind, much more, think always to obey them? Who can make every stroke of his work correct to order? But now the man has caught the idea or the spirit of his work. He has passed the line of laws, "Thou shalt," and "Thou shalt not," and sees what laws are for. He

is not here to obey laws, but laws are his method. Once they commanded him; now he uses them. This is the case as soon as any man gives himself up to go with that new and deeper motion of conscience which urges him, not only to do the deeds of the man of good will, but to live the life of good will.

The old question was, Is the act right? The act might be right and the man all wrong. The act might be on the surface; it might be from constraint or from policy; it might be popular to do that particular act; it might be one's selfish interest. And the man who did it might be asking what he would get for his honest act. The radical question now is, Is the man right? Is he acting out of his friendliness? We say a profounder thing than to beware of the selfish act. We say, Beware of the selfish mood. Are you out of tune with the universe? You are in danger of doing wrong every moment, as long as you are wrong. Hasten and come again into unison. It is well if your action is just. But it is needful also that a just and humane self shall be behind the just act.

The deeper conscience is nothing if not social. It tells us, when we "bring our gift to the altar," whether or not we have aught against any brother. We know as by a flash of light whether we harbor ill-will. As the ancient oracle was imagined to disclose a man's innermost thoughts and translate his dreams, so conscience, like the voice of God, reveals what manner of men we are; it determines whether our voices ring true or false. There is one note which binds us with all souls, which is the word of the Eternal. It is the note of good will. Do our lives ring true to that note? Are we, or are we not, now in unison with the flow of

the universal life? This is the social sense at its highest.

And yet, one may ask, may not wrong or unjust acts proceed even out of the spirit of good will? Have not kind men often done wrong? Do not kindly men commit tragic blunders? Are they not sometimes dreadfully inefficient? Trying to please everyone, do they not often fail to do the one decisive thing that, though displeasing to many, might save the State? Many a friendly man has allowed himself to vote for needless war, not liking to lift up his voice against the acts of his friends or his party or his nation. This question only urges again the fact that conscience is not a single and simple element, but very complex. Even good will needs intelligence *plus* sympathy, *plus* imagination. The good act is not the work of a part of a man, but of the whole man; not the work of a moment, but the total movement of the man's life. It is not the work of the man alone; it is the expression of the spirit of the universe inspiring the whole man.

My point now is that a man is at his best, and only at his best, so as to render wise and just action, when his soul beats to the motion of good will or love. At such times the man is least liable to error. Terrible blunders are rarely if ever committed by men in the mood of virile friendliness, when they only ask to do what is best. The blunders mostly flow out of their moods of moral negligence, or out of pride and arrogance, when the man, otherwise well-intentioned, seeks for the time the ends of his own ambition, or lazily follows the lines of the least moral resistance. Which was it, the mood of humanity, or the mood of boyish frivolity and national pride, that hurried the Congress

of the United States into the Spanish War? The inefficiency of "the good" is largely the lack of a will to do good.

We return with renewed emphasis to the fact that conscience normally becomes the deepest source of satisfaction and delight. This fact lies at the root of all effectual teaching of ethics. Does anyone think of conscience as a remorseless and nagging disturber of our peace? Do you call it morbid and painful? It is like any other great factor or organ of life. What sense is there, which, though meant to bring larger life, yet if disregarded, may not be turned into an instrument of death? We are glad that we suffer from discords in music. For thus only do we pay the price whereby we enjoy the Heroic Symphony. So we are glad that we know the painful differences of good and evil. No one ever knew the joy of the good conscience without being grateful for every prick of the wronged or outraged conscience, which, like a divine pressure, forces us to find our rest in God, that is, in good will.

We see now what the morbid conscience, that time-honored scourge of the Puritan and the New England child, is. It is simply the self-conscious or egotistic stage of human growth. It belongs to the period of the observance of rules. It is a phase of moral apprenticeship. The happy conscience is the life of the free man to whom all laws are, as with God, the mode of the motion of His spirit.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE NATURE OF RIGHT

WE have been using the word *right* very glibly. What do we mean by it? It is the subject with which conscience has to deal. Let us consider and weigh several current notions about it. There are those in the first place who seem to identify right with custom, usage, or convention. You do right, they think, if you do what common usage, or especially the usage of your own social group, allows. You do wrong if you go contrary to the custom. Suppose a man is a stock-broker: he does right if he keeps the rules of the stock-exchange. He does not enquire whether the stock-exchange itself is a righteous institution. He does right, being a soldier, if he obeys orders, and fights by the rules of war. He does not ask whether or not the profession of a soldier is righteous. He does right, being a politician, if he votes with the party caucus. Grant that this is a materialist's world, and what more can we say about right, than that it is the conduct which, at each period and among each people or group of people, meets the standard of custom?

No thoughtful person, however, is satisfied that this is a materialist's world. We all suspect that right, so far from being merely customary, is beyond and above custom. It is what even a few may feel obliged to do, before any habit has yet set that way to give it popular sanction. Right often involves the setting of prevalent

custom aside. How else did monogamy ever come into vogue? Right is what on occasion a single man is bound to do, while all the world does the opposite. How else did the just man proceed, who first learned to forgive his enemies?

Hear now what is often said about right, namely, that it belongs to a purely ideal world. It is a mystery; perhaps God made it to be so. You must do right, simply because it is right. You cannot reduce it to reason or explain it; it is above this earth, where men buy and sell and marry and are given in marriage. Thus men say of the righteous, what Tennyson said of the six hundred at Balaklava:

“Theirs not to make reply,  
Theirs not to reason why,  
Theirs but to do and die.”

Such is the faithful child's view of right. Such is the view of those who teach right on the basis of a supernatural authority. This, at first, seems a splendid and heroic notion about right. And yet how can we help asking questions? As surely as we believe that this is a universe, we must think that it is wrought with intelligence. Right, then, cannot be apart by itself; right cannot be detached from reason or reality. If it belongs in the heavens, it must also dwell in this earth, which is of the same stuff and nature as the heavens. In fact we know nothing about right, apart from the relations of men who buy and sell and live together. Right is no abstract thing; it presides over the complex network of practical human life.

Good idealists have a prejudice against any species

of utilitarian doctrine. They talk nobly of "the scorn of consequence." Give us room for chivalry, men say. Give us room for faith. Better throw life away for the sake of the right, not knowing what use there is in the sacrifice, than wait to be told that the right is also the useful. We appreciate this chivalrous feeling; we still see the need of the chivalry and the faith. We find a borderland of mystery where man's knowledge has not penetrated and in which he takes brave ventures. But we cannot deny the demands of the intelligence. We cannot be satisfied with a blind faith. It is a sane demand of the reason that the right shall also prove to be the useful; that is, it shall be one with the good, and prove some time, whether we see it or not, to bring good consequences. That faith alone is respectable which in its most daring leaps still holds to the unity of the world, and, when it cannot altogether understand how, yet trusts that no effort of right ever is wasted. This faith is anchored in intelligence, in experience, in concrete facts.

Somewhat similar to this last abstract notion about right is the preposterous, but not uncommon idea, that right is whatever we do not like! Right points one way and pleasure points the opposite way. We have referred to this idea in another connection. Children are often brought up with this notion. Right is austere and morose. Wrong is that which is pleasant. The righteous are uncomfortable to themselves and to others. To do wrong, to "commit sin," many imagine, is to be joyous; it is to be free and to have an easy range through the world. To do right is to be shut up within walls. All the more glorious is it, say the virtuous, to do right, though every in-

stinct of one's nature suffers crucifixion. "We scorn the way of pleasure; we take pride in denying ourselves."

Take care, we answer. There is no egotism so subtle as the egotism of the ascetic. There is no arrogance more grasping and selfish than that of those who "thank God that they are not like other men." There is no pleasure so solitary and unwholesome as is pride, albeit the pride of superior virtue.

Who now dares to make it a sin to be glad, like the birds and the little children? What inspiration of God ever pronounced it wrong to have happiness? If God is, has He not blessedness, that is, happiness? We reverently say that it is His pleasure to do right. Is it pleasure to Him, and has He made it not to be our highest pleasure also? This would be blasphemy against the universe.

But right, it is urged, is at least a discipline. It is the hard way to do a thing, whereas wrong is the easy way. Is not the way of sin the broad and smooth path, and right the straight and narrow way? Thus the world is conceived to be a sort of old-fashioned classical school, or a gymnasium. You do in it the things which will make you strong. It is no matter, for example, whether you will ever read and speak Greek. You do not study it for its rewards, but for the toughening of the mind. So the practice of right makes manhood.

There is something of truth in the statement that right is a discipline, as there was something of truth in the argument for a strict classical training. All that is here true, however, falls under a broader principle, namely, that whatever is good to do costs labor

and discipline. The cost, indeed, becomes a part of the proper pleasure of every worthy task. There is no full pleasure without a background of labor and discipline.

This does not mean that any discipline is good, merely for discipline. The discipline is incidental to something beyond itself. Has the study no value but discipline? Will you never really use the classic tongues? Then discipline becomes a mere Sisyphean task. There are plenty of studies which carry use and discipline too, which render pleasure along with their labor. Our best modern education is an attempt to realize this fact. The mind puts forth its best efforts when it sees reason and use in its work. The discipline is not less but more effective which carries a pleasurable zest with it, as the work of the gymnasium does for the athlete. The way of right, likewise, does not need to be made any harder than it really is. As the oarsman gets his best practice, not in pulling weights so many hundred times in a stuffy room, but by rowing a boat in the open bay, so virtue gets its best discipline in doing whatever serves man.

The fact is, there is no way of right which runs only for discipline and not for humanity. Virtue does not belong in the close air of convent cells. It wants the zest and the ozone of motion and struggle in activities where men put their hearts into their work. We have not, therefore, yet learned what the right is, if we do not begin to enjoy it. We do not know it yet, if we make hard work of it. We have had a poor teacher, if we have been taught that it is easy to do wrong and laborious to do right. Do we also think

that it is easy to be sick, and laborious to be well? Do we take no pleasure in a bracing morning bath?

We have exhausted the negative notions of right. Let us take up our subject in a more fruitful way, from the positive side. Let us view it, as it were, from the center of the universe. We have surmised that ethics and theism are one. Our conception is of a life eternal and infinite, out of which man's life proceeds. Good will, we conceive, is the supreme characteristic of this universe life. This idea makes sense of the world. Good will seeks the utmost welfare of its creatures. In other words, God wants happiness for them, like His own happiness. If His welfare is in love, so our highest happiness must be in love. The end and aim of the world is a human society of the men of good will. This is the best for each and the best for all. This meets the demands of our reason. The facts all proceed this way, or else it is idle to try to interpret the facts at all.

Grant this to be so, grant it at least as our working theory, and right, both for God and for us, takes on a simple and harmonious meaning. Right is, for God, the method by which His good will moves to its end. If we may speak modestly, right is the orderly way through which God does His best for all and for each as bound up with all. God satisfies our notion of justice if He so orders and uses each man's life that the best may be made of it for the sake of all lives. What other meaning can justice have for God? What could a man wish more? When we wish this, we are at the height of our manhood; we are ready to yield to every motion of the divine will.

Right for man is like right for God. It is the or-



derly method or way in which the divine good will, acting through us, reaches its ends. How shall my life count for the most? Right is the answer which good will, stirring my intelligence, gives to the question. Right is the complete use of all that is in me for the service of good will. Wrong is the lack or failure of this complete use of my life. In short, right is the method by which we bring about social welfare.

## CHAPTER VII

### WHAT THE RIGHT IS LIKE

It is as impossible adequately to define the grand factors of life as to define life itself. The deeper realities always lie beyond any mere verbal description. We may know them, and yet they continue to be more than we yet know. We do best with them by saying what they are like. Let us treat right thus in a series of parables.

First, very obviously, right is like a highway, where all go, as distinguished from the innumerable private trails, over which wanderers make their way through a wilderness. True, the trails are free; every man can go where he chooses and take his own time. The thoroughfare, the turnpike, or the railway is costly; you must pay tolls or taxes to keep it up. You must obey its conditions. So with right as compared with wrong. The right constrains you, but does it not make you free? Which man roams most freely, the primitive or the civilized man?

Moreover, the private trail is right, so long as you do not have to interfere with anyone else. The trail ceases to be right when not one man but many must travel, and when your trail crosses and tramples down your neighbor's corn.

It is written that long ago in ancient Palestine every man did "what was right in his own eyes." Yes. And he thought it right to raid across the border into the Edomites' lands; and he thought it right to take

blind revenge for an insult, or to put a slave to death. Who would like to go back for greater freedom, and live in Palestine in the twelfth century before Christ? Bring back to the present Palestine one of the ancient Hebrews, or bring back one of the primitive Indian tribesmen to America. He could not go any longer upon one of his old trails; he would have to travel, as we all do, by the highway of the common right.

Again, right is a mode of efficiency. It is like the wire which carries energy. The power is at Niagara; a few miles away in the city are the mills to be run and the houses to be lighted. Great cables carry the current. So right is the cable which carries the force, namely, good will. Here, for example, is a great factory with its thousands of workmen. What will the superintendent do, so as to secure the highest product? Let him pay the men generous wages; let him treat them like men, and not as serfs or pawns; let him promote their comfort; let him make good his engagements with them. Right is that line of least resistance which carries good will to the workshop. Whereas, wrong dissipates the current of humanity between the employers and the employed, and sooner or later ruins the work.

Right is like the circulation of the blood. Health means that all parts of the body get their share. Overload the stomach, and the stomach itself suffers with the rest of the body. Take from the extremities and give the brain more than its share, and the brain itself suffers congestion. Millions of laboring men and small farmers in the United States live on meager wages. A few thousand men actually suffer a congestion of wealth. Their luxury, ill-befitting a repub-

lic, oppressive to their happiness, is a bane to their children. Give us better circulation of the life of the people. Out of the unearned monopoly wealth of the few add as much as a tenth to the average wages; you will easily add a thousand millions of dollars to the purchasing power of the nation; there will be more trade for everyone, and new work for the unemployed. Right seeks this healthy circulation of life. It adds increased share of nutrition to the furthest extremities of the body.

Right is like the essential condition of a partnership. It is not, as men often think, an individual's claim to get all that belongs to him. It is mutual obligation. A man belongs to an insurance company, a club, a union, or a business. He expects and receives certain advantages; he is willing to take his share of the profits or the pleasure. All this is upon a single condition, namely, that he fulfills his part in the partnership. Now and then he must pay an assessment; he must work extra hours on occasion; he may even have to accept the risks of utter loss of all that he has put in. Who is the man who expects to receive, and not also to pay and take risks and suffer?

In fact, every man has a sort of contract with society. Is a man a soldier? His contract is to be willing to be shot. Is he a fireman or an engineer? His contract is to be willing to stay by his engine, even if it carries him over the embankment. Is a man cashier of a bank? His contract with society is not to be tempted, hired, or frightened to give up his trust. Is he a grocer or a provision dealer? Society gives him his living in return for his services. He is under bonds to furnish goods of the advertised weight and

quality, and nothing less. A day laborer's contract is to furnish the full worth of his labor. A man must do his part just the same, even when the public or the employer fails to meet his expectations of praise or pay. Who would not rather do more and take less than his share, than do less and take more than belongs to him?

Right, again, is like the delicate adjustment of a wonderful piece of mechanism. Three or four centuries ago a few hundred thousands of savages roamed over what now constitutes the United States of America. Few as these savages were, the continent was not large enough for them. To-day, in the single city of the greater New York, probably several times as many people as the whole Indian population of the country once was, live together in peace. Civilization means that people can live close together and not disturb one another. To be civilized is to know how to co-operate. To be barbarous is to interfere and jostle, and run amuck, like wild Malays. Right, then, is the marvelous and complex adjustment, wherein life touches life for mutual helpfulness; and wrong is maladjustment, friction, and resistance.

The people of every great city are learning this new meaning of right. They once thought that it was a man's private affair if he became a drunkard or frequented vile haunts. Citizens thought that they could attend to their own business and make money, while corruptionists stole the government, looted the treasury, and debauched the police. Every great city is finding that corruption, fraud, and selfish ambition spoil the intricate gearing of society. You cannot have a commonwealth except on the terms of righteous-

ness. There is no merely private wrong. Wrong is like gravel thrown into the machinery. There is no virtue set in the skies. Virtue is here in the working day world. At every point of human contact, through faithfulness, honor, clean lives, friendly deeds, it proves to be that which fits men together.

Here, for example, is the vast system of commerce and credit by which the modern world is fed and clothed. A man thinks that it is a private affair between himself and his small tradesman, or his washerwoman, whether or not he pays his bills promptly. On the contrary, his delay is not cruelty to a single person. A whole line of wheels turns upon his action, or stops if he fails. A procession of men and women wait for him to do right, or else, if he does wrong, they are tempted, or even forced, to do wrong in turn.

Suppose a city, or a nation repudiates an obligation, the United States, for example, to the Philippine Islands or to China. Men, perhaps, call it diplomacy to do something else than what was promised. Public men offer excuses to show that a nation, like a consecrated king, can do no wrong. But what is it for a nation to break its pledge? It is as if a great steel beam had dropped out of its place in the structure of a bridge. The family of nations is the structure which has been pulled apart. A raft, indeed, might hold together, though the sea came up between its logs. But in the modern iron ship every plate and rivet must stand true to its place. Right, then, is that which holds true civilization together, and wrong is whatever fracture opens a leak.

Once more, right is like the movement of life in every plant or tree which makes it grow toward the



sun. Wrong is that which stops or thwarts its growth. It is not enough that we do right to-day; a new and higher right faces us to-morrow. The habitual or customary right is only the basis of growth, like the tree's trunk. The new right is at the tip of the bough, closest to the sunshine. To do the new duty is to grow. No living thing can stop growing, and not straightway begin to die. Will we grow to our uttermost? To fall short of this becomes a wrong. We shall apply this principle later.

The so-called virtues that make up the good life are all forms of right. Take truthfulness, for example. Why tell the truth rather than a falsehood? Because truth, like a motion of life, makes civilized society possible, while falsehood baffles, perplexes, and separates us. We depend on one another; on the doctor to tell us about our health; on the engineer to report on the railroad or the mine; on the chemist to detect the presence of a poison; on the carpenter to tell us the state of our roof; on the teacher to show us what to do for our child. A myriad of transactions from the humblest to the highest proceed altogether upon the basis of trust in one another's truth. Break this trust and the work of civilization ceases.

What is honesty? It is not merely to make exact change, or to pay our debts and dues, whether to the grocer or to the electric car conductor; it is not even to keep our promises. It is to do our full and generous part in the movement of social life that constitutes the household, drives the wheels of business, or establishes the State. Honesty is more than not to evade our share; it is not to wish to evade our share of work, or taxes, or other contribution of service by

which we are indebted to one another. To be honest means to be a vital, efficient member of society in good, regular, and honorable standing. Who really wishes to be a parasite upon society?

Take even the personal virtues of cleanliness, purity, self-control, and temperance. Does anyone suppose that it would be a delight, if only the sense of shame would permit, or some Gyges ring could be had, to violate the law of these virtues? To go about with soiled clothes and unclean hands, and carry possible contagion? To become a beast or a demon and wrong womanhood? Not to repress unseemly cries, and ill-temper? To be drunken and disorderly? The truth is that the right at every point is simply that which the man at his best, and so far as he is a man, chooses and approves, as good for him and everyone else.

Our thesis was that right, welfare, happiness, life, fulfillment, civilization are all one, as befits an orderly and rational universe. That must be best which is the highest utility, and right is the straightest line to this best. But this is not to construct a selfish universe. The keynote of it is benevolence. It is founded in good will, as in our thought of God; with or without the thought of God, it is carried on and realized through good will in man. To be selfish is to miss its unity. To be selfish is to do and to be less than the best, and thus to be essentially and permanently wrong. Our ethics is thus bound up in the conception of the universal good will. Law, utility, reason, fact, and faith are involved together. Nothing is wanting to complete the unity.

We come back from another point of view to the same central point. Ethics ought not to be merely

a law ; it ought also to carry a gospel, or good news. We have a gospel. The righteous man is the well man in the universe. He has health and joy. It is joy and satisfaction to do fitting and harmonious things, it is gladness to make and complete new and ever nicer human adjustments ; it is satisfaction to foresee the processes by which human life shall surely be perfected. The new right, seen by the few, will presently be the law and habit for the many. It is joy and satisfaction also to feel within oneself the quality and eternal nature of good will. A man is like the good steel which, when the wrench comes, will hold its place. A man may, perhaps, be compelled to die at his post ; it is good to know that, if the Master of life bids, he is ready to die. Better and a thousand times happier to suffer or to die, if he must, than to live however long the life of a poltroon and coward. Is it not God's life which throbs in us, making us ready for whatever his service requires ?

If our thought is sound, it follows that courage, which has been supposed to be difficult, becomes easy. It is a kind of by-product of the good will. To do right, being normal, being socially useful, being the most effectual mode of life, is now beautiful. No one stands alone in doing right, but he stands in a grand structure, supporting and being supported. The dreadful thing now is to fail, to shirk, to betray confidence. To stand straight, to face one's duty, is the very thing that a man chooses. No one would ever wish to do wrong or fear to do right if he only could see plainly the social significance of his acts.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE TRUTH

THERE is another point of view from which we shall get light upon our problem of conscience and right. Let us ask what the word *truth* means. We have already used it in its ordinary sense. But it carries a deeper meaning. For it lies at the root of all ethics. In fact, the idea of truth is fundamental to the conception of a universe. When we say that we believe in a universe, we avow our belief that all things fit together and make a rational harmony; that if we knew all there is, there would be no contradiction or incongruity, but the reason would be satisfied. This is our faith in the truth of things. So far as we know them, they fit together and make sense and unity. To find that they fit is to find the truth. To discover a new fitness is to discover a truth. Thus Newton found a truth in the law of gravitation, for he saw how bodies in the heavens and dust in the air all fit together in obeying a single kind of motion. To state a bare fact is truth, only so far as the language fits, or explains the fact; to state the isolated fact, as, for example, that a new planet has been seen through a telescope, is not the truth about the planet. The truth appears when we find that astronomers had been looking for that very planet in order to fill and fit the place for which certain observed motions in the rest of the planets had called. When the planet was found pre-

cisely to meet the conditions, we had so far the truth, that is, the fact of its fitness or harmony.

Of course, in a large sense, truth is for us rather an approximation than a finality. To see the whole in all its fitnesses would be to see as God sees. In other words, it would be to know what we conceive to be the complete plan of the universe. In some respects we obviously make merely provisional statements of truth. Thus we take the undulatory theory of light, or the atomic theory of substance, or the conception of an ether filling space, as working theories in regard to the physical universe. They seem to allow us to harmonize groups of otherwise isolated facts or events. They may conceivably lead us on to more satisfying generalizations. To us who are learners there is nothing absolute or fixed. And yet there may be at each step of our progress a sufficiency of truth, that is, of fitnesses apprehended by our minds, to enable us to go further and learn nicer adjustments both in things and in thoughts.

What we say of truth in general holds in the ethical realm. This is a moral world. In other words, we can only understand or explain it, or find any sense and harmony in it, as we discover that it goes together on moral lines, and will not otherwise go together at all. Its history calls for moral uses and a moral purpose or direction. The truth here is the discovery of moral fitnesses or harmonies. We have been considering such harmonies. Thus, justice helps and binds men together, and enables them to live in happiness. Wherever justice prevails between men, peace prevails. Wherever justice holds between nations, the terror of war vanishes.

Someone may be skeptical enough to ask how we can ever be sure what really fits and makes sense. The idealistic answer is here just like the answer of science. In fact, the scientific answer is idealistic. The man of science proceeds upon the basis of a faith that, even if his provisional theory fails to cover all the facts, this will make way for a fuller and more accurate statement. So we believe in our statement of moral laws. We work toward a more complete expression of ethical harmony. We discern a tendency among all men who use their reason to agree in their thought about the essential moral facts. There is also a certain consensus of the experts or the teachers, which is probably much closer than men are aware. In fact, if we think at all, our thought implies the validity of the reasoning processes. They may be fallible, but they point the way of ultimate reality.

Every form of right is now seen to belong to the unity of truth and to make for harmony. To do right is to do that which fits or is true. It is like admirable workmanship. Each part fits into, and makes the perfection of, every other part. We thus say that the beam or the column, the floor or the wall is true. We mean that it is exactly where it belongs and is most efficient. We say likewise that a man is true. We mean that wherever we try him, he can be depended upon. He settles into his place, as the tenon settles into its mortise, and he holds fast. This is more than telling the truth. It is to be the kind of person of whom truth is the natural expression.

When we say that any person is true or right, we mean that he fits into civilized human society, and is harmonious with it, as the atom fills its proper place



in the crystal, or the cell in the structure of muscle or nerve. This is our tribute to our faith in the structural quality of the world. Every right or true act, word or life, fits somewhere, and goes to make social harmony, as each musical note belongs to a symphony.

Conscience may now be said to be a man's capacity to see, feel, appreciate, and enjoy social fitness, harmony, and unity. Through a good conscience a man sees what moral or social fitness is, what sort of acts each occasion calls for, what acts help most, what acts are socially beautiful. Conscience in this sense is a form of tact, like a nice taste or touch.

Every sense carries with it an impulse to act. Do you see what is fitting? There is an impulse to do it and bring the fitness about. Do you see what is right or true? The impulse is to do right. This is a part of the unity or harmony of the world. The power that creates the sense of beauty is one with the power that creates beauty. Sense and action tend to fit and go together. The power that creates the social or moral sense is one with the power in us that commands social and moral conduct. It will not let us merely see, and then do nothing. It bids us forever fall into the order and fit into our place. This is conscience, bidding us be what we see that we ought to be, filling us with joy and contentment, as often as we settle down into the safe mortise of obedience. It is then as if the spirit of the master builder possessed us and put us at rest.

Now the acme of all moral and social fitness is to be in the mood of good will. To see the truth of the world is to see all things unified in good will. Only as the world is thus unified does it become moral or social. Ill-will, self-will, social indifference, break

the universe into a horde of wild forces, and take the heart and harmony out of its history. At all events, the mood of good will is the one mood in which a man can actually come into inward unison and fit his own life together and make sense out of it, and also fit it into the life of society. Good will can always do this. The capacity to fit and to be unified is the test of truth. Conscience in this sense, and at its highest, is the power in us, "not ourselves," urging and pressing us to be true, that is, to live in good will.

Conscience, again, is the co-operative force in and behind all economic industrial and political conditions. It will not permit men to live at odds with each other. It will not suffer the individual to hate and quarrel, to snatch and covet and do injury, to be cruel or selfish. It will not suffer groups of men or nations to stand off and fight, or blindly compete, each to get the advantage of the other. This urgency is another form of the impulse to be true, that is, to fit together and make unity. The eternal pressure of the conscience of the world, the gravitation of the universe on each and all, is to co-operate with one another, to help one another, to emulate each other in the volume and the richness of human efficiency; in short, to translate all the powers of man and turn on the powers of the world to serve and increase the common life of good will. May we not say that conscience is the good will of the world pressing on us to express itself fittingly, and thus to have full and free utterance in beneficent deeds?

Such, finally, is beautiful conduct, of which all outward expressions of beauty are symbols and parables. Do we believe in the true, the good and the beautiful?

All men who know the values of life answer, Yes. The life of good will is that which creates the true, the good, and the beautiful.

In all this, however, as we have already suggested, man reaches toward, but never absolutely attains perfectness. The true and the good are like the beautiful. The artist always sees visions of greater beauty than any which are realized. It is enough joy if he does his best to embody his ideal. So truth and goodness ever stand above us. The law is that everyone shall "follow the gleam" and strive to put his ideal into practice. Thus social harmony and happiness come to pass.

## PART IV

### MORAL EVIL: HOW TO TREAT IT

#### CHAPTER I

##### THE FACT OF SIN

WE have to approach the subject of moral evil from two different points of view. The result will be the same mode of philosophical thought and the same practical treatment. Our first mode of approach will be a brief study of what we mean by the fact of "sin."

Let us disabuse the word "sin" of all theological meaning. Nevertheless, the word stands for a profound moral fact. What is this fact? What is it "to sin"? The easy answer is that it is to do wrong. But "wrong" may mean quite different things. It may mean what everyone recognizes as wrong or hurtful. It may mean what you hold to be wrong, and what really is wrong, while the other man who has done it, thinks it right; you accordingly call him a sinner. Or, it may mean what the other man holds to be wrong, which you may not think wrong at all, and which is not really wrong. And, again, "sin" may mean what neither you nor the other thinks to be wrong, but which, nevertheless, falls short of the ideal standard. You may have thus done wrong or "sinned" without recognizing that you did wrong.

Thus, the total abstainer thinks that every man does wrong who drinks wine, while thousands of wine

drinkers are totally unconscious of offense. Thus, the devout Roman Catholic woman thinks that she has committed sin in eating meat in Lent, which millions of good Protestants think is no offense at all. Thus, multitudes of people are conscious of no sin, even when they tell falsehoods, or become angry, or fight their enemies. The writers of the maledictory Psalms had no sense of sin in breaking the law of good will. They knew no such general law.

Moreover, sin is mostly used to describe an act of disobedience. But its deeper meaning, as we saw in the previous chapters, covers the man's attitude or temper. Is the man a "sinner," who commits murder, and is he not also a "sinner," who would like to kill if he dared? Is he a sinner who has stolen, and is he not also a sinner who covets his neighbor's goods or whose ambition is to live upon the labor of others? It is well to ask whether the man has committed an unjust or unsocial act, but it is a graver question whether the man is an unjust or unsocial man. The wrong act or the vile word is only an index or expression of the man. The act is the symptom; it tells a story of the man's weakness, his immaturity, his distemper, or his disease. It is a confession; it is a sign of his danger; it is a signal for moral help. If he is wrong at heart, it may be distinctly better that the fact should disclose itself than that it should slumber concealed.

The most comprehensive definition of sin is that it is the absence or the failure of good will, as more or less consciously recognized in the light of an ideal good will. In a society where there was plenty of love there might be errors and blunders and injuries, but there would be no sins. Show the man of good

will at any moment that his act or his word works an injury to others, and he will make haste to correct it. There is nothing that he wishes so much as to do benefits. Show him that he has lost his temper, and you have convicted him of what is worse than doing wrong; you have convicted him of being wrong. It is as if the musician's violin were out of tune. He cannot play again till he has come into tune.

Sin, then, is essentially the act of ill-will. The sinner is the man of ill or selfish will. You know the sinner by contrast with the standard set up by the man of integrity. Love at its best, like justice, is a form of will, like God's will; it is the flow of effective life, as if the steam were turned on. Sin, therefore, is not merely the lack of kindly feeling; it is the lack of efficiency, will, and life. It is moral poverty, and it presently becomes the failure of happiness, which, as we have seen, at its best, consists in the expression of life. There is nothing so pathetic and pitiable as sin is, of which disease and death are the outward figures and parables.

The sense of sin, that is, the sense of moral deficiency, grows, as intelligence and humanity are developed in man. The keenness of this sense and the distress which it involves on the occasion of a wrong act, or word; or even a wrong mood, are, as a rule, in proportion to the degree of moral attainment which has been reached. The more music one has, the more painful discords and noise become. The better one's taste, the more one's dislike of untidiness and ugliness. So, the more moral life anyone possesses, the more he feels the smart or the shame of wrong conduct and especially of his own. On the other hand, the



lower the tone of his moral life, that is, his intellectual and affectional life, the less sensitive one is to the sense of sin. This fact needs carefully to be noted. For many people are surprised to find that "the bad" are rarely aware of their badness.

This sense of an injured conscience, that is, of moral disapproval or shame, begins mostly in the consciousness of external restraint. The child and even the savage enters upon a world of laws and penalties. "Thou shalt not" is the sign put up at many a tempting pathway. Every law fixes a point of moral friction. It is a world of threats, menaces, and fears. Whippings, angry words, scowls, and hate, prisons, pains, social ostracism, and even death, await disobedience. This is a stern and solemn world on its reverse side.

To outward laws and restraints, parental, social, tribal, governmental, the inward intelligence and the growing sympathies presently respond. The sense of sin, beginning on the animal plane and in selfish fear, becomes blended at once with that marvelous social instinct which specially characterizes man, and through which each individual life more and more takes on the joys and sorrows, the weal and woe of humanity. To hurt another comes to hurt me; to do an injustice is a blow struck, not at the other only, but at me. To wrong the family or the state, is to wrong every member. Whoever does the wrong, if I do it myself, none the less it is done to me.

We learn at last that we are not each a separate self distinguished from all others. The true self—the complete person—has not yet come to birth, till it becomes literally true, which was said by the old

Roman writer: "Nothing which is human is foreign to me." A man's true personality is as wide as being is, and shares in the life of all humanity. As we have already shown, the happiness of each becomes one with the happiness of all. To do wrong is to militate against or to subtract from this happiness in which we all share. It is to waste the common treasures; it is to draw off the waters from the common reservoir; at its worst, it is to play the part of a traitor to one's own household, one's neighborhood, one's state, to all humanity. This is what "sin" does on the negative side. And to see this fact for the sinner is pain and shame and remorse, growing the more keen as one's intelligence and sympathy grow.

There is another side, however, in the development of the moral sense. It needs to be carefully qualified, but it must not be forgotten. In every relation of life, we learn to go by falling; we learn by our experiments, by mistakes, by failures. We learn all the arts so; we learn all virtues so; we learn love and life and happiness so. "It must needs be that offenses come." If they never came, there would be no moral progress and no growth in love.

See the double aspect of this rule. On the one hand I am full of sorrow that I sinned. It shames me that I proved unequal to the duty required of me. I am sorry and ashamed that, when I had the chance to do good, I was not equal to it. My sympathy, my intelligence, my will failed; my life and power proved to be meager and childish.

On the other hand, even in my shame I am forced to be glad of my failure. It showed me something, as when the child fails in his lesson. It hurt me, and it

did me good, as when the burnt child learns what fire is. It wounded my egotism, but it gave me a new sense of the fatuity of the selfish life. The worse the pain of my fall, the more I learnt that man's strength comes not from himself, but only by keeping the trolley of his little life close to the perpetual force of the universe,—the good will of God. Every failure, every smart of pain and shame, normally drives a man closer to the source of his life. He is strong and safe, only when his will is one with the will of God.

The truth is, no man can be genuinely moral in God's universe as long as he tries to absorb and get life for himself. His happiness, as we have already seen, is made to run with the outgo of the stream of his life. His happiness is made to dwell in that larger self, wherein he and all the universe are one. Now every moral failure brings in upon man this inexorable and beautiful lesson. It is for this reason that the best men always suffer the most from their own moral lapses. Their suffering is a proof of their sensitiveness. It is the condition by which they are made to grow better. If they did not care for the discords, it would be because they had ceased to care for the music. Thus sin becomes a necessary factor in the development of the highest morality. Even when gross sin has long since ceased to be possible, the subtler faults of negligence, egotism, and selfishness sting the growing soul to strive for nobler life.

The lesson is the same with the life of humanity as it is with the individual. On one side we tremble at the record of cruelty, hate and war, slavery and oppression, animalism, lust and greed, sometimes more gross, again subtle and refined, but always the same in

the selfishness at their roots. We bow our heads at the record of men's evil deeds in the nineteenth century. We are ashamed that the United States was obliged to rid itself of the evil of slavery by the disastrous cost of civil war. We are ashamed and humiliated that our own generation did not know better and do better than to break promises to its Indian wards; that our nation, choosing jauntily to go to war with Spain, and again in the Philippine Islands, proved not to be civilized, least of all Christian. We are ashamed of our failure to keep our great cities free of waste, corruption, and vice. We are ashamed of notorious methods of robbery under the name of business. This means that we are sorry and ashamed that we were not stronger and better than we really were. It means that we were not good enough to pass our examinations, and to be promoted into the rank where we aspired to stand. The lesson ought to be wholesome.

On the other hand, does anyone suppose that the nineteenth century surprised or disappointed the Almighty? Did it surprise any wise man, who, looking beneath the surface of our so-called civilization, observed how thin the layer yet was which separated us from the seething fires of the old-world barbarism? No! The slavery, the tyrannies, the hypocrisies, the cruel wars, the commercialism of the century, extending into the present time and coming to light in many a hideous revelation of greed and unscrupulousness in men on Wall Street and in Washington, had to break forth, because these faults were lurking in man's barbarous blood. They were not really a falling away from earlier and higher standards of virtue and hu-

manity. Mankind had never yet taken such higher standards seriously.

Sin is to do unsocial acts and to be selfish and inhuman. But it is not strictly sin, till man awakens from his animalism and becomes aware of those ideals which constitute his humanity. Again and again both the individual and society wake up to the sight of new standards of personal, commercial, political, or social morality. This is what the theologians used to call the "conviction of sin." It is a pity for any man or nation not to suffer such awakenings when we cry out anew, "There is no health in us." This is the natural movement of moral life. It demonstrates that there is health in us. This fact explains much of the alarm often expressed at the lapse of our age from moral standards. There may often be a lapse in certain directions at the very time when there is also the stirring of a new ethical sense.

The evil deeds and crimes of the ages are now seen to be the stern but salutary lessons compelling man from the ways of barbarism to realize his manhood. To the savage, as to the animal, these things hardly yet appear evil. They are shameful, not from the lower and brutal side of men's lives, but viewed from above. They are shameful and sickening, because man, catching their costly lesson, is growing more sensitive and humane. That they are exceedingly distressing does not prove that the world is growing worse, but it proves the opposite. It proves that there is that in man which cannot continue to tolerate inhumanity and barbarism. It proves that this is a world of ideals, and not the sport of dancing atoms. The eternal forces are behind man, never letting him rest till he

rests in the life of good will. The facts of human experience are thus seen to underlie the faith of religion, that this is God's world. The evils and sin of the weary past are the demonstration of the ethics of the Golden Rule and Beatitudes. They compel upon man an everlasting and beneficent urgency to climb and attain his manhood.



## CHAPTER II

### A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD EVIL

WE have now to consider the facts of moral evil from another point of view. We shall look at the marvelous range of parallelism or analogy between things called evil in the outward world, and the evil of the moral realm. We shall find a similar conclusion forcing itself upon our minds from both fields, precisely as if they were only complementary facts of one and the same order.

The characteristic of the customary and conventional thought about ethics has been a form of dualism or opposition. Good and evil have been usually arrayed against each other, like the twin powers in the ancient Persian religion. Good men and bad men likewise divided the world, the first class few, the other a vast multitude. The business of the good was to fight evil and specially to thwart and oppose bad men.

The keynote of all our modern thought is unity. But what possible unity can there be between good and evil? The answer to this question is found in an immense and growing volume of illustrations from the outward world. Look at the long list of material things once considered to be inimical to man, which we have learned to annex to man's uses. Thus, the desert, the forests, the mountains, the rocks, the ocean, all once forbidding and dreadful, tenanted by evil powers or demons, we have found out to be our most excel-

lent servants. We irrigate the desert and turn it into a garden; we hardly can find forests enough for our timber or fuel; we send our invalids, fearless of monsters, into the heights of the mountains and let the balmy air cure disease, or fatigue; we mine beneath the rocks, and find in the former homes of the gnomes vast supplies of coal and ore; we make the barren sea our highway to connect the nations and give us free course over the globe. We shall neutralize it yet and constitute it the great barrier against war. We would not vote away desert or mountain, or rocky soil or ocean. They all meet our uses. And no one dreams that demons frequent any part of the earth—not even the barren glaciers of the polar lands.

We learn also how to cure what we once thought evil conditions. Drain the swamps, and we presently take the malaria out of them; add certain fertilizers to the sands, and presently they are clothed in useful verdure. Store up the waters of the flood, and you increase your supplies of power for mills, and fill your reservoirs against the time of summer heat.

There is no respect in which the change from the old world régime to the new is so marked as in the use to which man subjects every power of nature. The winds, in old times, were his subtle and unseen enemy. The winds now are his angels, good and not bad. He knows at last where they come from, and what mighty agency of sun-power stirred their motion. Early man once dreaded thunder and lightning as the dire work of an angry God. To-day man harnesses his ships and his chariot wheels to the majestic electrical machinery of the universe and manufactures out of this kindly force daylight and heat through

the long winter nights. No little child in any civilized home is told any longer that God utters his anger behind the thunder cloud. In short, all the forces of the world are one force and not diverse at all. And all are found to be more and more subject to use, as we become better acquainted with them.

See also how we learn to redeem and annex to the kingdom of use and good what once we thought to be sheer waste and loss. They tell us that the profits of many kinds of business are wholly involved in the by-products, that were formerly thrown away. The crudities of the petroleum only need to be eliminated from the oil to become new forms of wealth, important in the arts, good for medicinal value.

Even at the worst, where we still seem ignorant or helpless before vast powers, in the presence of which we are pigmies, we cease to think of any opposition between man and nature. We see our towns swept by tornadoes, our fields flooded by the tumultuous streams, our ships overcome and wrecked, a mighty city shaken down by earthquake shock and devastated by fire. We perceive no longer hate or vengeance in any of these things; except in a relative sense, we cannot call them evil, though they hurt us or even kill us. They belong to the one grand scheme by which we live; they are a part of our universe; even the earthquake tells us the story of the long processes whereby our world came to be what it is.

In fact, we are forever learning new forms of adjustment to the processes and forces of our world, even to those which we cannot control or subdue. We build more solidly with reference to the winds, the earthquake, and the fire, and thus reduce our risks. We

light our coasts at night and construct stauncher ships; we range levees along the banks of our rivers. We keep the plague at bay, and make ourselves immune from one disease after another. This is the process of life—constant adjustment and readjustment. All our civilization grows out of this process. And when, in spite of all things, we at last die, we no longer imagine that death is our enemy. This, too, is one of the processes of the kind of world we live in—not bad, we surmise, for us who go, and certainly good for those who come after us, and need our room to dwell and work and be glad in.

We reckon upon a quality of venture or hazard in life. The possibility of life at all on our planet is within certain limits of heat or cold, of atmosphere not too dense or too rare, of moisture enough and not too much. Each life is won out of a balance of forces, and a due use of certain material. Struggling to live, the expression of our energy is at once the cost and the satisfaction of physical life. No strong life is possible without effort. We take life with this element of continual hazard, both for ourselves and for all whom we love. It seems harsh, at least when the pendulum swings away from the line of our pleasure and ease. But we should not dare if we could to get rid of the hazard and venture of life. It goes to make men of us; it goes to the zest and joy of life. It makes the tragedy; it makes also the beauty, the poetry, the music. There is no music without the heart-beat and rhythm. The process of continual adjustment through which life goes on civilizes us who obey the law of its motion.

My point here is that this very swing and motion,

the contrast and rhythm, are of the nature of a unity. They tell of no hostile powers. They mean a world where all things go at last into a harmony. This is the modern man's most solid conception of faith, with regard, at least, to the world that he inhabits. He comes to be altogether a citizen in it; that is, he learns everywhere how to make himself at home, as if it belonged to him. Every new idea of knowledge makes him more intimately a citizen, a master, a fellow creator. The more intelligent we become, therefore, the less do we tend to fight against anything as hostile to us. The child may, indeed, strike out against the post or the stone over which he has fallen, as if it were his enemy, and seek to punish it. A furious Xerxes might order his men to whip the sea which had swallowed his ships. But we have come to study the grain of things, and we seek to go with the grain as far as we can and not against it. We do not propose to beat against the walls which hem us in. All the more surely we are able to say to the mountain, "Be removed and be thou cast into the sea;" and the means lie at our hands, working with Nature, and not against her, to compass every reasonable desire.

It may be possibly urged here, by way of exception to this doctrine, that we are obliged to fight against disease, and against wild beasts and insect pests. The answer is, that we have less and less sense of malice or hate even toward the fiercest animals or the most destructive germs of disease. We do not conceive of any of these things as evil in themselves. On their own ground, or aside from the point of contact between these things and human life, we look on them with curiosity, and even at times with pleasure. We

see the beauty of the poise of the eagle in the air, of the painted skin and motion of the serpent, of the majesty of the lion. These creatures add variety and color to life; we cannot say that we wish they never had been; they bridge over the span of the succession of forms from the beginnings of life on the planet to the appearance of man. They are of one nature then with the nature in man. There is that in them, passion, appetite, fierce courage, slyness, jealousy, rage, which is also in man, which, therefore, helps man to understand himself and govern himself. Even when he must, in sheer self-defense, put these animal brothers of his to death, he wishes them no evil, and would cause them the least possible suffering.

I have dwelt at length upon the unity of the outward world, taking up into itself all seeming mischief and evil; I have insisted on the fact of a new attitude of growing intelligence, sympathy, and adaptability toward even the wild and brutal forces of the world, because we have here an immense parable of the relation of man to the things called good and evil in the realm of ethics. You cannot have unity everywhere else and discover at all points the structure of a universe, and cease to have unity and set up dualism all by itself in the case of human history and man's moral problems. Men following the old-time instinct have, indeed, tried to do this, and may try still to do it; but it is out of the order of all the analogies of the universe, and practically unworkable. The structure of the universe resents every attempt to represent its elements, its forces, its laws, as in conflict with one another. The world will not abide any conception of dualism.



## CHAPTER III

### THE NEW ATTITUDE IN ETHICS

It ought to be plain that evil can nowhere be conceived of as a separate power or entity. It is a form of weakness, or incapacity, or immaturity. See if this is not so in any of the phases in which we find moral and social mischief. Take the case of falsehood. This sort of evil stands for the want of courage or manliness, not to say intelligence. Falsehood is the special weakness of the slave, the coward, the young child, of the starved and oppressed peoples. The strong, the brave, the well-nourished, the intelligent, have hardly the temptation to tell falsehoods.

Take the case of injustice or dishonesty. Every injustice is a confession of weakness. The dishonest man tells you that he would choose to be honest; he has no wish to wrong you. But he was poor, he was tempted, he was weak in will to resist, he was not able to earn his living; or he was in the grip of powerful ambitions, or of greed. He was suspicious of his rivals; he did not dare to stand out against his fellows. He was not strong enough, or good enough, that is, he was not enough of a man to be honest. No thoroughly intelligent and strong man, no capable and useful man, is tempted to be dishonest.

Take the case of passion and lust. Here surely is weakness,—not, perhaps, on the animal side, but weakness for a man, weakness in self-control, weakness in the social sense, weakness in good will. Does the man

say, I have strong appetites? So much the more does he confess, when his appetites run away with him and do violence, when he commits injury through them and becomes a menace to society, that he has not manhood or clear intelligence sufficient to correspond to the strength of his passion. Let the same man's horse or dog thus break over restraints and run wild, and he would be the first to allow that the creature was,—not bad, for his strength is a matter of value, but ill-trained and inferior.

Consider the vices of cowardice, cruelty, ugliness, and hate. Under each of these names we find evident weakness, or poverty of mind and resource. The larger and more resourceful the nature, the less likelihood that these moral diseases will attack a man. At the worst, we find a nature that is one-sided and ill-nurtured. Find us a malicious man, and you have found a man who is not quite human. The man is not all there; the man has not been well nourished. Perhaps he has not been well treated; he has not had fair chances to show himself a man. This is a misfortune or weakness.

Pride, arrogance, egotism, moral pests as they are, all express a certain weakness, not power. Their victim lacks intelligence, a broader view of the bigness of the world, sympathy, and especially humor. Virility, enterprise, energy, make a man valuable, but not self-assertiveness and conceit, running over, as they do run, into envy and jealousy; these are faults that detract from a man's value and satisfaction. In what place in human society would you choose a man on the basis of his arrogance, or his jealousy?

Whichever way you look at sin or moral evil, it represents some sort of social incapacity. In chronic forms and in grown-up people, it becomes a species of disease, hampering growth, happiness, and life, and doubtless diminishing the physical health. For man's nature is properly a unity,—at its best, when the powers of the whole man act together in harmony,—subject also to sufferings and lapse of power, in so far as discordant thoughts, acts, and feelings agitate the mind and play on the fretted strings of the delicate nervous system.

We use the word "fault" advisedly in judging men's characters. A fault is that which spoils a man or makes trouble, as a leak spoils a roof, as a knot injures a board, as a rent or a spot hurts a garment, as a lameness incapacitates a runner. Find a fault if you can that any intelligent man would choose to keep by him. Would he be false, would he be mean, would he be jealous, would he be cruel, would he be overbearing, would he choose to be self-indulgent and take his pleasure at the cost or ruin of others? What kind of moral fault is there that anyone is fond or glad of, as one is glad of beauty, or power, or knowledge?

I say so much here because the idea is still in many minds that wrong is the pleasant way, if one only dared to travel it; and right is so austere and unlovely that no one would choose it unless under duress. This is absolutely untrue. It is as if one would like to lie in a hospital and be waited upon, or as if one would rather fall down than stand and walk, or as if it would be delightful, as it is easy, to sink and drown, rather than strike out and swim. But sin, it is urged, seems a pleasure. Why? Not in its injury to others, but be-

cause it looks like a cheap or short cut to reach something that the man desires. Thus stealing, besides being a crude and animal form of activity, is the dull or lazy man's way of getting most immediately what he wants. But the thief rarely seeks to injure his neighbor, of whose loss he hardly thinks. It is pleasant to the dull boy to show his power in torturing an animal. But develop the same boy's intelligence and it becomes far more fun to see what his trained dog may be taught to do. The crime is not pleasant by which a great operator in oil or railways makes his success. The supposed success is pleasant. What the man needs to perceive is that his crime vitiated his success. The umpires of the game of life report that he broke the laws. If his intellect has not been spoiled, he knows, like the slugger in the football game, that his supposed success, so far as it was won by fraud, was an actual failure. He was not a good enough player to keep the rules and win.

Let it be understood, however, that in insisting on the pleasure of goodness, as contrasted with the supposed pleasure of sin, we are not thinking of prim, artificial fashion-plates of goodness, or of virtues made to order and whitened down to meet a conventional sense of provincial propriety. We are thinking of hearty, warm-blooded, powerful, impulsive and yet self-controlled men and women, alive and awake, thoroughly human, with humor to match their power, who can laugh and even laugh at themselves, who are afraid of nothing, unless it be to do any kind of injury to their fellows, who never stop growing better.

## CHAPTER IV

### A SECRET OF LIFE

SEE now how we proceed to treat moral evil both in ourselves and in others. Here is almost a new secret of life, hardly yet more than begun to be used. This secret, open for generations, but slightly trusted or used, is to overcome evil with good. In the first place, we have cast out all hate. Hate belongs to a system of dualism. If the bad man were another kind of being from the good, if he were a possible child of the devil, an enemy of God, and if "we," who condemn him, were a little school of God's elect children, then we might afford to hate the wrongdoer, to hurt him and get him out of the way if we could. But this treatment becomes impossible in a universe. If we men are all of one blood and one nature, and if this is a universe, without any great Demon seeking to conquer it for himself, if there is no one to hate for sending winds and freshets and hot sunshine, so likewise there is no one to hate in the moral realm. If moral evil is a distemper, or a weakness, there is no use or sense or fitness in hating the man who is its victim. We can have no ill-will toward the feeble, or toward the sick, especially if they are so sick as not to be aware of their state. If we suffer from the same sicknesses, as we mostly do, we must sympathize with their victims. If we are really well and strong, we must pity them and if possible help them.

We do not even hate the tiger or the shark; he is

what he is, a brute creature; he would not be a brute if he did not catch and eat what comes his way. But we surely cannot hate brutal men; they, too, are what they are; it is the nature of their brutality, when they act the part of the beast. To hate is to wish them evil, to desire to be rid of them. We wish rather their good; we desire only one thing, that they may become grown men and have the joys of men.

Suppose that we have arrested a murderer. Which would we certainly choose, if we had our choice between killing him and being able to make him into a good man? Which would we certainly choose with our dying breath, supposing that he had murdered us? Even if we were obliged to sign a death-warrant to take the murderer's life, we could not sign it in hate, so as to send the man out of the world in ill-will. We should still wish to do the man all the good possible. Else, if we came to hate him, we would be like him, caught with the same disease, liable like him to do murder. To possess intelligent good will is thus to be forever ready to forgive; to show malice, from this point of view, ceases to be a temptation.

The ordinary way to treat moral evil was partial, and unworthy of rational manhood. Men have been accustomed to let themselves go with their feelings, with their excitement, with their shame, with their sense of individual hurt, with their wounded pride, with their indignation and resentment. Thus, for generations, men laid their coarse and angry hands on the lives of little children and on the weak and poor and hungry. Punish them, they said. Angry men parted with their intelligence, their sympathy, their humanity, their religion, that is, their faith and hope.



We mean now to apply all our powers and faculties in the treatment of moral evil. We will not dare to proceed a single step without the full use of our reason, our sympathies, our hope and expectation to find in the worst of men some trace of manhood. The whole man needs to be present in the overcoming of evil. Our method is that of the engineer. He studies the strength of materials and the uses of things, and finds out where to apply force on the lines of least resistance. He digs down till he finds solid bottom if possible, and he builds upon that, or at the worst he sinks piles into the sand and constructs a foundation. The engineer's methods are lessons for every parent or teacher or reformer. The engineer does not pound vainly at the face of the precipice; he undermines it, or bores through it, or finds his way around it.

See at this point the stupidity of the ordinary attacks upon evil. The self-styled "good" have often broken all the laws of moral engineering; they have fallen into the old beaten ruts of the world of beasts in antagonizing and brow-beating their fellows. They have fought them as enemies and aroused in them all the force of the animal nature in resistance. They have too frequently managed to put themselves in the wrong, at least in the sight of their opponents, and to seem to attack the rights and the property of their fellows, as, for example, in the bitter enforcement of prohibitory laws to the justice of which they had not yet persuaded their neighbors.

We do not mean to minimize the pain and sorrow of moral evil, or to blink a single tragic fact in the history of human crime, when we almost venture to say that the good people, parents, teachers, the clergy, the

reformers, have taken the evil of the world too seriously. What we mean is that the most tragical of all facts in this history has been the impatience, the antagonisms, the positive hatred of men, never perfect themselves, toward other men possessed with the same faults as their own. Watch this in every outburst of race antagonism in the Southern States or on the Pacific Coast. Read the story, though very noble in parts, of the anti-slavery struggle. It has always been the enormity of other men's sins that the disciplinarians, the zealots, the defenders of justice and avengers of wrong, have taken in hand. The terrible plays of *Æschylus* illustrate this. *Agamemnon*, himself of a sinful house, takes upon himself to punish the wicked *Paris*. *Clytemnestra*, the faithless, is seized with unholy zeal to avenge her wrongs on the sinning *Agamemnon*. The maledictory psalms of the Old Testament, inspiring millions of souls through more than twenty centuries, carry the same illustration. It is the repeated picture of the revengeful and unloving man who, though doubtless a sufferer, yet with unsubdued cruelty in his heart, is forever calling down the wrath of Heaven upon his wicked enemies. Observe that this emphasis on the blackness of sin, this terrible seriousness in condemning it, does not come from reverence for the shining ideals. For reverence teaches sympathy with the humblest of one's fellows. This cruel intensity comes largely out of the sense of personal hurt, or arrogance, or out of subtle spiritual pride, as of those who say, "I am holier than thou." It is the spirit of the fighter, or of the executioner.

Compare now the method of the good engineer in solving his problems, with the usual unthoughtful and

passionate methods of attacking moral evil. The engineer, indeed, makes his estimates; he does not minimize the bigness or the difficulty of his work; but he applies his power to correspond to the nature of his enterprise; he tries experiments; he uses intelligence and studies economy. Especially he takes advantage of every natural resource in his favor in the material to be handled. The engineers at Panama will turn the Chagres River from an enemy into a friend, and use its waters to fill their locks. They will flood the great swamps deep enough to carry their ships in safety. So the good engineers of character propose to train and use the natural, though animal, forces in a child or a barbarian and make his energy the servant of goodness. Why not? This is what all untamed energy is good for. This is the lesson of the famous old story of Saint Christopher. The churches are strangely slow to use their own doctrines!

The work of the trained teacher is an excellent illustration of the new method of approach to the problem of evil. Moral evil is like ignorance, as it is largely the child of ignorance. Does the skilled teacher fight ignorance, and vent his scorn and hatred against his helpless and ignorant pupils? No success was ever achieved on the lines of antagonism. The good teacher simply lets genial light into ignorant minds; he wakes up the intelligence; he stirs the natural curiosity; he induces interest. He was ignorant once himself; he does not know very much now; he applies his patience and sympathy to the dullest of his pupils, where sympathy is most needed. He finds what a child likes, and can do, and leads on and up, and builds a way, by what they call the doctrine of apperception, from the known

to the new and unknown. He does not take the ignorance of pupils too seriously, but regards much of it as a matter of course and smiles over it; he expects a modicum of inertia, of restlessness, of slowness to learn. He does not represent learning as a dreadful, difficult and impossible task, as the preachers of righteousness have too often exhibited the way of virtue. But he holds the way of wisdom to be good and beautiful and practicable, and behaves as if he thought so himself. This is good pedagogy. It is the only successful method of overcoming moral evil. The law is clear and simple. You overcome evil with good and with nothing else.\*

The profession of the physician gives another most suggestive list of illustrations of the same method of approach to the problem of sin. At the worst, moral evil is disease running down to death. Its most dreadful forms, sensuality, contempt of others, greed of gain, arrogance, the selfishness of grown men and women, are like poison in the blood. The good doctor never hates his patient. He does not lose patience because the disease is chronic or loathsome. He does not plan to put his patient out of the world because his case seems hopeless to everyone else. On the contrary, these hard cases challenge the physician's utmost skill, perseverance, friendliness, tact, in fact all his power. He tries every resource; he takes radical risks, if he must, for saving his patient's life; he uses caustics and surgery, if necessary, but always with one dominating

\* The remark of a boy to his mother upon being for the first time sent to school is suggestive, "Mama! The bad boys are not so very bad and the good boys are not so very good!"

purpose. The skilled doctor teaches the ordinary moralists a lesson. Wherein is his method wise for the cure of the body, and not equally wise for "the cure of souls?" No one ever tried the method of the good physician toward sin and found it to fail.

We need to put aside hysteria and apply the same intelligence to the moral problem as we apply elsewhere. The great moral problem is this: Given a world of men emerging out of animal conditions: How shall we guide and help and lift, and each best do his part, to help each other attain the stature of whole and all-round men? This problem implies a theory of optimism. If it were not for the optimist's standards and ideals there would be no moral problem. To say that the problem is moral is to say that it is a human problem; it is not the problem of a better class toward a worse, of superiors to inferiors, of Christians to heathen. It is quite democratic.

The problem is at the same time social, and also each man's individual enterprise. A man begins as an unconscious child; he grows to the stage of self-consciousness, and so comes to the knowledge of good and evil. He catches gleams of the ideals of real and beautiful manhood. His best self seems at variance with his lower self. Do you tell him that this is war in his members, that the lower life is his nature, and the better life is supernatural, if not impossible? He could not be told a more perilous error.

Let us be frank with ourselves. Let us do the very opposite to what we have been told; let us put aside war in our members; let us take the passions and appetites and ambitions in ourselves, the God-given natural forces in us, not as the enemies of good (that is,

of the ideal self in us), but as the servants of good. Let us take Browning's verses in earnest: "Nor soul helps flesh more now than flesh helps soul." Let us not try to fight even ourselves, but do better, namely, assume that our best selves are our true selves. We will do for the moral nature what we do for the training of the body. We give the body simple food, fresh air, clean water, plenty of healthful exercise, and we flood out disease with an access of health. So give our own moral nature clean and high thoughts, visions, noble company, poems and psalms; give it wholesome atmosphere, plenty of faith and hope; give it a worthy purpose and object; fill it with friendship and good will; set it to work to serve the social life, the home, the village, the state or mankind, and we have ceased to fight evil; there is no evil in us to fight.

The Christian Scientists, however futile their philosophy may seem, have had a message for the world, not inapplicable here. Do not think about diseases, they say, but think about life. Do not live in fears and regrets, but live in hope. This is sound moral doctrine likewise. The less we think of our sins or our faults the better for us. To think about faults is a species of moral paralysis. All that we have to do with faults is promptly to take the lesson that each fault, once discovered, teaches, and then straightway leave it behind in the pursuit of the ideal which the fault itself urges us to attain. Thus, I will not dwell on my temperamental impatience, or my proneness to suspect others of mischief. I will set my face toward the beauty of friendliness; I will insist on turning my friendly side to everyone. We say that "we believe in the forgiveness of sins," that is, in ceasing to dwell



upon the sins of our fellows. Why, then, shall we not cease to dwell upon our own sins? We may do this with safety, if only we seek to move and march and climb in the good, beautiful, and normal way of life.

Another simple thing follows here, generally forgotten. We need forever to apply our sympathy in the treatment of evil. Stop thinking of evil as an entity, a demon, or an enemy, stop the hysterical cry that sinners are "lepers," and discover the fact that sin is a human infirmity or limitation, to which all imperfect beings are subject, and it becomes easy to use our sympathy toward those who suffer from it. If to sin is to be wanting in the higher forms of vitality, then we are sorry for anyone who is a "sinner."

The engineer, on occasion, takes workmen into his confidence, and tells them his plans and asks their co-operation. The teacher explains the character of a hard lesson and shows why it is necessary to take it, or even perhaps confesses his own difficulties in learning it. The physician frankly tells his patient his situation, and assures himself that he and the patient understand one another. So in the realm of ethics we do well to take each other into our confidence. We confess that we are all human together; we all face common human problems of practice and conduct; we give each other our sympathy; yes, to the men whom we blame, to the men who are injuring society and staying the progress of civilization, to the criminals in jail and the captains of high finance whom we think ought to be in jail. We appeal to them all. We insist that we have a common enterprise; we are not here to war upon them; we need their assistance; we pity

them the more, if they are as yet unable to see their opportunity and the significance of their lives; we do not hate them, even if we are obliged in the name of humanity to vote against them and to thwart their selfish plans. We hope still for some measure of their co-operation. We can never be content to believe that they are quite willing to be traitors, and to prey upon the body of mankind.

Does anyone think that this attitude is idle? We claim that no other attitude is true to the facts of life. It is futility to declare war against whole classes of our fellows. No one has the right to shut all his sympathies away, even from despots, grafters and corruptionists, from trust magnates, from Mormons, or from idlers and hoodlums. These are all men like ourselves. We say, Appeal to their manhood, trust that they possess some trace of it, look for its signs, challenge it. Only so can you save them. We appeal to a splendid and growing list of stories of how this kind of attitude and this appeal often reach rough boys, and reach savages, and sometimes reach the idle and dissolute, or even the "Pharisees," who are also men. The women who work in thousands of schools, Jane Addams and her associates in the College Settlements, the judges of the new Juvenile Courts, the managers of the George Junior Republic, will tell us such stories as these by the hour.

## CHAPTER V

### ABOUT MOTIVES

A NATURAL question arises at this point touching the motives which we shall use to persuade men to the good, or social, or normal life. It is still a very backward, not to say wicked, world, full of the survivals of all forms of ancient mischief. Habits, customs, superstitions, ideas, standards of conduct, inherited from ages of brutal and barbarous strife, hypnotize multitudes of people. We are still told that people in the mass can only be held and subdued by constraint, by force and fear of punishment. We are reminded of the peril of French revolutions and mob violence, which threaten civilization whenever the unruly forces in a city or state are given freedom to assert themselves. Have we not in America peculiar reason to suspect and fear this crazy, undisciplined, childish, human nature, just climbing out of savagery and swarming in myriads to our shores? Why may not democracy play as tyrannous a part as ever the individual despot played, if, indeed, it does not topple over into some ancient kind of autocracy? Thus a certain class always tend to argue from the side of their fears, in favor of some existing or imaginary order of constraining authority, parental, priestly, aristocratic, Puritan, by which order they always mean themselves and their group. And they all naïvely and honestly think that they can govern the world and interpret and administer authority for and over its lower classes and

inferior peoples, better than these feeble folk can ever manage of their own free volition!

We meet here a primeval form of doubt concerning human nature. The doubt is whether human nature is improvable, whether this present world is better than the old world, or can be made really better, whether men ever will be virtuous or honest of their own will, whether the struggle to maintain civilization is not like the struggle for life, a perpetual conflict between the forces of good and the forces of mischief, between good men and the bad, between the educated or "better people" and the ignorant, the vicious, and the alien elements among us, between advanced races, like our own, and retrogressive races in Asia and Africa, more different from us than they are like us.

To raise this doubt is to turn again toward the doctrine, and worse yet, the practice, of dualism, with its wretched contending factions breaking up the universe in discord. We have already set the theory of dualism aside. One fact is clear. The practice of dualism is bad for saints and sinners alike, for the superior and the inferior peoples also. The dualistic doubts about the improbability of our common human nature are in truth doubts whether there is any moral reality or any enduring value in the world. The doubt touching the possibility of progress runs practically in the direction of toryism and absolutism, whereas civilization is based on faith and hope.

We are bound now to show that there are normal motives persuading men to goodness, that men are naturally subject to motives, that the very characteristic of human nature is its improvable, as led and swayed by motives, that under right and sufficient mo-

tives goodness is more easy and natural than badness; in short, that moral and spiritual health and happiness may be as truly expected to prove the general rule as fair health and useful activity are already the rule of the physical life among great communities. We make all needful allowance for temporary exceptions and for periods of moral or physical depression, disease, accident, or temporary excitement.

We begin with the motives that proceed from the side of the intelligence. They may seem at first the least workable or popular; but they are essential to civilized man; they lie in the field of domestic, religious, and public education. Mankind is only beginning as yet to see how potent these motives are.

Take the most concrete case. We will suppose a group of thoughtless boys who have been detected in cruelty to animals, or in mischievous hoodlumism. No punishment, however it may frighten them, will make those boys less cruel or dangerous to society. Their sympathies are not developed. Make appeal now to the boys' intelligence and interest, open a playground for them; wake up new interests; set them to following the birds with a camera and learning their habits; teach them to do skillful things with tools. All this is a familiar method of persuasion; it has been tried with boys seemingly the most perverse. You may say that it never has been tried with perseverance and skill where it has been found to fail. They had called the boys bad, malicious, hateful, enemies of society. The same boys, catching new and larger interests, show themselves responsive, kindly, social and right-minded. You literally overcome evil with good.

Take again the dishonorable boys, found even in the

universities, who are willing to lie and cheat in order to win their games and prizes. You will do almost nothing with these boys by a front attack by way of penalties. What will you do? Appeal from a less intelligence to the higher intelligence dormant in all boys. Show them, if you please, by pictures or stories, what honest, thorough, and beautiful sport is, and how much more skill, power, "grit," and manliness it needs than the sport of the skulk, the coward or the cheat;\* show the boys that the mean way is simply a confession of weakness made in advance; in short, throw light into boys' minds to see the relative meaning of things,—the natural contrast of evil and good; and you will have brought the mighty motive power of intelligence to bear on them. Before, under the old method, we tried to punish boys while they remained the same boys. Now, with the new persuasion, we have a new and better set of boys, who do not desire to do childish and futile things. We have made goodness what it is, a form of virile power, and trickery what it really is, the mark of the beast or the reptile.

This method of intellectual persuasion is now seen to be universal. We are all like children under its impulse. What is education, unless it is the opening up and the appraisement of values? Education enlightens the mind to see what things are worth while, what values are means only wherewith to reach higher values, what things are worth more than all things else, and alone are precious enough to make men willing to

\* This course has actually been followed by Mr. E. M. Fairchild, of Troy, N. Y., with the help of lantern slides.



die for them. True education is nothing less than this. Everyone is susceptible to the motive of light.

The child thinks beads, pebbles, straws, ribbons have value. Education teaches him to set his eyes on better things. He experiments with cups and medals, with prizes and "marks" at school, and later with diplomas and testimonials, along with all kinds of money tokens. He tries honors, degrees, place and office. None of these things constitute lasting value; none of these are universal or good at every time and place.

What thing has lasting value, good everywhere and at all times? There is a form of power which uses all other kinds of power. There is that which is untouched by evil, but which uses even mischances as its servants. There is that which will unify all other things and reduce them to order,—honors or unpopularity, wealth or poverty, comfort or discipline, joy or sorrow, wielding all forces to do its bidding. This one sublime, irresistible, universal and everlasting value is a good will. Its various names are faithfulness, truth, courage, modesty, reverence, justice, friendliness, humanity. But it is always *will*, urgent, forceful, determined; it is always beneficent and alike good toward all.

To see this fact is an awakening of intelligence. You see it by object lessons, in persons, by stories, by pictures, of the Christ, the Buddha, the Madonna, of the Saints; of the household saints, loving mothers, noble fathers, brave children; of the national saints, the heroes and patriots and statesmen; of the poets and prophets, lovers of mankind. Whoever looks into the eyes that shine with good will sees the one value

and beauty of the world, as if one saw God. Whoever sees this value desires it, at least while he looks on. Rude boys can know this; they need this; at their best, they want this; they love manliness in its highest ranges, as they will not be fooled or tricked with any semblance of it. The savage has an intelligence for this. Send Booker Washington into the heart of Africa and men will like to do what he teaches. Wherever was this appeal to the intelligence made, and it did not convert and persuade? The coming education, then, will everywhere set the eyes of the youth on the one end of all education,—the value that endures, and passes current in all parts of the universe.

This comes near to saying that we only need to know enough and to know aright in order to be good. This is pretty near the truth. Wisdom is goodness. Goodness and intelligence are really one. We do not mean to say that knowledge of science, or of history, or of any number of details, the detached parts of the universe, will persuade anyone to goodness. It may help, or it may hinder. But every gleam of intelligence that opens the mind to conceive what the one message, the meaning and the use of the universe is, tends to make anyone better. Show men that life is to possess and to utter good will, that this is success, that this makes anyone welcome everywhere, and no one will easily persuade them to do anything false or harmful, as long as they see this.

Herein goodness is like patriotism. It may or may not make us patriots to read the history of our country, or to know its geography or geology. But it stirs us to be patriots, as soon as we see by living object

lesson, or by memorable story, what the one idea of a country or nation is, its one use, the one happiness of its people, in terms of the common welfare, the common prosperity, the sharing of the common spirit of loyalty. This idea fits into an eternal place in the soul of every man.

The truth is that we are only beginning to learn the art of moral education. The old-fashioned "religious" education, as it was called, has largely proved to be futile. The teaching of "Scriptural facts" did not make boys and girls generous and honorable. On the contrary, such teaching often led to very awkward questions, in which the youth lost the track of the grand and simple principles, both of ethics and religion, amidst the confusion of a dubious theology. The best religious and educational leaders are now finding the need of a more effective ethical training than the conventional Sunday School has ever furnished.

The new teaching will be practical; it will deal with modern issues, and will present fresh illustrations from modern life. It will tend entirely to reverse the injurious prejudice, which represented the good and honest men as failures in business, and the unscrupulous as the winners of success. We shall establish the fact that men mostly succeed because they have some social service to render or some desirable product to offer. We shall show that the work of the world is increasingly co-operative, so that the individual comes under bonds to help his fellows. We shall show that the pressure of vast economic forces works to thwart the individual who seeks to prey upon society, that the good will of the universe acts to kill selfishness, as sunlight

kills miasma. We shall demonstrate the essential unity of the good and the useful, the practical and the ideal. We shall set forth an illustrious list of true-hearted men who have lifted business into a fine art and achieved a noble success; we shall tell interesting stories about them.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ETHICAL MOTIVES

LET us proceed to what may be called distinctly the ethical motives toward the good life. The easiest and most powerful form of persuasion is on the side of the feelings, through sympathy. This approach is really one with the way of intelligence. The "bad" are mostly dull, unimaginative, insensitive. You touch the feelings through the mind. It is through the growth of intelligence, touching the imagination and the sympathy, that contributions are raised for Negro schools, or for a Japanese or Chinese famine. The appeal at the last resort is to the social sense. It is awakened in little children by telling them stories of other children like themselves, who are suffering from cold or hunger or cruelty. It is awakened in Russian peasants by telling them of the sorrows of other persecuted people. The recompense that we have for suffering in any measure ourselves is, that we are able henceforth to enter into and share the sufferings of others. We bear losses ourselves, and presently we have annexed to the domain of selfhood new areas of life around us, at our doors, and across the earth. All mankind at last belongs to us, as of reality it ought.

"For mankind are one in spirit, and an instinct  
bears along,  
Round the earth's electric circle, the swift flash  
of right or wrong."

Our new thought of right and wrong makes a fresh appeal to our sympathy. To declare merely that an act is "wrong" or "forbidden" does not appeal to our emotions. To declare that a certain mode of conduct, temperance, or chastity, is a right or a duty, makes no special appeal to the social sense. Virtue in this case seems cold and lonely; it may even challenge and antagonize the personal will. But show us in warm social terms what wrong is, in every instance; show us that the wrong thing somewhere hurts a person like ourselves; show us the wrong in the form of social loss or injury, weakening the structure of the home or the state, or the industrial structure; show us that sensuality ruins women just like our own mothers or sisters; show us that a bad rivet in the steel frame or a can of poisoned meat means the risk of death to children just like our children; show us, likewise, what right is in social terms of added wealth, comfort, safety, mutual trust, happiness and public virtue; show us that honor in the official means prosperity for the great city, that the integrity or courage of the statesman means the international order and peace of the world; in short, show us that our refusal of the wrong and our doing of the right help to protect, serve and enrich the lives of actual persons, as such conduct always does, and must do, through a long succession of good acts following one another, and no one will easily tempt us to do wrong, while we feel the pull of the social tie that binds and urges us to act together as one. We love to act so.

The world has only begun to use the force of this kind of social constraint and persuasion. There is hardly a wretch in states prison that is not susceptible



to it. To a large extent people do wrong, because they simply do not know the social meaning of their acts. They have really thought that they could do wrong and only hurt themselves and pay the penalty. Or, they have thought, while disobeying the laws, that a hostile class or an unfriendly government was fighting them, in resisting which they might fairly take their own risks. Men everywhere are coming slowly to see that no wrong is anywhere committed, a threat uttered, a bomb thrown, a negro lynched in Alabama, a railroad rebate or pass demanded and accepted, a vote bought or sold, a public office given in return for private or partisan favors, without pain and suffering in consequence, in which all the people of the world share. More cheering by far, we are coming to see that no beautiful deed of mercy or honor or friendship, wherever it shines out in the street or the workshop, is ever wasted. It adds to the volume of stored-up sunshine, out of which the great world draws its life.

There is another very real and subtle form of persuasion, or motive power for right and against wrong. It is the action of will upon will, and especially of good will, once become persuasive. This is analogous to the fact known as induction, whereby a strong moving current passes over into every tiny wire near it, and to make it carry the same movement. This is a power both for good and for evil. But its normal use is for good, as surely as good is at the heart of the world. Thus, in a town meeting, in a city council, in a legislature or in Congress, a strong will for the public good uttered through a single voice, free of partisanship, of fear or favor, in behalf of justice, or magnanimity,

or peace, naturally tends to persuade and at times to carry all wills along with it.

The orators have many a time used this almost hypnotic power for dubious purposes, like Demosthenes for example, to stir men's wills to war. The prophets and the great preachers have also shown in some measure how we may hope in time to bring a good common will to bear for great common ends. We know this vaguely now as "public opinion." We see it on occasion bursting out into beneficent action, as when the shaken and burned San Francisco willed to go on and build a more beautiful city, or when an aroused nation determined that it must have justice shown, without favor to special interests, throughout the railway service of the country.

We hardly begin to know yet the force of an awakened public good will, unified and concentrated on definite ends. Always so far the forces of the good have been in frequent opposition to one another, the good will of one party, the conservatives, against the will of the pioneers or radicals. It remains to be seen what we can do in the world when men of good will join hands together and ask, How can we help each other secure the ends that we all desire? This question might have seemed wild and impossible in the period of Pericles. It presses upon us to-day; it is practical; we are learning to combine human wills in every form of activity. We shall yet learn to turn on the good will of a whole town, or a state, or of the world to reach specific ends. For example, it is within reach of our generation, when all the men of good will shall say: We will have no more war between nations, as

we have already proclaimed; We will have no more slavery; We will have no private duelling. Thus the strong good will of a part or of a few dominates and possesses and rules into line the wills of the many, and lo! it becomes the popular fashion, enacted into solid habit or law. At last we accept and demand as the normal rule of the world what once poets and prophets only saw in their vision.

This kind of moral public opinion works upon the principle of imitation. A good custom—window gardening, or green lawns, or the use of soap—has quite as fair a chance to make its way in the world as a bad fashion like profanity. Moreover, the rule is, that the good fashion, being essentially serviceable, comes to stay; while the bad fashion, carrying an element of mischief, arouses antagonism and brings the seed of its own final dissolution. Civil manners, good temper, the expression of sympathy, higher standards of honesty in trade, are catching, and at last become irresistible in their sway.

This natural tendency of the good custom or habit to prevail becomes obvious, when we observe how human society is constituted. There will generally be three strata or groups shading into each other. First, there are a few per cent. in every considerable number of men,—a “remnant,” as Matthew Arnold liked to say,—who follow principles; they have visions of “the hills of God” and march toward them; they see and set new standards; they make and alter public opinion.

At the other extreme of the scale are the few, in almost every group of society, who drag morally on all the others. They are quite as likely to be among the rich and educated as among the poor. They may be

likened to "the submerged tenth," who suffer the distress of actual poverty. They seem either to have no moral sense, or else their brutal passions and inordinate greed overwhelm their slumbering humanity. They correspond to the fraction of the population who are sickly, feeble and insane.

Between the two extremes of the strong in moral will and the defective is the large body of those who are still immature in character. In every school, village, or state, these constitute at present the large majority. They present the phenomenon of "arrested development." They lack moral initiative; they need moral leadership; they are extremely susceptible to generous impulses, while at the same time they feel oppressively the drag of all sorts of immoral habits and traditions. They are dangerously liable to the mischief of unscrupulous leadership, whether flying the banner of some time-honored party, or proclaiming a new gospel and plausibly urging demagogic means for the overthrow of ancient abuses.

The moral health of a community depends upon the proportions of the elements in its composition. Increase by only a little the percentage of the men and women of principle, give even Sodom as many as ten quite righteous men, and you may save the city. Find high-minded leaders enough and the people will follow them. Reduce this disinterested element, however, by as much as a fraction, let the flow of the pure good will become sluggish in any community, and presently vulgar habits and decadent barbarous customs of conduct resume their sway, and by force of imitation degrade the whole population. There are literally "rotten boroughs," where unchecked graft and cor-

ruption have grown to be the customary conduct, all for the want of a few decided men who might rally the easy-going people to worthier standards.

We may see now the possibilities which lie in the way of definite moral education. The world has only yet begun to study, much less to use, these possibilities. We have taught everything else better than the art of all arts, namely, how to live together in society. We have counted men as having a liberal education, who remained narrow, unsocial, exclusive and selfish. We have given men the university degrees, who have not yet the slightest purpose to live as citizens of a universe. We have allowed youth to suppose that their education was merely for getting a living, or for enjoying themselves, as if there were any honorable mode of getting or using income except through some form of actual social outgo! We have been content to pass men through examinations in mathematics or classics, without caring to raise the deepest of human questions: What do you conceive that you are here in this world for? A more thorough and insistent moral education is already demanded, through which every community shall procure an ample supply of true-hearted and devoted leaders. With enough of the right kind of educated leaders, statesmen, teachers, lawyers, physicians, ministers, merchants, besides such natural leaders—often the best of all—as are always springing from the ranks, there will be no need to doubt the readiness of the plain people gladly to follow the higher habitudes of truth, honor, virtue, and friendliness.

There is no doubt at all about the facts which we are urging. There is motive power enough in the

world to make the world willingly good, that is, friendly, humane, and social. The power works in and through human nature, moulding it. Man does not make the power. It makes man. It is the working of the Almighty goodness. Nothing else accounts for it, or for what it already has done. It is everywhere in this age of ours, bourgeoning forth in new forms and combinations. It urges indeed and compels suffering when men resist it, but it never is satisfied; its real nature is not disclosed till men, being its children, gladly make it the rule of their lives.

We have still to consider the greatest of ethical impulses. This is what men have sometimes called the "supernatural" motive. Others simply call it the religious. It is of little consequence how it is called. The essence of it is a sense that the power of the universe, "the will of God," is in and behind every just, sincere, or friendly act. The man is not alone in his honesty or faithfulness, even in the darkest night, but the life of the universe is with him. He feels that "no good act is failure and no evil act success." The good powers approve and uphold him. This idea or conviction is an overwhelming leverage in conduct. The man is at his best who believes that his act is in obedience to the universal will. Let him conceive that good will is at the heart of the world and that he is its servant or son; in this thought he seems to draw on infinite moral resources. It is as if, to quote Browning,

"There were witnesses, cohorts about me to left and  
to right,  
Angels, powers, the unuttered, unseen, the alive,  
the aware."



## CHAPTER VII

### THE VICTORIOUS TONE

THE question may here be asked whether the world can ever omit altogether from its ethics the warning motive of fear. There are things to be afraid of, natural pains and penalties which follow every kind of law. Some of these penalties are dreadful and tragic. They constitute the method by which mankind is urged and led into the way of life and kept there. At certain stages of development men are more susceptible to this kind of urgency than to any other. You will hardly appeal to the glutton to be temperate for love's sake, but an ache or pain does appeal to him. This is the first call upon his intelligence. Men, like children, will often be asking, What will our fellows say to this or that course? What will they do to us if we follow it? Will they perhaps punish us? These questions are as radical as the question, What will our fellows give us by way of reward, praise or honors for doing their service?

We do not purpose to neglect the facts that work through fear to warn men. But we purpose to use the motive power of fear in a somewhat different way from heretofore. The traditional idea of pains and penalties was that they expressed the reprobation, indignation, and even the hate, of the disciplining authority, the parents, or "the good people," or the God. Punishment in human history has mostly been the means of showing vengeance. The ill-

doer, men reckon, has done so much harm; so much harm in return must be done to him. As if anyone could measure harm with a meter. This is the justice in *Æschylus*, and in the classic plays. We purpose, on the contrary, to use even the motive of fear to express our sympathy and to bring help to the wrong-doer—a very new idea of justice.

We use fear and pain in the moral realm after the same analogy as these motives are used in the material realm. We tell the child that "fire burns," and, if necessary, we may even administer a homeopathic dose of heat to scare the daring child from the stove. But the burn or the scald expresses no malice or vengeance on our part, nor any spirit of evil in fire. We warn children that the ivy plant may poison them. We say: Do not touch it. This is the statement of a fact, needful to know and merciful, therefore, to state. Otherwise, the ivy is harmless and beautiful. We rarely need to make the statement a second time; we merely have to explain the difference between the dangerous three-leaved plant and the innocent five-fingered variety. Now we purpose to use the simple facts of moral mischief in the same clear, simple and friendly manner of objective demonstration. We will take the child into our confidence,—not at all times or when we are vexed with him, but when the elder and the younger are in the mood to understand each other; we will show by object lessons what falsehood, stealing, disobedience do to us and why they must, and always do, drag a train of mischief and pain after them. We will show, not that we hate the wrong-doer, but that he puts himself by every act or word of malice or injury outside the pale of friendly society; not that we ostracize the dis-

obedient member of the family, or the state, but that he ostracizes himself. We will show why the violent and disorderly, like wild cattle or mad dogs, cannot be free to go at large, but must be restrained or even on occasion excluded from ordinary society. We shall show this in such clearness of vision that the wrong-doer himself must admit that such treatment is fair and needful, and such as he would himself advise in the case of anyone else.

This may prove to be very rigorous treatment, even more severe at times than the traditional customs have prescribed. But it is the rigor of the kindly surgeon who is seeking to cure; it is the rigor of the ship-captain, who must secure the safety of his passengers. We should have no persons of wild passions—train-wreckers, burglars, assailants of lonely women—at large. We should treat the whole class who habitually prey on society as we treat the insane, with mercy, pity and kindness, but with the firm hand that such people need to steady them. We should stop asking the idle question, What does the "moral leper" deserve? No one knows what he deserves. No one knows the processes of heredity and bad environment that made him a species of leper. We shall ask what does he need, if possible to cure the dreadful leprosy, namely, passion and appetite? What does society need to do with him, so that such leprosy shall not spread by contagion? This second question is often the dominant one.

We have suggested that it is possible to take moral evil too seriously. This means that we may bear down upon it so excessively as to increase the inflammation and disease. Appear to loathe men, and you

put them at their worst. Hate them and you rouse more hate. In fact, the use of fear or the threat of penalty is often worse than waste of moral power. It serves, on the contrary, to reinforce the misdirected will of the wrong-doer. He needs tact and sympathy, not threats. Turn to him as to a brother, subject to the same passions, led by similar if not identical temptations. Try this with the lawless capitalists; try it with the striking workmen. Grasp hands with these men over the fact of common interests. You will find that only the few need to be threatened with legal proceedings. They no more need to be sent to jail than others of us who have become hot in pursuit of them. Fear is a motive for all of us. But who of us relishes the application of it at the hands of men like ourselves? Who is good enough to dare to threaten his fellows with punishments? The sane and true question is: How can we learn to cure the common evils of society?

The truth is, we cannot believe that moral evil, animalism, selfishness, are ever the winning forces in the world. The winning force is goodness. We need to take the tone that belongs with the faith in this fact. We need to take it always toward the wrong-doer. Nothing pleases him more or suits his egotism better than to treat him as a dangerous and powerful person, as if society had reason to be afraid of him. A good deal of crime probably proceeds from the publicity which we give, by means of the press, to sensational stories of murder and violence. Criminal egotism thrives upon publicity.

We are advocating a use of moral pains and penal-

ties, the very opposite to that mostly in vogue. We can no longer regard the wrong-doer as very dangerous. We think of him as the survival of a brute world; we purpose to give him hospital treatment, as a sick man or as nervously ill-balanced. We submit that no mode of treatment strikes such a blow as this does at the egotism that breeds crime. The brutal man has thought of himself as a possible monster, whom everyone is talking about. Like a bold Robin Hood, he has thought that he could make society tremble by his skill and power. He finds himself an object of pity, as if he had been caught with smallpox or cholera! Treat him as he really is, treat him as well men should treat the victim of a distemper, and you have largely taken away the backbone of his wickedness.

We appeal here to innumerable human experiences which ought, one would think, long ago to have taught mankind how to use moral pains and penalties, when they must be used, with effectiveness. Take the case of the mischievous schoolboy. His fun is to find a teacher or policeman or some other victim, whom he can tease and stir to wrath. The fun stops when the supposed victim cannot be angered. The boys do not even try this kind of sport with the strong and good-tempered. The "bad" are strong, or seem to themselves strong, against the weak good whom they can vex or worry. The bad prove to be weak themselves, in the presence of goodness strong enough to hold good all the time. Moreover, the mischievous boys like and admire this kind of goodness,—the master who is strong, kindly, and patient beyond the reach of their mischief; the policeman or judge who is their friend, while he will not suffer them to be lawless. They re-

spect a firm hand, and approve the man or woman who understands them.

It may be asked whether anyone has a right to use the victorious tone in a world that contains so much mischief. To ask this is to doubt or deny the fact of a good universe. Who have a right, indeed, to use the victorious tone? Not the evil, who belong to the world of the past, but the good, the friendly, the just, who are daily coming into their heritage. Take then the victorious tone toward the wrong-doer, and even when you have to warn him, you warn him in the tone of cheerful kindness, as the good doctor warns his patient. The doctor and not the patient is the master of the situation.

The fact is, the emphasis upon sin, its gravity, and its peril, never did very much good. You clothed sin with a robe of mystery; you awakened men's curiosity about it; you almost believed yourself that it was pleasant; you lent a sort of Miltonic dignity to it, as if the devil were perhaps interesting company. Strip off all this conventional dress from wrongdoing, deny that it has any infinite quality, and the mystery of evil drops away. It is a very finite thing—merely animal—weak and contemptible. No one really loves it, mean, false, faithless, selfish, beggarly. The only thing that men loved or could love in the evil-doer was his possible wit, or skill, or *bonhomie*, or generosity. We all love these things wherever they shine. We are glad to find them in any man. They constitute our bond of natural sympathy with the maker of mischief, and enable us to reach his heart.

Change now the emphasis from sin to goodness, from disease to health. Sufficient emphasis has never



been placed on the great social heroic virtues. Set your eyes on truth, justice, modesty, courage, good faith, good will. Was it ever thought that men do not love goodness? They love it wherever it is genuine. Take the tone of victory then in facing the ills of the world. Goodness is the only force that can triumph. No devil, much less any weak man, can stand up against it.

## PART V

### THE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN NATURE

#### CHAPTER I

##### VALUES; OR THE GOOD

OUR study of ethics has really involved us in a philosophy of human nature and human life. I do not here mean philosophy in the sense of metaphysics or mental gymnastics, but in the very ancient and practical sense of the word in which philosophy is "the guide of life." To understand ethics is profoundly to understand man, the forces or motives that rule him, the ideals that inspire him, the line of the march of development on which he proceeds. To understand ethics is to know the values that give life its meaning, both for the individual and for society. Let us now somewhat rapidly rush forward to certain great conclusions and afterward look back for the ground of their verification.

There are certain values, or objects of desire, that make life worth living. What are these values? We have touched the border of this question before. We come now to the heart of it. It is the greatest of questions. Evidently we never know values in advance. To learn and appreciate values is the business of life. The whole world is a school to teach and to yield values. We learn as children do by the use of counters, figures and parables. We think at first all

bright objects have value. In other words, we are born with multifarious desires to reach and touch and taste and handle all sorts of things. All our senses are active in their demand to be used and satisfied. Whatever meets a desire, or gratifies one of our senses, whatever "tastes good" or pleases us, whatever fits a need, becomes a matter of value, and, so far, however tiny it is, helps to make life worth living. In general, we may say that whatever we are able to appropriate and use is a value.

Values are of all grades, sizes, and qualities, coarse and fine, little and great,—food and trinkets, poetry and music, flowers and stars. Some of these things please us a little while, and then pass, at least for the moment, into satiety; others grow more precious the more we use and enjoy them; they grow with our growth, and always continue to satisfy us. What now are the great values? How do we know them, and what makes them? The figure of money helps to answer this question. Men have used all kinds of material for money, that is, for the purpose of exchange, barter and trade. But the experience of the world has sought out and discovered certain precious metals, and finally largely agreed upon a single one of them, gold, into which other material values may everywhere be translated. The gold is in itself a thing of beauty and use; it is comparatively indestructible, not being subject to rust or decay; it is costly to obtain; a very little of it is equivalent to a great deal of almost anything else; men, therefore, everywhere desire it. The highest values in life are like the precious metals or the gold. They have an element of indestructibility or permanence; they cost effort; other things

pass up and translate into these higher values; in other words, men will give a great deal of the lower coinage for a very little of the higher; and men everywhere need the higher values more than they need anything else.

We call gold a high value because it commands other things; it will buy or procure everything material. It will also buy power, service, labor, skill, art. We touch now a new realm where money may fail altogether to measure the values. What will a man not give for health, or for life—his own or the life of wife or child? What is all the money in the world for, except in an infinite variety of ways to minister to the welfare and the happiness of man? Money, the symbol of all material values, exists to facilitate the winning of that which no material thing can weigh or measure, namely the growth, fulfillment and enrichment of life. Discover a new kind of power that saves or lengthens life; take away from men the temptation to fight and kill one another; discover or teach a new thought that heightens the meaning of life; show men how to co-operate better and to act socially together; teach mankind how to distribute its ever-increasing product of goods,—not food only, but the products of skill and art; especially, add new increments to the volume of friendliness, respect, humanity, courage, and hope; and, out of the range of material things where gold overtopped everything, now appear the evident human and spiritual values which make life worth living. To have millions of money is nothing to a man if that is all that he has. Give him the joy of a real home; give him the light of love in the faces of his children; give him his own self-respect,

a quiet mind and the regard of his fellows; give him "health and a day."

The realm of the real values is, therefore, ethical. We have to do with all that list of powers, qualities, delights, ideals that characterize our common humanity. We are in a realm where the elements of the atmosphere that we breathe are justice, truth, kindness, sympathy, good will. Every consideration, every motion is social or ethical. Every new question concerns the effect of conduct on the welfare and happiness of men. The betterment of the physical health is only a means to the increase of the inward or ethical health. The lowering of the general death-rate is futile unless it goes along with the increase of the social happiness of the people. The hygiene and improvement of dwelling-houses is nothing unless the houses become happy homes. The public economies are nothing but a means for the procurement of a hearty, friendly, hopeful, joyous people. The people who are trying to get more *things* often forget what all things are for. Shall we say at last that the real and lasting values are certain great virtues, integrity, truthfulness, and the rest? Shall we say that all lower values point up toward these ethical terms as ends in themselves? By no means! There are no virtues that exist by themselves. Justice or truth or courage is no abstract thing. These words are merely the descriptions of a normal man. We have no idea of turning out a product of so much virtue, as one might establish a mint for the coinage of money.

Shall we say again that the highest value is character, and, in particular, virtuous, or noble character? We can say something truer and more vital than even

to say this. The highest value that we know in this world is the mature and normal man, just, high-minded, generous, true, fearless, modest, happy, and hopeful. This is the ripened fruit of the tree of humanity. All values go to produce him. All social and governmental effort, the co-operative labor of the world and its commerce, the forms of law and order, courts and town meetings and legislatures and congresses, schools and universities, libraries and museums, music and drama, churches and Bibles—all have their mediate value as they help to develop and establish, not virtues, not even character, but virtuous, noble, joyous, living men and women. The virtue, the character, justice, or fidelity, or modesty, is simply the expression of manhood and womanhood, as the color or the ring of the metal is the expression of the gold.

We said that real value has an element of indestructibility or permanence. Can this be said of any human life, even the fullest and richest? This cannot certainly be said of the human body, which only barely holds its footing within a narrow margin of favoring conditions. Yet in a real sense we say of a true man that he is indestructible. He is beyond all price; he cannot be bribed or bought. He cannot be swayed from the line of his purpose; his good will cannot be broken or injured. This inward vital power preserves itself and grows more serene and inexpugnable as long as the man remains in sight. We may say with truth that manhood, that is, a man's inner self, belongs to the realm of permanence. We cannot think of death, a physical change, as coming into collision with this type of value.



The great moments and dramatic crises of life have the same quality of permanent value. There are times when, we say, we "live a whole lifetime" in a few moments. It may be under the stress of a tremendous temptation, when the man stands up to his height and puts selfishness beneath him; it may be an hour of a very great and pure joy, as of love; it may come in the stress of a mighty sympathy; it may be the vision of a new truth; all the content of a man's life passes over and is crowded into this moment, and straightway, like the symphony that is played through, the drama that is acted, or the grand fête for which weeks had gone to prepare the performers—all is over. Yes! all is over in the field of time; but the scene, the play, the music, the drama, the crisis, that wonderful hour of vision or of love is of the indestructible and eternal,—one may almost say infinite. It has gone into the enduring spiritual structure, and the man is never the same as before. He has become ennobled. Here is the meaning of the parable of the gold, that will not disintegrate. Whoever studies human values recognizes the truth of this parable.

A very thoughtful and suggestive Danish writer, Professor Höffding, who teaches Philosophy and Ethics in the University of Copenhagen, has made the fact of which we are speaking the substance of his definition of religion. He says that the essence of religion is, "the faith in the permanence of values"; in other words, that there are values through which the fundamental reality of the universe is expressed. The conviction of religion under all its forms is that such values are indestructible. Moreover, he holds that philosophy encourages this faith.

We have already suggested that all good education rests upon a science of values. What things are primary, and what others are only subordinate? What is the true perspective in the field of intelligence? What is the difference between an ill-educated and a well-educated person? These questions carry one up to the grand end and aim of all education, namely, the training of a civilized people, who shall use all the arts and sciences for the increase of life, social welfare, and individual happiness. To understand and appreciate the great values is the first step in pedagogy. What sort of a man do you seek to develop?

We said that the highest value is universal. Everyone wants it. It passes current everywhere. Is not this true to say of the thorough and normal man? He is wanted everywhere. There is no home or field or factory or ship or mine or school or senate, where the man or woman of this type is not in demand; more than ever before in human history the universality of the demand is made known. Deep down in all our hearts we each want nothing so much as inward health, integrity, courage, faith, and happiness. We want nothing so much for our children. As Tennyson says:

“ ’Tis life of which our nerves are scant.  
More life and fuller than we want.”

We said that the highest value or good was that which could use and appropriate all other values, while being itself final. The highest reality is that which can put everything else to the widest uses. This is true of the mature and civilized man. Show us what he cannot appropriate and turn to account?

He uses all materials, and grinds even the poisons into his medicines or his colors. He uses the laws of the world and its universal forces, and thus becomes a poet and creator. He uses the tremendous law of cost, and out of his labors and pains he wins joy and victory. He uses the hard law of contrast, and out of his sorrows he develops more love. Like the trainer in the gymnasium, he finds use in blows, buffets, disappointments, hardships, turning pain under his feet, and growing more god-like. Such is man at his best. As sure as ethics underlies society, society is one vast school to develop the grown and civilized man out of the child and out of the savage, not a few saints and aristocrats only, but an increasing multitude of men and women who find their life in the costly, happy activities of a democratic commonwealth, a just, wholesome, social, joyous humanity.

## CHAPTER II

### A CHAPTER OF SKEPTICISM

WE have spoken so far in the tone of affirmation, but it is time to recognize that questions are in order. How do we know relative values? For men are not at all agreed as to what they most desire. How, then, can anyone be sure that his scheme of valuation, his *summum bonum*, or the highest good to be sought, is valid as against other men's opinion of a different end or ideal? What authority can be set up to which the minds of Europeans or Orientals, of thinkers and plain men, of men of affairs as well as artists and poets shall conform? If there is a pope at Rome who might tell us what the highest good is, there is also a Grand Lama in Thibet. If there were a world council of Christians, there might be a world council of Buddhists or Mohammedans. If one group of people chose to follow Emerson or Kant, another might choose the dictum of Schopenhauer or of Nietzsche.

We must admit at once that we have no absolute authority for any disputed proposition. In the free realm of thought, as in the field of science, dogmatism has no place to stand. The accepted methods of knowledge everywhere are the same, namely, enquiry, investigation, experience, observation of the facts both of the external world and the inward life. There are few, if any, propositions which admit of complete or absolute demonstration. Each man only can say how the world looks to him, what sensations he has, what

pictures mirror themselves upon his brain, what methods of living satisfy him, and in what way they give satisfaction. It is not difficult in the region of free thought to throw off all the ties of supposed reality and to play the rôle of an all round agnostic.

On the other hand, the practical life, as we call it, presses on us all and will not permit us to stand still and do nothing but doubt. We are set to the business of choosing, deciding, preferring, willing, accomplishing. We are not so badly off as one might think for our inability to make absolute demonstration. The path of probability and of experimentation is both interesting and fruitful. It is Nature's own way with us. "Try and see," she says. If we have lost our shallow anchorage, we can now sail, with deep sea under us, with days of sunshine, also, and the sight of stars.

The method of ethical valuation is analogous to the study of food values. The universal experience of mankind points us in the direction where life proceeds. Different families of mankind compare their schemes of diet; each learns of the other; new foods are added to the supply of the world; the chemist and the physician at last find out what essential life-giving elements are found in all foods. These vital elements are common. Individuals make their experiments, some wise and some foolish, toward the choice and the preparation of the most nutritive diet. Very simple conditions, however, underlie the use of all the varieties of the foods of the world. It is not practically difficult to find what will best sustain life. Try and taste and discover, we say. So we say in the realm of ethics.

Neither is it difficult to know what food is bad, wasteful, detrimental or poisonous. Men have found

out by costly experiments, by disease and frequent death. The signal of danger is now posted over many an unwholesome product. So the devious ways of the bad or immoral life are marked well enough to warn men generally of their nature.

The valuations of the artists throw light on the way of the student of ethics. What extraordinary differences are found among men touching their standards and ideals of beauty or music. That multitudes of people seem to possess no artistic standards any more than if they were color-blind or deaf, does not drive any lover of beauty to agnosticism. There is no overwhelming obstacle in the way of a science of painting or architecture or music. In fact, there are common principles, simple elements of form, chords and harmonies, to which it is found that men generally are capable of answering, which most men may at least be trained to enjoy, or even to cultivate. It is not impossible for Orientals to admire the Capitol at Washington. It is the easy fashion to enjoy Japanese art.

In the province of art, however, while we acknowledge an element of artistic sense common to all men, we are accustomed to go to the experts and students and artists for information and discipline. We see masters who can teach us all. One man is not as good as another in this realm. What shall we do then when the masters disagree? The answer is, that, as regards the important canons of art and beauty, the masters tend to a large agreement. The common opinion of the lovers of beauty everywhere follows one direction. Ugly and hideous things, discords and noise, do not prevail as good art and music. Whoever wants the best can discover and enjoy the best. The sense



and the taste for beauty, the more they are cultivated, develop broadly, perhaps, so as to embrace many varieties, but never in opposite ways; they grow toward certain satisfying ideals, whither the great artists lead.

The same things are true in the valuation of ethical worth and reality. We do not suppose that all men see what Socrates or Jesus saw. We do not suppose that children know at once the highest values in conduct. We admit that men are sometimes born without much if any moral or social sense, as some are unfortunate enough to be born idiots. But we find no practical difficulty for the most part in the discovery of the best types of human conduct. Orientals and Europeans know a true or a brave or a just man whenever he appears. As Kipling says:

“There is neither East nor West, Border nor Breed  
nor Birth,

When two strong men stand face to face, tho’ they  
come from the ends of the earth.”

The story of the Buddha comes to America, and men love to read it; the story of the Christ wins men’s hearts indifferently in the slums of great English cities and in the heart of India. In other words, wherever the forms in which good will incarnates itself appear, men tend to admire, enjoy, emulate, and find the sources of their life. We can sophisticate the facts away or blind ourselves to them, but the old law of all human research still holds true: “Taste and see that the Lord is good.” In modern language, Try this form of life as compared with any other type of life, and see if it does not prove itself to be the best.

## CHAPTER III

### THE MYSTERY OF PERSONALITY

THE highest value in the world is a whole, civilized, and normal man. Let us grant this. There is still a mystery about the heights of manhood. It is hard enough to define what life is in the case of the animal. The student of biology finally comes out at the unknown. But the difficulty is greater and quite different when we ask what we mean by personality. Ask it about Goethe or Dante or Socrates. Ask it in your own case. Who are you? What constitutes you a person?

The word person is necessary, although the idea is baffling. There is a fact behind the word. Is it the fact of limitation? Are you a person merely because your life is cut off from the lives of all the rest of the world, as if it were a separate planet among the stars? This is merely to be an individual. Surely we mean more by *person* than we mean by *individual*. The life of a fly is individual, but is it personal? The individuality may be very marked, as in your pet dog, while you would hardly call him a person.

Let us look, in asking about personality, not in the way of limitation, but rather in the opposite direction. The person is not what *is* now,—to be described in an inventory of peculiarities,—but rather that which is coming to be. Personality lies upward, in the range of the incomplete; the word points to all manner of possibilities and ideals. We may say that it cannot be lim-

ited. What is limited is not real personality. There is thus an element of the infinite in a person.

See if this is not true in the case of the noblest person whom you happen to think of. See if it is not true, so far as you know your own best self. For example, the first element in one's life is consciousness. We cannot conceive of personal life without some sort of consciousness. The fact of the brain machinery now associated with consciousness, is not necessary at all to our conception. We can imagine the possession of consciousness, without our bodies. There are modes of thought and feeling when we are not aware of the use of our physical senses. The great fact, however, in the highest order of person is the extraordinary range and height of the possibilities of the consciousness. There are times when it almost seems as if the human consciousness might in a way mirror the experiences of the universe and compass all history, thus commanding time and space into a moment. Not its limits but its extension characterizes personal consciousness.

Again, a central idea of personality is its unity. This is not the unity of a chain, or a series, or a train of recollections. It is the same kind of unity that we predicate of the universe itself. It is a unity into which the details and incidents fit; or rather, it is the unity of a living organism, all the cells and forces of which exist in harmony. Such is the unity of personal character. The person takes up all that has ever happened to it, and by some vital power translates the events of the outward life into the unity of its personality. As the universe is not a congeries of parts, but is a significant whole, and only has significance

as we attribute an ideal or moral value to its wholeness, and call it harmonious, orderly, and good,—so the life of a person must have significance, not by virtue of its finiteness, its eccentricities, its incidents, but for what it is, or tends to become, as a whole, that is for its permanent value. It possesses a spiritual or ethical unity. The person at his best is orderly, harmonious, good. There is no limit to this aspect of personality. It is no limitation of the idea of God, when we say, "The good God."

It is in respect to this very aspect of unity that all human personality strikes us as in process of growth and not yet complete. We see the lines of the normal development toward perfect unity. The man at his best, and in his most normal and joyous hour, is most nearly *one*. At such times he is least subject to any sense of limitation. He is free, at his best. We shall have occasion to consider this fact of freedom in a subsequent section. It is enough to say here, that, at his best, and when all his activities work normally in unison, he does precisely what he wills or pleases to do. God could not be more free.

Whenever we behold order or unity, whether in nature, or in a work of art, or in a growing person, we may discover some dominant force or factor that establishes and characterizes the unity. In the best specimens of human personality we tend to discover the ground of unity in the principle of good will. We have already dwelt upon this fact in other connections. Good will, then, is the substance of normal personality. It is the highest form of power known to us in the universe. There is no need to conceive anything beyond it, but only to conceive of this as final.

The mind is thus satisfied. The good will in a normal person, or in any person in his most normal hours, rules all the other faculties harmoniously together, commands the body into the condition of the best health possible, lays hold on the treasures of memory, and marshals them to its purposes, binds the intellectual powers into obedience, exercises the wit and humor, plays and sings, touches the deep chords of sympathy, drives the moral energies into efficient and purposeful action, joins hands with other persons in co-operative service, expresses itself, or rather expresses the life of the universe coursing through its veins, with power and joy. In all this free play of life the individuality may constitute a barrier or make friction. It may or may not freely give itself to the motion. But that which constitutes the person, flooding the individual, is the universal good will. Thus, the essence of personality, which makes a human life precious, is at the same time the driving power and master life of all ethics. The only personality worth having—that which all the motion and social forces of the world go together to develop—is ethical.

## CHAPTER IV

### ESSENTIAL FREEDOM

You will already have anticipated that we need a new and larger definition of human freedom, or Free Will, than is usually given. We all agree in holding that the distinction of a true person is in the freedom of his acts. Whatever he does, the free person is pleased or willing to do precisely this thing, and for the time nothing else. You cannot constrain or compel him to do otherwise than he wills, or to be other than he really is. There is that in his personality which is beyond the reach of any outward urgency. We have to show that the normal man, so far as he is intelligent, is at every moment doing, or at least is able to do, what, on the whole, he chooses, or prefers, or even likes to do. We have no such idea of freedom in the case of the animal. The animal, on the contrary, is subject to all manner of constraints and compulsions. Not what he wills but what others will, what the forces of nature compel upon him, governs and characterizes his action.

The essence of freedom,—that which makes it worthy and beautiful,—is that its acts are the easy and natural expression of the person's character. They do not come from outward and material necessity, but they are the gladsome outflow of the inner nature. Whatever you do as a free personality, you express your nature in the act. The act belongs to you as its author; the work belongs to you as its creator; the



word you speak is yourself. The charm of all sincerity is in this fact.

The mistake commonly made in the treatment of the subject of freedom is that the childish and animal man is supposed to be free at the start. Are not all men born with substantial freedom? it is asked. Cannot everyone do as he pleases, or at least will and choose as he pleases? The contrary is true. The closer you live to the animal life the more closely you live under all sorts of constraint and bondage, often to others, mostly to circumstances, largely to outward and material conditions. We have already agreed that personality itself is in this human life only in the process of making. How many men do we know who have yet attained unity and simplicity of character? How many men are there in our acquaintance whose acts flow, for example, as Emerson's did, from the inward moral and spiritual nature, as a man's acts should flow? On the contrary, men's acts largely flow from the urgency of bodily appetites and passions, or from the fear and favor of other men, from the pressure of popular majorities, or from selfish ambitions, concerning what others may say of them and do for them.

We might illustrate this perilous limitation of men's freedom by the daily course of business and politics. Most men doubtless really wish to be honest. To injure, or rob, or crush other men gives no pleasure, but tends to give pain even to the most predatory of the capitalistic monopolists. Yet men will tell you that, while they prefer to deal fairly, the current practices of the business compel them to do, not as they like, but as other men about them do. To do right, as they

would like, would mean, they think, to lose their wealth, or to sacrifice their trade, and—what they cannot bear—to fall behind in the race. "We cannot starve," men say. There is no true freedom in men who talk like this.

Possibly, however, a man says: "I could do the honest thing, I could be independent of the party tyranny, I could break with the evil habit, if I pleased to do so." This is sheer mental illusion and egotism. The man who says, "I could do right if I pleased," while he goes on to do wrong, does not yet know himself. The truth is that in the man's inner self, who talks so, there is as yet no unity, or prevailing will. No dominant value has appeared; no principle yet asserts itself. The man's inconstancy, his irresolution, his wish to win the game, his dim sight of ideals in conflict with the pressure of the habits of his class or his party, in short, the man's baser or animal nature lording it over his best self, tells the truth about himself and confesses his impotence, his inward discord, and his bondage, by the very act of doing wrong. Whoever fails to see the true values, whoever desires gain or place or baubles, more than he desires reality, beauty, truth, or humanity, has not yet won the freedom to do right. As well expect a ship to be steered without a rudder or without its keel as to expect a man to be able to do socially beautiful, helpful, and effective acts, without the backbone of an inner principle, or without ever having yet caught the desire and the will to accomplish such acts. Nero, being Nero, will do the works of Nero, even though the thought of Seneca's teaching may give him remorse. Napoleon will be cruel and unscrupulous as long as

his colossal egotism is the central fact of his character. Does anyone think that Nero or Napoleon was free to act the part of Marcus Aurelius or of William of Orange? The man is swayed by the law of his character, that is, by his nature. This is what Paul saw, when he wrote the quaint verse, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

Someone asks whether we are not directly conscious of our innate freedom? We are *conscious*, men say, even under the stress of temptation, that we can do right or wrong at will. Ask more carefully of what we are conscious. We are conscious, as we move, of a fork in the way, that is, of a choice or dilemma. We easily confuse the consciousness of a dilemma with our notion of freedom. Merely to see opposite possibilities of conduct is not to be free to take either of them. After we have acted, and when it is too late to return, we remember, perhaps, as long as we live, that as we passed down the one path we caught sight of the other, and thought how fine it would be to go there also. This is not the consciousness of freedom. We may be conscious afterward, if we chose the wrong course, that we have cause to repent bitterly of going the way of wreck and grief; and we are conscious now (or think we are conscious) that, if we could return with the costly experience we have gained, we would choose the right way. What we are never conscious of at the time, what we do not know ourselves well enough to measure, is the force of the inward tides of all sorts of traditions and motives, urging us the way of temptation, or, on the other hand, commanding our allegiance to duty. Why did you do the selfish or dishonorable or cruel thing, if

you were conscious all the time that you were free to do the noble and generous act instead? Because you were more selfish than you were generous; because you wanted the reward of dishonor more than you wanted to behave like a man; in short, because you were not "all there" as a free man, but were only a part of a man, and, therefore, not free.

Why do we feel the sense of discord within us, you ask, at the moment of a wrong act? We have already seen that the discord is frequently felt in the moment of a wrong mood, or attitude, or temper, as well as in the wrong act. The discord is also felt in a right act, when a man really desires to do wrong, and is only restrained by fear, or by hope of reward; when, in short, the man's heart is not in the right act. There must always be discord till the man is glad or happy or satisfied in his act, in his mood, or his attitude. The man is not yet free when he is not content in what he does. And a man can never be content, joyous, happy in anything except righteous living. His own nature and the pressure of the universe make discord and pain at unsocial acts and thoughts. A divided will is not a good or a free will.

But it may be urged that, on this ground, the good man in his good acts is also bound and constrained. For he is made by the tide of the inner forces of his character to do one thing alone—the good, the humane, the friendly thing, and he is not permitted to do the opposite thing,—the bad, the mean or the selfish act. Precisely so. His own nature constrains him to express himself in the highest way possible. This is self-expression, not tyranny, or sacrifice. This is the rule of the man, and not of the animal. This is the

whole of the man, acting in unity, and not a part of the man in opposition to the rest. And the result is satisfaction. Yes! even when on occasion the bodily appetites have to go hungry. The man may never be more wholly himself than at such a time. This is the essence of freedom. The man does what he chooses to do and is glad in his act, even while he pays the cost of the act. What more do you wish?

Obviously there can be only one perfect and altogether free person, namely, God; that is, the highest possible perfection of power and goodness we can conceive. We think of God's life as one and free. Even if one owns to no religion, one still conceives of such ideal goodness. It is a wonderful conception, and almost preposterous, if no reality exists to urge it upon the mirror of our minds. Suppose, now, constant good will is the highest form or symbol under which we can think of reality. Will is the most intellectual form of power. Goodness is the most rational and orderly form of Will. The eternal and universal good will is free, and yet it is self-determined or bound, not by any external necessity, but by the unity of its own nature. It cannot be otherwise than it is. It cannot express ill-will, even for a moment; or a divided will, partly good and partly evil. This would be to lose its own infinite nature. By inward urgency it is bound to do the best for its own creation, and nothing less than the best. Its joy is to do that which its own nature urges. Such is ideal freedom. What a marvel it is that man can even imagine it!

Man's true freedom—the most real thing we ever know—is quite above the realm of physical or mechanical forces; it is ideal, like God's, as man's happiness

and his goodness are like God's. What hour is it when you give yourself utterly to do the deeds of good will, and your humanity fully expresses itself through you? In that hour you are a free man. You lacked true freedom before; you were not free when you halted in doubt, dreaded the physical friction or material resistance involved in the good act, hesitated in fear as to what men would say of you, or how they would treat you. But now, as if the divine tide had lifted you up, you move and rejoice in your motion.

What made the difference between one hour and the next? Did you make it yourself? Did you furnish the access of power? Did you provide for yourself new intelligence, or kindle your own sympathies? Ask rather how the plant grows, and where the new warmth at its roots comes from that bids it burst into blossom. Does not all power, light, wisdom, goodness, flow from the central Life of the universe? Are you not its child? Is it not enough for you to become a sharer of the same kind of freedom which satisfies God? What more do you want than that at your best your nature flows out in happy and unconstrained good will? You are one with God, and your act is one with yourself. It would be heaven, would it not? or eternal blessedness, to be always thus expressing in every kind of intelligent activity the life of goodness.

We do not insist upon any precise mode to clothe these profound facts. We do not urge that Mr. Huxley or Mr. Haeckel, in their obvious admiration of the True, the Good, the Beautiful, shall say a word about "God." Nevertheless, whatever may be our creed or our philosophy, when we are at our best, the great



words of religion, certain wonderful psalms or hymns, the sayings of prophets, beatitudes and golden rules, better than any other words express our sense of rest, content, peace, power, and freedom. We are free persons, not when we do "as we please," as mere individuals, but when we are pleased to follow the universal good will, which underlies our common humanity.

Take now certain notable lives, the life of Epictetus the Stoic, or Madam Guyon the mystic. Take the common ideal of Jesus' life! These lives seem in a sense to rule circumstances. They express their inner nature just as well through untoward and uncongenial circumstances as through favoring outward conditions. Thus, whatever they do to Jesus, even when men bind him and crucify him, his humanity flows as freely as ever. Nothing can compel him to hate men. If suffering is in the line of God's will, then suffering becomes the very thing that he too would choose. Through suffering and death he is free to express himself. Men put Madame Guyon in a dungeon. They cannot keep her from singing. Circumstances set the good Emperor on a throne. He can be free still, even in a palace. His good will now flows to the confines of the Empire.

Does anyone, then, wish freedom? He must win it; he must give himself to the deeds and the manner of life through which humanity, which in its highest form is divinity, utters itself. He must desire freedom enough to pay its cost; he must grow to it; tired and sick of slavery to passions and appetites, he must go over heart and mind and strength, to the vision of those ideal things, truth, righteousness, mercy, love, which always through the laws of our common con-

sciousness stir men to aspire after and do mighty deeds. Man's soul is made to respond to God, as the seeds are made to answer the sunshine and the rain.

It is nothing unusual for men to catch the idea of this kind of free life. There are many who could tell us, not boastfully, nor in the sense of loose indulgence, but in the purest sense, that they always do what they please. More accurately, they would say that they are habitually pleased to do what they have to do, namely, "their job," their duty, their part in the business of the universe.

## CHAPTER V

### RESPONSIBILITY

A LOGICAL question arises. We hold men responsible for their conduct. We warn children that if they disobey we shall treat them accordingly. We reward them or praise them when they do well. We have a great social system of so-called justice, the cornerstone of which is that men are responsible for their acts. What do we mean by this fact of responsibility? It goes with a sense of either good or ill desert. We say that a man deserves his punishment, as he deserves his reward.

Say now that all power and goodness is from God; say that man is only a child and a beginner; admit that all sorts of primitive and wild passions run in him, with their distant sources in generations of animal ancestry; admit that physical conditions, conditions of bodily health, or disease, the conformations of the brain and the shape of the head, the climate in which he lives, whether hot or cold, and the food supply, whether plentiful or meager, have their bearing on every feeling and act; admit that he is in some sense inevitably the child of his period, whether of the stone age or of the twentieth century; admit that he is a social creature, moved by the common and subtle traditions, superstitions, fears, ambitions, and hopes of his race, his tribe, his nation, and his religion—how far is a man responsible? Is he responsible at all?

The need here, as with the question of freedom, is

of clear thought as to what consciousness tells us. We have to take account of a larger realm of facts than were considered in the old-fashioned study of ethics. The difficulty at first is in managing and interpreting these newly seen *data*; they reveal how complex human nature is.

The idea of responsibility is, first, our way of connecting moral causes and effects together. Certain acts, for instance, theft or violence, point toward, and naturally result in, a sense of pain, injury, fear, indignation, not merely in the individual who suffers, but among his social group. This injury or apprehension seeks to express itself in some way, however blind, and to set up its appropriate signal of distress. It is as if the wounded flesh tries to get rid of a thorn, and sets up an inflammation around it. "You have done us hurt," say the wounded members of society to the ill-doer. "We hold you responsible for it." We see the claim of this blind sense of responsibility in the case of the child who wants to punish the stone against which he himself tripped and fell.

There is more in the idea of responsibility seeking for a cause, than a sense of hurt. We do not seriously hold an animal responsible for biting or goring a man. We let off young children from responsibility. If a man unwittingly breaks a law, we do not hold him "responsible." The word expresses a *moral* connection between the cause and the consequence. Thus, while we restrain or even kill the ugly dog, and while we shut up the maniac, we do not think of giving the one or the other a trial in court. We say that the animal or the maniac lacks moral responsibility.

What is it, then, that constitutes responsibility? Is

it the fact that a man, being a free person, could have abstained from doing the wrong if he had so willed? On the contrary, we hold the man responsible who does the injury in a fit of uncontrollable passion. The man is carried away, he tells us, by his anger or by a tremendous temptation. Have we not all known times when we seemed to be swept toward wrong conduct, as if by the rush of a torrent? We are responsible, however, even if we cannot resist the tide. We are responsible in spite of the fact that we are not strong or good enough to stand fast. What is the difference between us, thus bound in the grip of a passion, and the brute or the maniac? It is not that the man is free and the animal is not free. It is the fact of intelligence, of conscience, of the social sense or pressure in us. The animal does not know that he is doing any evil,\* while even at the worst, in the height of passion, the man holds still a glimmer at least of social, that is, moral consciousness, and knows the evil he is rushing to do. If he does not know it at the instant he acknowledges it afterward. We are responsible through the fact of our intelligence, which recognizes ideals and duties, which binds moral cause and effect together, and proclaims the man who neglects his

\*I do not wish to draw any hard and fast line between animals and men. So far as there is intelligence in any creature there is consciousness, which may be appealed to by the appropriate stimulus. We train and direct and punish dogs, and we certainly find in them the rudiments of conscience. They may be very susceptible to praise and blame, reward and chastisement, and just so far we attribute to them a measure of responsibility, residing in a certain consciousness of the quality of an act as socially hurtful or useful.

recognized duties to be a doer of evil, that is, of social hurt. The man, as a man, does wrong in the face of a force that urges him to do right. He is responsible to go with this force. In other words, a man is responsible as soon as he has a conscience about anything.

We distinguish at once different grades of responsibility. The child has a social conscience about hurting another or about theft, earlier than he has any conscience against telling a lie. There are men with a social conscience keen enough to keep them true to the customs of their tribe, their set, or their class, who have little, if any, consciousness of doing a wrong to foreigners. Does the Moro tribesman feel disturbed in shooting an American? At the top of the scale of sensitiveness are the men and women who count everything human as holy. To pass an unjust or hasty judgment, even in the secret chamber of their thought, carries a sense of social discord. To be in an ill humor is for them to be conscious of doing wrong. Such men are responsible for their words and for the tones of their voices.

In general we may say that a man is rightly held responsible for any act, in the doing of which he is at all conscious of inflicting an injury, or overpassing a law, or of having acted in malice. We hold him responsible, also, when he did not mean to do wrong. Suppose, for instance, the negligent engineer has to confess merely that he was not doing his best, or using his utmost care and skill at the time of the accident. We hold him responsible, even though he may have been very weary at the critical moment, and though we know that it is not humanly possible at all times to do



one's best. Yet we judge a man by his own ideal of his work, and hold him accountable for every conscious lapse. We thus help to brace him to his task; and he owns to this exacting sense of responsibility. But we practically exculpate a man from responsibility when he proves to have done the best he knew, as, for example, when his error was only of judgment.

The fact is, the idea of responsibility does not belong in the realm of metaphysical theory, but in the world of practical conduct. There is a commonplace reason why we hold men responsible for their actions. We must defend and protect ourselves against social mischief. We treat a man who possesses social consciousness, that is, a conscience, with a view to the direction and improvement of his conduct, as we do not and cannot treat wild beasts. We weave moral causes and effects together over his head so as to create a wholesome fear of doing evil, so as to invigorate his will, so as to buttress his individual weakness with the moral forces and constraints of society. We make appeal to the man's feelings and reason; we reinforce his memory; we almost hypnotize him with moral suggestions; we give him notice in advance what we expect of him. If he is a proper man, he thanks us for this treatment, and he answers back by expecting so much the more of us who make up society.

Does the soldier excuse himself on the ground that he was overcome with sleep? Does the bank messenger say that he only laid down his package of money for a moment? Does the teacher lose his temper before his class? Does the minister drop for one day to the sensual level? The moral consequences are nevertheless irreversible. Defeat, wreck, loss, waste, death,

pain and remorse touch us and press on us, because we have conscience and sympathies, because we are responsible, that is, socially bound together; each nerve answers to the pressure laid upon it. All this urgency tends to a practical end, namely, that we may grow to be faithful, to recollect our duties, to keep up to "concert pitch," to become ever more responsible, and at last to enjoy our responsibility as an added power. We measure the volume of a man's manhood by the keenness of his sense of responsibility.

It seems to be a futile contention that the responsible wrong-doer could at every step have done right, *if* he had so chosen. The plain facts and the testimony of the deepest consciousness point the other way. The trouble is with the word "if." We discover a long receding succession of "ifs" running back into our primitive heredity. The first man was not made morally strong enough to refuse the legendary apple. In my first act of disobedience I was not yet strong or wise or good enough to do right. My act was the actual outcome of my weak and undisciplined will. Is it not enough to have suffered the fall, to have felt the prick of moral pain, to have learned what social disapprobation means, to have begun to hunger and thirst after righteousness, without trying to make myself believe that, as a child, I could as well as not have behaved as a grown man? Is it not enough henceforth to have the labor and care of getting upon the right track, with the growing certainty of additional pains and penalties unless I remain on the track? Do you want to cause me additional remorse for not having been what I was not, namely, strong and infallible? This is not justice. It is not founded in truth.

We see now what repentance is. The one use of responsibility is to get me upon the track of right as soon as possible. The aim of responsibility is forward-looking, not backward. Repentance is the negative side of responsibility. It bids a man look back on what he has done. But repentance is not to stand sorrowful over the past; it is to see to it that we do not repeat the sorrowful past. The use of repentance is not to prolong the pain; it is to urge the man to do better; it is the beginning of fresh life and moral power. Cease to do evil, learn to do well. Then the angels of God rejoice with you. You enter again into the free circulation of the universe life; you become a channel to carry the universal good will. When you live the life of good will, when you give yourself to truth, justice and friendliness, "sin" passes away.

Responsibility does not merely concern our acts. We have seen in the analysis of conscience that it concerns ourselves and our character. I am what I was born; I am what a myriad influences have made me to be. Grant that I could not have made myself other than I am. Grant that I suffer various moral weaknesses. Nevertheless, the moment I become conscious of what I am, as distinguished from the ideal of what I should be, I am henceforth responsible, or answerable, for my character, as well as for every act that flows from it. I am responsible for the results of my faults; I am responsible for curing them. If my ill-temper breaks out, I am accountable for it. What is more, I wish to be held thus accountable. For I wish society to keep me up to my ideals. To let me off from this responsibility would be moral or

social disaster. Send the irresponsible to the hospital, if you must, and keep them out of the active world. But if you want to train men as men, shoulder responsibility upon them.

One thought more upon this subject. We are learning that society is responsible for the care of its delinquent members, or for the education of its children. We confess, as a nation, that we are all responsible together for certain evils and injustices, for lynching, for excessive loss of life on railroads, for bad tenement-house conditions. To confess this is not to say that the city or the nation could before our time have prevented these ills. How could it have prevented that of which it had not yet become aware? To say that we are socially responsible does not concern the past, or the question how social ills arose, but rather challenges us to our duty and our opportunity for the future. Our corporate responsibility, not to let the innocent suffer, points the way to new ideals of the city, the state, and the nation. Having begun to suffer together certain social pains, we awake to consciousness of what the trouble is. A new bond is placed upon us to fulfill our ideals. We must suffer more till we are sufficiently stirred to practical action. Here is the whole meaning of the moral responsibility of Society or of the State. In the ultimate analysis this is a new form of individual responsibility. For society only exists by virtue of its members.

## CHAPTER VI

### BLAME

**THERE** are several common words in daily use that call for examination. One of these is blame. It is attached to responsibility. If anyone does not meet his responsibility we blame him. What do we mean when we blame another or blame ourselves? Blame is a moral word, for we do not blame a non-moral creature. We blame one who has a conscience. Does our blame imply that the wrong-doer could have done differently from what he actually did? Does it carry any special metaphysical theory about the freedom of the will? No! It expresses a fact, as true for a determinist as for a believer in the loosest doctrine of freedom. Your blame is the expression of your moral or social disapproval of yourself or another. Blame implies an ideal of possible conduct which a man has failed to reach. It implies that a man has done harm, where his business or his opportunity was to do good. Blame also touches the man's character. He ought to be a man, we say, whereas he has behaved unworthily of his manhood.

The truth seems to be in what we say about "blame," that wrong-doing, injustice, falsehood, demand some proper and effective demonstration of feeling. We may not be indifferent to it; it excites a natural emotion. We react against evil and injury, whether done to ourselves or to others. The teacher cannot be pleased with a bad lesson; neither can the

pupil afford to be pleased with it. We cannot allow disease to fasten its evil growth on our child; neither can the child be allowed to sit down content with disease. The practical problem, however, is to cure the disease, to learn a good lesson, to correct the wrong act, and win the child over to righteousness.

What form, then, shall our natural sense of displeasure at a hurtful act take? The first crude instinct of emotion against an injustice is impatience, exasperation, or even hate. "We kick ourselves," men say, even of their own mean acts. It is the feeling of one who is taken by surprise. The trained teacher, the true parent, is never surprised. God can never be surprised at men's ill deeds. The wise teacher foresees. He never hates, he is never impatient or irritated, but he uses will, he urges, he may even be severe if occasion requires. He also is sorry for the dull or idle mind; he does not fail to mingle sympathy in his severest condemnation. In other words, he translates the crude emotion of selfish impatience into the wise, firm, and tactful expression of his love. Such is our thought of the blame of God, always going its way of help and redemption. Is blame ever true or efficient into which sympathy and good will do not enter?

Blame is relative to the age, the conditions, the standards, of an individual or a people. Take, by way of illustration, the varying judgments, partly moral and partly intellectual, with which we treat pupils in a school. We do not blame the children in the primary grade that they are restless, or that they cannot read long words. We only blame them when they fail to meet the reasonable requirements of their grade.



So we do not blame the men of the stone age that they killed their enemies. But we blame a civilized people for the barbarism of war. We blame the English people for fighting the Boers; they ought to have done better than to fight. We Americans begin, perhaps, to blame ourselves for not doing better than to settle the question of slavery by a bloody civil war. More humane methods for settling quarrels were in sight.

We count a person blameworthy then, in proportion to the moral light in the face of which he does wrong. If he had no light, he is not blameworthy. If he has had little light, he is only slightly blameworthy, even in doing a great wrong. If he has all the light of a civilized man, we call him blameworthy for even small acts of thoughtlessness or discourtesy, for blowing his tobacco smoke in our faces.

To express the same thought in another form, we count a person blameworthy whenever he acts against the remonstrance or inward warning of his conscience, that is, when he is aware, or at least knows enough to be aware that he is giving offense by his act. We blame him more or less, not altogether according to the size of the offense, but according to the clearness of the warning which he neglects. It is no matter whether we think that he was or was not strong and good enough to have resisted the temptation. The event seems to have proved that he was not strong enough. Our blame is intended like a tonic, to make him strong enough to stand against the next temptation when it comes. Our blame or disapproval is the emotional instrument of our judgment of his moral responsibility.

These considerations lead us to revise our common

thought and practice regarding the use of blame. We generally follow the easy habit of blurting out our disapproval at everything which happens to disturb us. The use of blame may be as selfish, and, therefore, as immoral, as the act of the person whom we visit with our censure. It may express our personal arrogance, or even hate and revenge, and may so react upon ourselves as to sour or embitter our character.

The idea of the dominant good will can alone guide us to the safe use of blame. We have called blame,—our judgment of moral disapproval,—an instrument. An instrument is meant to serve and help men, even though it be a lancet to torture them. On the contrary, people are every day using blame as careless boys might play with the surgeon's knives. The well-to-do, the virtuous, the "respectable," and even the elderly, who ought to have learned lessons of pity, will often draw the blade of their wrath upon the immature and the ignorant, upon strangers and foreigners. Surely no one knows the facts of life, the mysterious springs of conduct, the complex conditions under which moral action goes on, the subtle influence of education and environment, the low vitality and stunted bodies which multitudes of people inherit, the enfeeblement of will caused by various diseases, or by a freezing atmosphere of hopelessness in the home or the school, and almost necessitated by continuous overwork,—no one can observe and weigh these facts, or carefully study his own moral experience, without learning to exercise blame without harshness. "Would I or could I have done better?" any modest or thoughtful man asks, "if I had been born and exposed to the rude and barbarous, or positively unwhole-

some conditions of the men whose conduct I deplore or resent?" Who dares to say that he could have done differently from the average man, if he had been reared in the environment of the East Side of New York, or in a rude miner's camp, or amidst the traditions of the Kentucky mountains? Blame men we must, in the sense that we must express the eternal difference between good and evil, our reverence for the good, and our revolt from the hateful and cruel. But our reverence for the good, implied in every moral judgment, is essentially reverence, only when we are ourselves filled with humanity!

## CHAPTER VII

### SHAME, GUILT, AND DESERT

WE shall get light on our study of the ethical emotions if we consider the meaning of shame. It exists in animals. It is the response of a creature to the disapproval, the disparagement or the ridicule of his fellows. It implies an acknowledgment that the disapproval or ridicule fits, or is deserved. Ridicule the man who thinks himself in the right, shower curses or reproaches on him, and he has no shame,—not even when he may perhaps be in error, and when he ought to suffer shame.

Shame is a social word and belongs close to the realm of ethics. But it does not always strictly imply the stain of moral delinquency. A man is ashamed of a blunder, or of being ridiculous, though his blunder may have done no harm to anyone, and may even have contributed to the innocent amusement of his comrades. Yet, curiously enough, the man's shame in such a case may be as great and real a hurt to his self-esteem as if he had committed an injustice!

A man suffers shame whether he "could have helped himself" or not. It is only necessary that the blame or ridicule of his fellows fits his case. Thus he is ashamed to be seen with soiled hands, or a torn coat, or in undress. He may be ashamed, even when he is caught unawares, and could not have guarded against the accident. He may even be put to shame by the fault of another and not at all by his own neglect.

The fact is, he is ashamed not to be in good social form, such as men expect. So, likewise, a man is rightly ashamed to be caught in a meanness or an injustice, even though he may never have appreciated the nature of his offense till the moment when it happened to drag him into the light of publicity. Do you not suppose that many a millionaire, who up to this time harbored a slumbering conscience, now suffers shame for the methods with which he made his fortune? Men's blame or censure, even though sometimes misjudged, falls on us like a searchlight. We see ourselves as others see us. Only the good conscience and the good will can bear this sort of exposure without wilting under it.

A word akin to shame is *remorse*. It is a severe form of shame. The common notion is that it is the appropriate feeling which belongs to very wicked men touching the worst crimes. The curious fact, however, is that the "wicked" as we call them, seem to suffer very little remorse. The case of a Judas, who is so grieved as to go out and hang himself, is quite unusual, and probably denotes that the man, so far from being a desperate or hopeless evil-doer, is somewhat tender-hearted, and therefore a promising subject for moral recovery. Remorse depends not so much upon a high degree of guilt as upon sensitiveness, imagination, sympathy, which, when violated, react in pain. The remorse of the saints is perhaps more common than the remorse of the sinners.

Another frequent ethical term is *guilt*. It is strictly a forensic or theological word. Our blame of a man carries not only disfavor, but a certain condemnation. The judge pronounces him guilty of crime. The law

prescribes certain penalties or consequences. There are always also natural consequences that follow guilt. What is it, then, to incur the taint of guilt? There is doubtless an important fact of consciousness here. Man is no automaton, merely played upon by forces from without; he is a conscious life; the sources of his action are within. He is moved by pains and pleasures, stirred by hopes and fears, susceptible to overwhelming movements of sympathy, as if indeed his life were bound up with the tidal waves of the great life of the universe. The judgment of a man's guilt lifts him, as it were, either in fact or in imagination, upon the pillory, and exposes him to the sudden disfavor of his fellows. This is a tremendous human experience.

It will be observed that the facts which we have considered make any merely mechanical doctrine of consciousness, that would interpret its action as the result of changes in the brain tissue, appear preposterous. A moment of intelligence, a prick of the spiritual sense of guilt, awakened, it may be, by a friendly word, by a verse from the New Testament, or by a passage of poetry, may stir a man to enter upon a new course of conduct, as when on occasion the habitual drunkard is moved to give up forever the use of alcoholic drink. A spiritual fact has in such a case altered the motions of the whole bodily mechanism. The essential fact in the train of consequences is not the recording brain cell, but a thought, a memory, an idea, a movement of good will.

The moral life cannot be dissociated from the rest of man's being, as if it were a supernatural depart-



ment, held under another and different kind of law. We insist that the moral life follows all the great common natural analogies. Thus, moral evil is like weakness, childishness or disease. It involves the sense of failure, of frustration, of disfavor, of consequent pain and unrest. The judgment or sense of guilt fixes the fact of this weakness or disease. It calls attention to it and publishes it. This is salutary. The sense of guilt points toward the way of strength or cure. If I had known in the outbreak of passion what I know now, I believe that I would and could have acted differently. If I do the same thing again, I shall suffer hurt and shame. The guilt or "sin" is my personal affair, as sickness or a toothache is. It is I who am the center of a moral disturbance. It is I who need and desire medicine. It is I who will suffer till cure is effected. The consciousness that painful social consequences fit my case is the essence of guilt. The sense of guilt is a demand for a moral remedy, suitable to the case.

The essence of guilt consists in a man's being found out to be deliberately acting "against his light," or "against his conscience." See if this is not so. Search your consciousness and see what happened at the moment when you did wrong. You will find that in doing wrong you were more or less conscious of friction, unrest, or inward resistance. Your moral sense was hurt by the act, as if by the shock of a discord. The more acute this sense was, the more you blame yourself now for the act. You wish that the resistance had been greater; you recognize that if the unrest had been as keen then as it seems to be now, you could not have done wrong. In short, you accept

the guilt as yours. On the other hand, if at the time of the act you suffered no unrest whatever; that is, if you were unaware of the nature of the wrong act and only came to discover it later, you refuse to be called guilty. "I did not know any better; I do not deserve to be punished," the child says. The sense of guilt which one accepts seems, therefore, to depend upon the keenness of the discord which one feels between one's act and the inward urgency of that higher will or deeper intelligence which opposed the act. If there was no sense of discord at the time, there was no guilt. There may even be valid responsibility, without any sense of guilt, as in the case of the sentinel asleep at his post from sheer exhaustion.

We call the social remedy applied to fit the case of guilt "punishment." This is judicial or conventional punishment. It is not strictly a natural penalty. There is a danger in the word in that it has been so largely used to express the idea of retaliation or revenge. In nature, that is, in God's world, there is no revenge or hate to the ill-doer any more than to the blunderer. But there are inevitable conditions and consequences, often extremely severe. They are defensive and remedial. They are warnings and urgencies. The unsocial creature must either grow social or perish. Nature in her highest form, as represented in the life of good will, grows tender and aims to save every possible life, even of the idle and selfish. Her children are ready to die on occasion, as in an effort of life-saving, for the sake of accomplishing her beneficent purpose of rescue and healing. None the less does the merciful nature insist on the inexorable laws which make sorrowful consequences follow guilt. The noblest sons

of God march forth with willing hearts to share these bitter consequences with the guilty. Thus, physicians risk their lives to cure fevers, which a corrupt city government has invited.

Desert is another word that has been needlessly involved with metaphysical theories touching the nature of man's freedom. Whether good or ill, it is the accompaniment of good or bad character. The truth is that desert follows character, and attaches itself to the acts that flow from a man's character, quite independently of any theory as to whether the man makes his own character or not. We say that a man who possesses a genius in music or in generalship is fit, or deserves, to hold place and emolument. We say that a fool is not fit to hold office. But the musical or organizing genius did not make himself, any more than the poor fool chose to be a fool. We use the same principle in our judgments of moral desert. The dreadful Pomeroy boy never chose to be born an abnormal creature. Yet, so far as there is the slightest moral sense in such a man, we hold that he deserves restraint. Restraint and disapproval fit his case. We cannot give any more credit to Florence Nightingale for creating her beautiful compassion than we give to Colburn for his marvelous gifts in arithmetic. Nevertheless, admiration, honor, love, satisfaction, naturally follow such a nature. Whatever the good man or the good musician has done to develop his nature, our rewards and our praise naturally follow him, as much for that part of him with which he was born, as for that other part which grew with his growth. The gift to grow, the desire to grow nobly, the will to grow, as well as the environment to grow in,—where did these come from?

Is there not a peculiar kind of credit, you ask, which we award to the man who struggles against odds and wins education, skill, or virtue? Certainly, we make all kinds and degrees of moral valuation. We give credit for different considerations. Sometimes we give it for practical reasons, to encourage the child in his struggles to please us, or to the ignorant in their effort to become civilized. We express pleasure in growth, in effort, in winning victory against odds. And again we give our credit and our praise simply out of our native wonder at exceptional beauty or fitness, for conspicuous natural goodness, for the admirable Crichtons. We no more ask whether the good president or singer made himself, than we ask whether the diamond chose to be beautiful. What we know is, that a Gladstone deserves to be premier, and Shakespeare deserves to be read.

It must be seen that all our moral terms, interpret them as we may, express our belief in and regard for personality. They are a tribute to the nature of men who have intelligence, sympathy, aspirations, and ideals. They imply a spiritual quality in the dullest of men. They point toward a growth of manhood in the direction of ideals. These words do not assert that a man is already free or happy, but they do imply that he ought to be free. In other words, they convey an ideal of a being like the highest conception of God. The good man, like the good God, does right and expresses constant good will through every channel of his activity, because such action is his delight. The one use of all moral terms, and the moral treatment that fits the terms, is to stir men to grow in the way of noble manhood and womanhood. It is also incidentally to forbid and prevent and withstand, and also to cure moral bar-

barism or degeneration. We blame the man, wherever he is, who does not grow better. We hold a man responsible to grow in manhood. We hold him guilty, if, having seen the light, he does not follow it; if, being a man, he drops to the level of a beast. But in the worst case we never may venture to say that he deserves to be treated as a beast. For he is still a man, and only the treatment of a man fits his case.

## CHAPTER VIII

### A NEW LIGHT ON "FORGIVENESS"

A NEW thought on the nature of forgiveness, possibly already suggested, grows out of the ideas of blame and guilt. We agreed that the sole use of blame is for the future; for punishment by itself, and with reference to the past only, is of no use. If men were unimprovable, if they were so bad that hopeless hell and nothing more promising fitted their case, why should they be kept in existence? No bad being could possibly deserve to suffer forever. For only death befits that which ceases to grow. All analogies teach this lesson.

If blame, then, is an instrument of urgency toward growth and improvement, when it has had its use, it is laid aside, like all other instruments. You blame the child for his negligence. He becomes careful, you blame him no longer. You blame the corrupt politician for offering bribes. He heeds the blame of his constituents and stops the evil practice. All that you ask is that he shall cease to do evil and begin to do well, that is, he must grow in social usefulness. Your blame ceases as soon as the occasion ceases. This is the essence of forgiveness. In forgiveness you recognize that the man is no longer the same—an evil-doer; he has become better, and in growing better has outgrown the former blame. It should be noted that while we drop blame,



we never can afford to drop the burden of responsibility.

This rule of forgiveness applies to oneself as well as to others. You have committed an injury to society. You will always be sorry for it; you ought never quite to forget it. You will make it good if you can. But having become a better and a friendly man, being now no longer capable of committing the old injustice, you are freed of guilt. You have ceased to be the man who was guilty. In a true sense you are a new man. Everyone recognizes this law of forgiveness as true. Assure us to-morrow that all the inmates of the prisons have caught the idea of social good will, and society would take them to its heart. It could afford to release them, having no longer use for bonds and pains for those who have really ceased to do ill. In a word, we should do for the inmates of the prisons exactly what we do when we are able to give the patient in a hospital a clean bill of health.

There is, however, a very deep and costly law that governs forgiveness and the cure of all moral disease. It has been known in theology and religion as the law of "atonement" or "reconciliation." This law is that nothing but suffering, and the good will that conquers suffering and grows out of it, can reach the heart of the wrong-doer and lift him up. Suppose no one suffered at all from an act of cruelty or oppression, there would be no moral evil; neither would there be any moral growth, nor any incentive to it. Pain and sorrow are essential to moral growth. The mother suffers for her wayward boy, the wife suffers for the brutality of a drunken husband, the friend suffers on account of a neighbor's unfaithfulness, the people suffer

from the injustice of their leaders, from waste, and from war. A martyr suffers at the hands of a reckless mob. Every unsocial act carries a sting of pain or a heart-throb of grief. The sight and sense of the pain, the look of sorrowing faces, the disappointment, the disease and the deaths—especially the grief of the innocent, the sufferings of children and of women, of our own mothers—touch the hearts of men with sympathy, touch at last even the hearts of the unthinking, the coarse and sensual, awaken slumbering emotion and humanity in the doers of evil. Suffering can never be confined; it spreads and goes everywhere, and reaches the ends of the world, making appeal to the common heart of humanity. It bids men arise and stop the cause of suffering. In this sense the death of a Christ is typical. The whole world feels the call of a man who dies at the hands of his enemies, while yet forgiving them. The call is to put an end to enmity and all that breeds it. All suffering makes this call. It becomes more effective as sympathy in each generation binds men more closely together.

## CHAPTER IX

### MORAL DETERMINISM

It may be objected by this time that our teaching is clear determinism. Please do not accept this charge in prejudice, without asking what determinism—a somewhat spoiled word for our purpose—means. If it means a merely mechanical or material view of the world, then we have already set this aside as intellectually impossible. The word really expresses our faith in an orderly realm of quite invisible, intellectual, and spiritual relations, of which the visible and material things constitute a sort of picture-language. The word means that these relations are real, constant, and orderly, not loose and chaotic. It means that ethics is properly a science, governed by principles, by the knowledge of which you can predict results and apply means to ends. It means our conviction that society is in process of growth, on the beautiful fixed lines of justice, truth, purity, kindness. We believe that the more we know and the more good will we possess, we can bring to bear such motives and create such an environment, in homes, schools, factories, shops, courts, congresses, as to mould men in the way of goodness. We believe that men are definitely improvable and educable, born for good and not to evil. We believe that good will is an invincible power which no man really wishes to resist. We believe that we may expect moral results in the realm where good will acts, as surely as we expect

results when we wield the force of electricity. Is not this wholesome and morally helpful to believe?

We not only believe, but we see the actual working of ethical laws. We behold the steady pressure of blame as it acts on us and on others; we watch the motion of social responsibility, as it awakens in boys and men. Society through a myriad voices, in books and in newspapers, is saying to-day as never before, to the ill-doer, whether of high or low degree, to the rich idler as well as to the tramp, to the plunderer of millions, or to the petty thief: "See all this mischief that you are doing. We value you as socially worthless. You do not deserve to live; yet we pity you as a miserable failure. Even now, after years of futility and injury, we offer you hope. Change your order of life; become faithful, useful and friendly; be honest, try to give equivalent for all that you take, and we receive you into the ranks of your brothers."

Society calls with similar voices on the noble and high-minded and says: "We value you at an infinite worth. We value nothing so much as power, skill, intellect, art, beauty, all co-operating under the dominant good will of the universe to build a civilized world."

One thing more on this point. Our view of moral or spiritual law, or "determinism" (say, rather, the will of God!), governing all human or social events, does make a serious attack on a point dear to the egotist. It leaves no intelligent ground for his egotism. It cuts at the roots of all conceit. Does a man claim glory and personal credit for his acts and his character? The study of the moral facts and forces of life denies to a man the right to such personal glori-

fication. For his nature, for his visions, for his highest instincts and the sensitiveness of his conscience, for the energy in him, for the training and moral atmosphere around him, for the essential good will that possesses him, at every point a man owes all that he has to the informing, guiding and universal life of the world, the common breath of all men. We may be sons of God, each with derived life. We are not "supermen" or gods.

## PART VI

### THE REALM OF CASUISTRY

#### CHAPTER I

##### THEORY AND PRACTICE

NOTHING at first seems more simple than to describe the good life. "Tell the truth; Be loyal; Be modest; Do justly; Be pure; Use self-control; Act kindly." What more does anyone want? These main laws of goodness are ancient in human history. The early notion was that they were handed down from heaven. The truth is that they hold good wherever intelligent beings live. They seem to belong to the universal reason, being recognized at once as fundamental as soon as they are stated. But they are all simply the intelligent methods which the good will instinctively takes when it comes into human life. They are the first and common discoveries which the social sense or humanity makes. Simple as they seem, they are not simple at all in their myriad daily applications among people of all degrees of civilization. The daily problem is, What is just, that is, the precise application of justice, at this precise juncture? What is true? How make the words fit the fact or the thought? Is it well always to utter the truth? What does purity require? What is the most merciful conduct?

The rule of the physician is to save life. There are certain general methods of medication, sanitation, diet,



sometimes of surgery. The daily problem of the physician is how to apply these general methods to each particular case. There is no one and simple answer to these problems. It is a constant exercise of the most enlightened intelligence guided by the highest humanity. So with the common problems of ethics.

Ethics is the art of living together humanely. It is like every other art. There is nowhere any royal and infallible code of conduct which will save him who uses it the inexorable cost of getting wisdom. The science of ethics belongs to no supernatural realm outside of the order of that discipline and experience through which man learns everything else that is worth knowing. How, in fact, could there ever have been any inspiring record of moral progress, with its splendid ventures and its illustrious example, had there been given to man an exact and accessible bill of particulars wherein the rule of every new question of conduct had easy and direct solution? The law of the development of the good will in man is through constant exercise.

Have we not at least the Ten Commandments? many will exclaim. They certainly comprise a lofty summary of primitive law. But analyze them a moment. Do they or do they not allow men to inflict the death penalty? Do they or do they not forbid men to wage war, and kill by wholesale? What is theft? Is it or is it not theft to take the "unearned increment" of the land of the world? Is it or is it not theft to corner the wheat market? Is the ancient law of adultery intended to be equally binding for the man and the woman? Of all the commandments, the tenth (at least in its present rather modern form) is the most

radical and spiritual. How far, "after thousands of years," have men yet learned even to understand its meaning?

Moreover, the famous Two Tables are remarkable for their omissions. Where do they require scrupulous truthfulness? Where do they utter a specific word against human slavery? What barrier do they establish against priestcraft or kingcraft? They make for obedience, but not definitely for liberty.

Jesus seems to have felt these signal omissions of the ancient code. Does he then lay down a series of new rules, comprehensive enough for all cases in ages to come? The very contrary. In fact, he appears to have reacted against the minutiae of ethical and ecclesiastical conventionality with which Pharisaism had tyrannized over men's consciences without making men love, or even bear with one another. Jesus' most characteristic teaching, therefore, is to bring forward a rule, already ancient, which tries men's souls by their temper or attitude. "Love one another," he says, that is, Be men of good will. Whoever acts in good will, he is good. Whoever fails in good will is outside the kingdom of heaven, for he is outside of the order of humanity.

Jesus translates the single law of good will into its most practical terms in the Golden Rule, a quotation itself from some ancient and unknown seer. To the question, How shall we show love in our acts? the simplest intellectual answer always has been, "Do unto others as you wish them to do to you." Men have called this the Golden Rule, with an instinct that if all would obey it the world would immediately become like heaven.

But even the Golden Rule, simple as it seems, demands intelligence in its application. It is not infallible, unless it is infallibly interpreted. Suppose a narrow-minded, indolent, prejudiced, greedy and selfish man. He wishes to be let alone in his ignorance. He wishes to have others support him; he likes to receive alms, and wants money more than he wants anything else. Or, the man is ambitious and egotistic. Does the Golden Rule say anything intelligible to such a man? It has been proclaimed for centuries, yet it is still commonly looked upon as a chimera. It needs to be translated and illustrated in order to be taken in earnest. It needs to be shown in its application, almost as if the world were testing the use of the steam engine for the first time.

Moreover, the application of the Golden Rule is not simple, but very complex. I must do more for the other than what he wants me to do. He may want me to do what is foolish and hurtful for him and for society. He may want me to give him help or money, when he needs to be obliged to earn money. I must do, not what he wishes, but what is best for him and for others also; not what either he or I may now like, but what is for his permanent welfare, and even more, whatever is for the welfare of society. What, then, if I have no clear idea of the real welfare of man? What if I think it is mainly in what man gets? What if I only regard him as an animal to be fed, or an inferior to be commanded, and not as a man to love and be loved? What if I have not learned that man's highest satisfaction is, not in getting, but in the expression of life? Thus my thought of what life is good for, and my understanding of the nature

of the universe, serve to determine how I will apply the Golden Rule.

Moreover, there is an atmosphere of philosophy and of religion through which, or else without which, one sees and interprets all moral principles. The same rule that stirs a man's soul in one atmosphere, in another and denser air hardly reaches him. Is this a world of atoms and chance, or a divine universe? In the one case I conceive only a momentary flash of sensation to be behind the impulse which bids me act for my neighbor. In the other case, I conceive that the Power which guides the stars is with me and in me. The whole man, and the man at his best, mind, conscience, heart, and will, are involved by this view in every act of application of the Golden Rule.

Furthermore, modern ethics grows constantly more democratic. The modern question is two-fold: What is good for all? And, What is good for each, as bound up with the life of all? This implies a philosophy that permits a belief in the value of the average man, a belief in progress, and at least a working faith in the improvability of human nature. The ethics of democracy rests on a different philosophy from the ethics of an aristocratic conception of humanity. The application of the idea of justice, for example, is very different for a Nietzsche or a Napoleon, and for a Phillips Brooks. The one is thinking of what he purposes to get from men here and now, and the other of what he owes men—a perpetual obligation. The one is thinking of self-aggrandizement and the other of human betterment. One of these positions is religious and the other is not.

Emmanuel Kant, quite as great a moralist as a

philosopher, saw the vagueness of the Golden Rule by itself. He accordingly paraphrased it: Do as it would be well to do, if all men under similar circumstances were to do the same. That is, your conduct must not be private and personal; it must be universal and for man's lasting good. What, then, is man's lasting good or universal welfare? This is the question of modern democracy. No aristocrat asks it. We thus see that at every turn ethics is found to rest in a substratum of thought. Is there a universe? Then, and only then, is there a reasonable consideration of universal welfare.

Grant now that we live in a universe; grant that we have a sufficient definition of human welfare in the ideal of a society in which all men shall have the amplest opportunity for the possession and expression of the divine life and the good will, we still return to Kant's law with the problem of its application. Shall we do to-day, in this very barbarous world, with its Kaisers and armies, with its gigantic Trusts, as it would be well for men to do in a perfected society? Shall I dare to do alone, what it would be well for all men to do, while as most men are unwilling to co-operate with me? Shall the newly enrolled Russian youth obey Tolstoi's advice and refuse to take military orders? Precisely such practical questions meet us on the very threshold of our attempt to obey any one of the grand and simple ideal laws of ethical science. There would be no science at all, if there were no widespread need to understand more intimately the nature of our common and daily ethical problems.

## CHAPTER II

### THE SUBJECTS OF CASUISTRY

I HAVE used the words: "The Realm of Casuistry." We have already seen that the advance of civilized society is forever bringing forward new moral issues and fresh problems of conduct. The discussion and settlement of these questions constitute casuistry. We use the word here in its serious and good sense; we put aside that use of the word which makes it the mere spinning of refined webs of sophistry about ethical problems. There is a valid art of casuistry. It is necessarily involved in the moral growth of every individual and of each social group to which the individuals belong. It concerns the application of a few moral principles to the changing relations which intellectual and spiritual growth brings about.

The moral growth, whether of the individual or of society, is like the growth of a tree. The hard wood of the trunk and branches may be likened to the solid deposit of habits, fixed rules and ancient laws, in the strata of which generations of human experience are recorded and stored. You do not lightly bend or alter, or throw away even the forms and words under which mankind has legislated, which generations of parents have insisted upon and taught, in favor of property, of chastity, of monogamy, of the rights of the person, and of the protection of the state. On the other hand, the new growth, the new questions, the new impulses at work in the social life



may be likened to the new growth of twigs and tendrils which appear afresh every season. They are the outcome of the old trunk, but each is seeking the air and the light. The life of a growing society consists in this new movement of the free tendrils pushing their way out and upward. The old wood is maintained and renewed by virtue of the health of this new growth. The person or the society dies, where no new moral life asserts itself.

Here, then, is the field of casuistry. There is an art in directing the new growth of the moral life. Selection may be needful. Stern pruning may be needed. Everywhere the individual life, pressed by a universal law, seeks its fullest development and its best happiness. The question is, How shall each and all be favored and satisfied? How shall there be the least possible interference of one life with another? How shall the common life be most fully shared? How shall the way be laid to throw out new, great and strong branches as heretofore? How shall the trunk also grow thick and sound? For the life of human society does not consist merely in tendrils and leaves, however lusty they grow. The ethical art tries to answer these questions. Art combines the experience of the moral history of the race with practical wisdom, insight, and training so as to understand present conditions, and to foresee future results. As the painter's art is inspired by the love of beauty, so the inspiration of the ethical art consists in the enthusiasm for righteousness or social welfare, and in a controlling good will.

A startling fact faces us when we survey the modern field of casuistry. It is the variety of the moral

standards that are competing together for mastery. The realm of ethics, once limited to the territory of a tribe, or a people, or even an empire as large as Rome, has now broadened out into the width of the world. We are astonished at the difference of moral levels upon which men with whom we have to deal are living, each with their appropriate standard, the standard of George William Curtis, and the *Springfield Republican*; the standard of Mr. Hearst, the standard of Mr. Depew and Mr. Rockefeller (these men surely have some kind of moral standard!); the standard of the new Italian immigrant, or the man from the Emerald Isle; the standard of the New South and the Old South; of the ignorant plantation negro on the one hand and of Booker T. Washington on the other. All these standards and others besides prevail around us at one and the same time, and grade into each other. This surprising complexity makes the realm of casuistry sufficiently perplexing.

There is, however, another fact which seems much more significant, namely, that men are living a far more closely social life than in any other period in history. They are destined to live still closer together. The behavior of the atoms, as they are remotely related together in the gaseous state, is altogether different from their behavior when, under pressure, the same atoms have become a liquid or even a solid. Now all human society is passing, under some universal mode of pressure, from the somewhat loose and individualistic relations of its separate parts into a new closeness of relation. The time is fast going by when a tribe, or a family, or a person can be sufficient unto himself. The single man cannot

easily betake himself to the woods anywhere to-day and live his own life. He is dependent for tools and foods upon the commerce of the whole world. The farmer in these days of specialization cannot live on the product of his own farm. The workman cannot carry on his own trade alone. We are all dependent on one another. All work is coming to be in some actual sense co-operative. No man knows, or can exactly ascertain, what the social worth of his own work is, or how much of it is his own, and how much is the contribution of others, of inventors and scientific investigators, or the result of improved methods, or of more intelligent modes of distribution and commerce. He may readily believe that the worth of his work is greater than it really is.

This new closeness of our social life, prevailing everywhere, evidently forces fresh ethical problems upon us. The grandest of all social ends is the development of worthy and complete personality. On one hand, it might seem as if the pressure of modern life would restrain the freedom of the individual's growth and exercise a depressing tyranny over him. On the other hand, new possibilities appear for each to use the wealth, the power, the intelligence of all as a more effective means to develop large, mature, free and happy manhood. It may already be said with confidence that the men and women who have learned to adjust themselves to the closest mutual and social relations of modern life, such men, for example, as the late William H. Baldwin, of New York, show no sign whatever of the loss of substantial character, the power of initiative, fresh and attractive originality of thought

and expression, or the old-time sensitiveness of conscience.

We shall hope now to suggest in the course of our discussion that the extremely interesting problems of casuistry are of a nature to foster, among those who take them up, no dilettante sentimentalism or futile academic speculation, but rather, virile ethical enthusiasm. This will appear, I trust, as soon as we try to appreciate anew the great words which in all time have characterized man's ethical life.

## CHAPTER III

### WHAT JUSTICE IS

LET us now take a single one of the great ethical words, follow it out, and find what it signifies. We will take the idea of justice. To many men this has seemed to be the one and sufficient rule of the good life: "Do justice." What is justice? I shall endeavor to show that in every department of life our conception of justice, and especially the ideal of what its application should be, is the result of a long and costly struggle and development, which is still going on, and the practical outcome of which the wisest man can scarcely foresee.

Consider the idea of justice, first, in respect to the subject of property rights. These property rights have the simplest beginnings. Whoever is a direct maker of anything, a tool, a weapon, an ornament, is instinctively conceived as owning it. By natural relationship, the maker and the thing made belong together. You falsify facts by breaking the relationship and taking the thing away from the man who made it. So, likewise, if a man or a child has found or discovered anything, a fruit, or a jewel, which no one else had found, it is his. So, if a man had hunted or fished, his game was his own and not another's. Even animals seem to have this rudimentary sense of justice with respect to each other's nests or lairs or food. They seem dimly conscious of approaching a danger

line when they begin to rob other animals, especially those of their own species.

The sense of individual property rights hardly begins to assert itself before it receives modification from the side of the social sense. What is the child's is claimed on occasion by the parent for the sake of the household. The child cannot hold anything against the necessity of the family. There is also family property, as for instance, the house, and its furnishings. There may be communal property, in which a hundred households share. To whom, unless to the whole community, do the hunting grounds, the fish and the game belong? Will justice permit a few of the people to own exclusive rights, to kill the wild animals and take the fish? To what source, pray, can such a claim of rights, however supported by legal documents, fairly go back?

What, now, if the individual claims, and holds by force or assertion of vested right, the fountain to which the whole village must repair for its water? How shall we draw the line between the private rights of property, and the family, the public, or the national rights, or the common rights of mankind? What may the individual hold as his own against the possible claim of the necessity of his fellowmen? If, as ancient custom prescribed, he must stand ready to die, without a thought of compensation, in defense of his tribe or his state, has he any property right which he is not bound to give up, with or without compensation, in case the good of mankind requires it?

This is the type of new questions such as are arising all over the world. Men thought they had fences and landmarks dividing the private and public rights from



each other. Society to-day in the interests of justice is questioning all the landmarks. The ethical history of mankind has been a struggle to determine the true balance or adjustment between individual and social property rights. No one knew in advance where the lines of harmony were. No god prescribed these lines. We have had to learn our ethics, as we have learned everything else, by costly experience of good and evil.

It is easy to see some of the evident extremes to which the mighty sense of individual right has stretched out its grasping hands over society. Thus, for example, the father, the patriarch, the chief, the king, early developed a claim, as of right, over all that belonged to his people. This may have been at first only the natural claim of trusteeship in behalf of the whole. However the claim arose, human egotism has almost never been able to resist the subtle fascination of treating an unlimited trust as the man's own personal property. The marvel is that multitudes of men, becoming used to the claim of one man or one family, have acquiesced in it. What had once become custom seemed to them right, without asking why. The world is asking "Why?" as never before.

Observe, again, the common acquiescence in the time-honored claims to property by right of conquest. Grant, if you like, what few can believe, that such claims took their rise in the case of wars which had been maliciously provoked, and for which pillage was thought a just penalty. Nevertheless, pillage, robbery and loot came to be the admitted rule of the world, hardly questioned at all, even when the innocent suffered. Even to-day, the barbarous rule holds good

with respect to war against semi-civilized peoples. How many of the soldiers of "Christian" nations in the Orient have had any sense of doing injustice in ransacking a Philippine or Chinese town? A large number of Germans, Frenchmen, English or Americans entertain no doubt that a vast war indemnity may justly be collected from any nation over which they have been victorious in war. Here is the claim of the right by conquest holding its sway still.

Another claim of property right, handed down from savage days, is to hold as one's own what has been won by gambling. The winnings, however outrageous they may be, are the winner's property as much as if he had created them by his industry, or saved them by his frugality. The loser acknowledges the claim. Modern laws, in America at least, disown the claim. Yes!—with respect to the petty winnings of professional gamblers. But men who hold up their heads in churches claim as theirs by right, what they have won by gigantic and unscrupulous gambling upon the stock or produce exchange. Their winnings, taken from the commonwealth, represent no social service whatever!

What shall we say to the astonishing modern claim of property right to the largest possible profits of business, to gains based on special legislation, on tariffs and subsidies, to foolish public grants of mines and franchises, to gain resting upon colossal monopolies in which a few financial kings can levy a tax of millions of dollars upon a nation—an income for services rendered which a few men assess and others must pay? Mr. Carnegie's colossal income from a single

tariff-protected corporation illustrates our meaning. Into what idea of justice does it fit?

Another grand and ancient claim to private property rests upon the idea of heredity. As the prince was once assumed by all to have a divine right to hand down his throne and political power to his son or nearest heir, however unworthy to rule, who must henceforth be obeyed, so the possessor of millions of property, workshops, mines, forests, towns, is commonly acknowledged to have a right over his millions, even after he dies! He can make his right hereditary and "found a family" in free America, based on a power more irresponsible than the titular prince exercised. This is to-day the rule of the civilized world. Men hand down such "rights," and most men admit them as just. Multitudes are seeking, though hopelessly, to get and transmit such rights to their children. Are these unqualified claims really just? Or are they only legal, like the rights by which Scottish Lords hold the lands which once doubtless belonged to their tribesmen, or English Lords hold what was granted their forefathers by usurping kings or an aristocratic Parliament?

What shall we say to the claims of those in our American cities whose hold on the titles to the land gives them, without a stroke of labor, an added share in every gain made by the efforts of a million of men? Who shall tell us the line where individual right leaves off, and the right of the people begins? There was never an age in which the world has taken more extreme strides in its experiments on the side of individualism. The truth is, in this age of commercialism and individual exploitation of the treasures of the

world, powerful individualists have had the making of the laws, as the nobles made the laws in the earlier and feudal period. It is at least possible that the pendulum has swung altogether too far on one side. It is altogether likely that justice lies now in the direction of the rights of the people, of society, of humanity.

There can be no possible doubt that the present industrial and economical condition is fraught with injustice. We will not insist that the world is worse off than in the days of serfdom and slavery. We will grant that it is growing better, as it is certainly richer. But it is not a world with which any lover of his kind can be satisfied. It is not right that a fraction only of the people should have,—we will not say merely the larger part of the aggregate wealth, but also specially free and easy access in favor of their children to the grand opportunities of higher education, art, power, and influence. It is not well, either for this limited class or for their children. It is not good circulation in the body politics which draws off to one part an enormous excess of the nourishment. That very part suffers disease, while the rest of the body is depleted.

We affirm without bitterness, but as a matter of fact, that millions of families live too close to the line of stern necessity, hunger and cold. The workingman's child should not be so nearly bound, as he often must be to-day, to the life of unskilled labor. The taxes are not justly proportioned to the shoulders of those who carry them. Notoriously the poorer people carry the heavier burdens. The assessor who cannot find millions of dollars which belong to corporations or to great private estates, finds easily enough all that the small artisan has in his shop, and the

small farmers' cows and hens. Without laying too cruel blame upon individuals, we are becoming alive to the fact that the great gifts of the earth, the richness of the soil, the ores and the minerals, the forces of nature, the processes of man's inventive genius, all of which ought to be the common inheritance of each new generation, are largely monopolized by the few, while many live nearly hopeless lives, often like bondmen. Who pretends that the balance is fair? How could it yet be fair, when it is still so very recent that the people have had any representation in the legislatures and congresses? The whole people have no representation yet, as compared with the vested interests, the monopolies, the egotists, and the self-seekers. Nowhere are men yet educated enough to send real and honest tribunes of the people to see to it that the commonwealth suffers no harm. It is in the light of such facts as these that the question recurs: What is justice?

## CHAPTER IV

### A BIT OF SOPHISTRY

LET us now try a little process of sophistication. It is very familiar. We will grant that things are not yet ideal in the world. If this is a growing world, it is not to be expected that conditions can be ideal yet. Meanwhile, we know the present existing system of industry and commerce, and we know no other system. Perhaps it is too individualistic, and competition has had too large sway in it. But strong individuals are necessary to manage our world; they are necessary for the public good, as commanders are necessary in an army. Powerful individuals have already contributed enormously to the enrichment of the world, which upon the whole was never so prosperous as it is to-day. These men do better for the people than the people could do for themselves. Meanwhile they must have grand prizes, or they will not be so efficient. In fact, the prizes, the power, the estates, the monopolies, serve as a mighty incentive to lift all mankind. They constantly raise strong leaders from the ranks, who straightway serve by their genius of organization to raise the whole level of humanity. In short, it is said, that with incidental injustice, on the whole, society already does substantial justice to its members,—more at least than the weak without the help of strong leadership could get for themselves. Meanwhile world-forces are doubtless at work, which in spite of, or aside from, man's puny



efforts will probably by and by in due time bring in more favorable and more just conditions. The inference is that justice, for the present at least, is what is practicable, or, as men say, "what the others do."

What, now, will the man of honest good will say to this *laissez faire* doctrine of justice? How far will he accept the foregoing ingenious excuses in behalf of the existing doctrine of property rights? Look straight at the facts, he replies. The larger part of the increment, which the progress of inventions and the growth and pressure of population have added to the wealth of the world, admittedly now goes into the hands of a few. Thus, the land underneath a great city rises in value by leaps and bounds. It is preposterous to allow this rise to be set up in colossal prizes to become the exclusive property of the men who can outwit and outforce others in the art of commercial crowding and pushing!

A list has been recently published of the estimated estates of the hundred richest persons in the world. The striking fact about the origin of the larger number of these vast multi-millionaire properties is that the present owner has obviously done little or nothing to warrant his holding a first-mortgage upon all the income of the world. Some kind of monopoly, either of his own acquisition or of his ancestors, has produced the Astor, the Carnegie, the Rockefeller, and other such fortunes. Mines, or lands, or the manipulation of finance, or corrupting political influence, has built them up. In other words, the prizes, besides being extortionate, do not go where prizes belong.

Moreover, our right-minded man of good will is not seeking what he shall get for himself, how high he can

fix his profits, how large a salary he can draw, what monopoly tax he can assess upon his fellows, what size of fortune he can leave his children. He has got beyond this acquisitive period of the animal instinct. He can do more and better with his power than to get piles of things together, or to make up a lumber yard. He has now conceived the idea of construction and expression. He has become, though still an individual, a social person. He has gained the sense of a larger self, wider than his own family, as wide as the brotherhood of man. Some of the ablest men who have ever done business, Leclair, Peter Cooper, Samuel M. Jones, the late Mayor of Toledo, and others easily named, have already shown that men do not need vast personal prizes to stir their activity. They love to do their work.

Furthermore we may trace a steady tendency, working like a law of nature, to undermine, in great sections, men's exclusive claims to private property. Thus, the right to hold slaves, the divine right of princes once unchallenged, the right to inflict a nuisance upon the public health or safety, as by a powder factory or a house of prostitution, the right to sell poisons, drugs or liquors, the right to employ little children or women in mines or shops to the deterioration of the physical and moral standard of humanity, the right to crowd men and women in cellars or slums,—these private rights "to do as one pleases with his own" have all given way under inspection and prove not to be private rights at all. Show plainly, then, that any assumed private right is a public wrong, and it ceases to be a "right" any longer. We are all coming to recognize this law. Justice consists in obeying it.

See the new firing line where justice is now throwing up its entrenchments. The right to control the streets of a town, the right to assess a tax upon the transportation across a State or a Continent, the right to fix or limit the output of the coal, iron, or copper mines of a country, the right to draw a private income from the growth of the wealth of a metropolis, the right to enjoy the income of bonds fastened upon the labor of a nation for a hundred years,—such alleged “rights” as these are now under fire, and seem unlikely to pass the ordeal. The man of good will is already inclined to pronounce them outrageous. They seem to him like the claims of the medieval baron who charged “all that the traffic would bear” upon the voyagers who passed his castle on the Rhine. They seem as unworthy of a socially minded people as the conduct of the man would be who compelled his neighbors to pay for every gallon of water which they drew from the only spring in the town. It is not the few experts to-day who are making this judgment upon various alleged property rights, but all unsophisticated people who have acquired any clear social sense about human welfare. Even a President of the United States has taken his stand at the front of this new movement of justice.

What shall we say now to the claim which the leaders of finance and the captains of industry are in the habit of urging on account of the exceptional value of their services? This is merely the old claim, revived in a new form, once made by the soldiers and princes. The world owed its military aristocracy, they told us, palaces and fortunes for the services of defense which they rendered. As if they were not the very

class throughout the world, who, by their violence and ambitions, made costly defenses necessary! We do not purpose to depreciate in any way the real services rendered by the actual inventors, organizers, promoters and captains of industry. We wish to recompense them liberally for the services through which they have enriched mankind. But we call attention to the obvious fact that no man or group of men ever make their fortunes by themselves. It cannot be theirs, therefore, by exclusive right of production. Other men's work is involved, beyond our power to analyze its proportions, in every item of modern wealth. No man, therefore, can have a right to do what he pleases with his wealth, as if it were surely and only his own.

This will be clearer when we ask and answer, if we can, a radical question. How is it that mankind has progressed and civilization has come in through thousands of years? Through forces above and beyond the control of any human being; through inscrutable social and moral forces working through the lives and acts of men. From savagery upwards, individual men, as if inspired by "a Power not themselves making for Righteousness," have stood before the ranks of their tribe, their social group, their nation, constantly setting forth, by word and by deed, new standards of practical conduct higher than custom or law required, making original applications of the old and simple rules: "Thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not kill." All the moral gains of mankind have come about through men, who, besides what the moral usage of their age required, did things beyond and above the limits of usage. At times, no public opinion supported them, but something more

majestic, through the motion of which, indeed, public opinion and law came about. Now, all the wealth of the world is acquired and rendered secure by virtue of this moral heritage of an unknown host of men and women, who have added the values to human life that money only symbolizes. Take out the idealism from the world, the contribution of those who, like Amos and Socrates and Epictetus, have owned little or no property, and all the property drops at once by the value of billions of dollars. The fact is, no man strictly possesses any exclusive property rights, least of all the man who denies the very ideals of good will and humanity, on which his property is based. For all values at the last analysis are involved with the common heritage of the race. Thus no man has a right "to do what he pleases with his own."

## CHAPTER V

### WHAT TO DO

It is easy in innumerable instances to show that something is wrong. It is easy, for example, to show that the present system of the distribution of the wealth of the world, necessary as it may have been in the process of evolution, has now come to be unjust and cruel. It is quite another matter to decide what to do about it. Certain individuals hold vast amounts of private property which rightly belongs, not to them, but to society. These are not bad men. They have simply taken over what common law and usage permitted them to get. "Scramble," society said to them, as the huge prizes were thrown into the market place, "and get what you can." Society now sees that it does injustice to its own children in permitting this riotous scramble. The society of to-day resents what the society of yesterday permitted. But the injustice is done. The question is how to undo it. Shall we take back from the private owners of inordinate wealth what they have been allowed to sequester? Can we justly revoke charters and franchises and bonds and leases running a thousand years? Can we reappropriate for the good of the people, lands, mines and forests, that never ought to have been expropriated? Can we lay hands on the ancient shrine of "the inviolability of contracts," entrenched by a famous decision of the Supreme Court, at the heart of the Consti-



tution of the United States? All these questions are in the air to-day.

Granting the right of eminent domain in the hands of the people; assuming that the States or the Nation may, if this seems needful for the common good, take over all the property, such as railroads, and lands, by which the life of the nation subsists and has circulation; recollecting that the life of the private citizen may on occasion be demanded for the defense of all, what does justice demand in behalf of the minority in whose possession this excessive share of the public wealth is discovered? Is it or is it not, as some say, a species of stealing or confiscation to take the excess from a part and give it back to the whole? Grant that it is right to seek in some form to do this, how can it be done?

Moreover, we now use a system of interchange of the values of the world, known as competition. By the use of this time-honored method, men set and alter the values of their work and its products. Each commodity is made to seek its level and go where it is most wanted. The sugar crop of Cuba, the cotton of the Gulf States, and the wheat crop of Dakota, are interchanged, each rushing to fill the place of largest demand. But it is under this very system of competition, or at least by its manipulation and abuse, that men have ground the faces of the poor and exploited the commonwealth. Is the system then essentially an unjust one? Must it be set aside? How, then, shall we otherwise contrive more fairly to award the wages to which the laborer is entitled, and to distribute the wealth that all help to create? Who will show us a fairer or more effective method than the working of

this deep law through which scarcity and abundance are made naturally to change places? Who will perhaps show the proper limits of competition? What if we discover that it is not the working of competition that hurts the poor and piles up dangerous fortunes, but the vitiation of the principle of competition by the devices of men's greed and ambition? The task of our age is to say what justice is, as applied to these typical questions.

Consider the last question first, for it will thus throw light upon the earlier one. Competition in itself is not more moral or immoral than is the sense of hunger. The attitude of men to one another in competition is that alone which makes it good or bad. Thus, two friendly men bargain together. One trades in potatoes, the other in lumber. Each of them has the good will to be fair. Neither can afford to give the other beyond a certain limit of value. The limit is conditioned on the abundance or scarcity of the article in question. The two friendly men might both endeavor to come as near as possible to this limit, not on the side of their selfishness, but on the side of their generosity. Do you call this process emulation? Whatever you call it, the result follows the law of competition. Whether the two men seek to do as well as they can for each other, or each seeks to do as meanly as he can to the other, the economic result of the exchange will not greatly differ.

In fact, many friendly people are every day trading with the attitude of good will. Their action is doubtless complicated by the fact that they have to be on their guard against unfriendly men. Their free action is handicapped by every holder of a special privilege

or a monopoly. Nevertheless, the average man tends always to respond to fair treatment. We all choose, other things being equal, to trade with friendly men, and not with sharpers. We enjoy doing as well as we can for those who do well for us. If no land monopolies or other monopolies, tariffs or special privileges existed, it would not be difficult to imagine whole communities who should trade with one another as men, and not as beasts of prey. Competition does not need to be abolished. Men only need to use its fundamental principle, as kindly men already are daily using it. Indeed, even in a socialist state, it is impossible to see how man could rule out the general principle that governs all interchange of supplies. Neither is it possible to understand any method or system which selfish and grasping men might not manipulate so as to secure more than their share of the product of the world. Who are going to be the Governors, the Mayors, the Judges and the Captains of Industry in a Socialist State?

Let us ask, now, what we ought to do about the dubious processes by which excessive wealth is still being rolled up to the account of the few. The greed of individuals, the unscrupulousness of some of them, the indifference, the negligence, and the shiftlessness of others, have fostered the wrongful distribution of wealth. How have greed and unscrupulousness gone to work? They have made use of an old-world system of land tenure; they have used old laws unsuited to modern conditions; they have created tariff barriers like fences to protect private interests from the natural working of social forces; by persuasion or even by bribes they have got concessions from legislatures or

city councils for the exploitation of lands or forests or streets. In a word, greed and unscrupulousness have established monopolies and special privileges, which presently work like so many tight bandages to stop the corporate circulation of industrial life.

Let us be perfectly fair to our successful men of wealth. Greedy and unscrupulous many of them have often been. But they have also been energetic and enterprising. They have not been without public spirit and a will to serve their fellows. Individuals among them have been as high-minded and generous as others have been dishonorable or avaricious. The great leaders in business have been our brothers, with the same human nature. Often, without the consciousness of an evil intent or of disastrous consequences, they have taken advantage of means and laws which society had hardly ever questioned. Most men would have willingly done the same things if the chance had come in their way. Let us not blame individuals for injustices which we all permitted, and for the remedy of which we are all henceforth responsible together.

The first evident remedy is to get rid, as fast as we can, of the bands and swathings which check the circulation of life, and let the body go free. The remedy is to withdraw monopolies and special privileges, surely not to give any more. This is general and easy to say. The difficulty is in the application. Shall we remove the bandages at once and altogether? Shall we abrogate the tariffs? Some of us say, Yes, holding that this course, while right, is in the long run most merciful even to the few who would be hurt. Others say, Loosen the bands. Others say, Loosen one at a time. Take off the tariffs, beginning with the

most oppressive. Begin to free the land, next, from the vast burden of private rentals; at least make the great holders of land pay just taxes. Then see what can be done to abolish what are called, "vested interests"—the mortgage bonds fastened by the improvidence of earlier generations upon their descendants. All say, with renewed emphasis, Establish no more monopolies. Keep such public rights as remain, the streets, the mines, the forests, the shores.

The principle of good will throws light upon all these answers. It requires us to use due consideration and generosity toward those who, we may believe, possess unjust privileges. It bids us, as far as possible, to act together, and to seek, however resolutely, the methods of persuasion. It tends, therefore, to proceed cautiously by way of evolution and not revolution. It goes vigorously to its end, but it moves one step at a time and constructively. It carries the change of method and machinery along with the change of mind and heart to use the better machinery. This method, both conservative and radical, will now have illustration in our treatment of the tremendous and pressing question of the disposal of the monopolistic fortunes, already gathered and still in process of growing.

What everyone thinks of first is the legal right of the holder of property. Is his title good in the courts? Then the property is his. Thus men hastily judge of the Astor or Rockefeller fortunes. But the deeper question concerns the forgotten millions of the people of the United States.

The first answer to be considered may seem like a

"counsel of perfection." But one very rich man, Mr. Carnegie, has already given this answer, although the world wonders whether he will succeed in carrying it out. The over-rich man is asked to hold his fortune in trust, and thus practically to return it to society, where it doubtless belongs. A considerable number of individuals to-day freely acknowledge that their wealth is not strictly their own. The popular pressure grows upon the people of large fortune to regard their wealth in this way. This pressure of public opinion may conceivably go so far as to compel the possessors of great hereditary wealth to relinquish their holdings, as the members of the British House of Lords will some day be politely requested to relinquish their hereditary titles to political power. The development of the principle of good will, if it were only confined to the people who profess to believe in the religion of the Golden Rule, would doubtless lead to some form of voluntary renunciation of abnormal property rights. The willing disposal of excessive fortunes would be so wholesome for society that it would be worth while for the many to continue to suffer some measure of temporary injustice, provided the inordinately rich might be finally converted, on the side of their humanity and chivalry, to rid themselves of the evident injustice involved in their excessive wealth.

But we have to carry our enquiry a step further. Society, that is, all of us, for the fear of doing a legal or technical injustice to a few, cannot righteously hesitate or refuse to take steps to correct a real injustice inflicted upon a multitude of people, and affecting every child born into the world. Suppose speculative and monopolistic fortunes increase; sup-



pose the few own most of the land, and the many dwell in tenement houses; suppose the blood flows to a single organ of the body, and the body itself is impoverished, there can be no question of the duty of society to see to it that the natural circulation shall be restored.

Let us be more concrete. Grant that a million of the people substantially own all the nerves and arteries of commerce, the railways and the telegraph lines, the mines also, and the forests, the resources upon which the common life of all of us depends; there appear at once two aspects of justice. We must be fair to the legal holders of these properties. But we must also be fair to the hosts of the nation from whom these great holdings of natural wealth ought never to have been alienated, and upon whose labor their present value is reared. The law of good will seeks to secure the welfare of all. Faith in the law of good will is the faith that the welfare of all will prove to be for the real interest of the few as well as the many.

See now whether society ought not to do something like this: Society may sometime say to every holder of properties, either in lands more than the owner is able to use by himself, or of quasi-public businesses: "We will exercise our right of eminent domain for the sake of the public good over these properties; meantime we will guarantee a certain income, say three per cent. upon their value, to you and to your children as long as you and they live. We will not, however, hold ourselves bound to pay a tax to the *unborn* children of the present holders of the titles to the great properties at issue. In other words, society shall merely resume its inherent right not to allow its laws

of inheritance and its probate courts to be used for the defense of monopoly or privilege, as against the actual welfare of all the people. It seems to me that this action would be more than just to the few. It would be generous treatment. It would be hard to show that any man's claim to a millionaire fortune, much less to dispose of it by will as he pleases, is either well for the man, or just to society. Everyone knows that it is apt to be demoralizing to his children.

## CHAPTER VI

### LEGALITY AND RIGHT

WE have touched upon as difficult a subject as can be found in the field of practical conduct. It is the relation between legality and righteousness. It is the old issue between the letter and the spirit. Must we arbitrarily keep a promise that proves to work an injury? Must the soldier, or sailor, or workman obey an order that he finds to be foolish or hurtful? Must the citizen obey laws that he believes do harm rather than good? Must he even help the officers of the law to carry out what seem to him unrighteous policies? Shall he help catch fugitive slaves? Shall he fight in a bad war? Shall he help make an unrighteous tariff or tax law work smoothly? How far shall a man meekly bow before an injustice, whether from a tyrant, or from a majority, or from uncivilized legislation? The practical answer to such questions is at once the test and the discipline of character.

The first quite clear thing to say is, that a man ought, whatever he does, to keep his good will and good temper as he would keep his sanity or his health. We have already seen that the man is not "all there," as a whole man, in the attitude of ill-will or self-will. In such a mood he is at a disadvantage for counsel or action. He must not hate; he must not wish to take revenge; he must not lose his humanity. His independence must not become egotism. Because others are ignorant or selfish

or unfair, he is bound all the more, like a sound nerve in the body, to keep his integrity and not to be inflamed with a mean or unfriendly emotion. Perhaps a man had better even make an error of judgment, and yet do it in good will, than to do the correct thing and lose his temper in doing it.

Moreover, in the issue between legality and justice, no man has a right to consider an injustice as done only to himself. There must be more at stake than a personal inconvenience, loss, or injury. There must be a principle in the case, affecting others as well as the individual. Living as closely as we do in modern society, hardly any law can be passed that does not work some temporary, incidental or individual hardship. We each and all agree to the conditions of a commonwealth, with the knowledge that what is good and fair for all may for a time bear heavily upon the individual. As society may ask the individual to give up his life for the good of all, he may fairly be asked to submit willingly to loss or inconvenience for the good of all. All that the individual asks, or ought to ask, in such a case is that the general rule that restrains or disturbs him or injures his business is really for the welfare of all. So in refusing, or disobeying, or resisting a law or convention of society, the individual is bound to believe that his action is not merely selfish, but that he is upholding a principle, and thus serving other and larger interests than his own. Otherwise, the individual is put in the inequitable and anomalous position of setting his tiny advantage against the good of all.

It is on this ground that a man may doubtless set at nought a law that seems to him inhumane, or refuse

to fight in a war that he believes unjust. On the same ground he may venture to break a promise which proves to conflict with the spirit in which the promise was made; he may disregard an order of his captain or employer that would bring serious injury to the service or the business. But in every case the ethical condition is that the act shall proceed in the name of good will, and not of wilfulness or individualism.

This attitude is of the highest importance. For the want of it many good men come to defeat. If a man sets aside a legal requirement in favor of a supposed command of justice or for the general welfare, his act must be free of the arrogant, egotistic, contemptuous or defiant tone. In a word, he must take his venture in a spirit of seriousness, modesty, and sympathy. It is a grave venture—a form of anarchism—for the individual to set himself against the order of society. The presumption must generally be in favor of the beaten road where others go. One needs to be very sure that some bridge is down or some washout has occurred, in order to turn out of the road upon forbidden ground.

Moreover, the individual who sets legality or convention aside, in the interest of a supposed principle of justice, must be prepared for personal sacrifice, cost or penalty. The soldier who disobeys his commands in order to save the army must take the risks of misunderstanding, failure and court-martial. The patriot who will not join in his nation's battles must not complain if he suffers the name of a traitor. The cashier who, on suspicion of fraud, refuses to pay the draft of his bank president may lose his place. The reformer who

seeks to break down an old custom or law must expect to incur opprobrium and prejudice. It is no easy task to bring about social or legal change. Whoever undertakes this needs a clean conscience and a high purpose. Every change involves a certain waste or loss or friction in the period of adjustment. It is preposterous for the reformer to expect to be comfortable when he makes discomfort for others.

It should be observed, also, that outgrown legality and convention, though they sometimes work considerable injury, and even on exceptional occasions demand a duty of disobedience from those who see their injustice, nevertheless generally represent a crude attempt in the direction of social co-operation. Most laws and rules, therefore, will be found to deserve a certain respect. You despise them at your peril, and you are bound to have something better to put in their place. No better example of this fact can be given than the case of the marriage laws. Individual cases of hardship occur under them, and an occasional outcry is made against them for their obvious failure to work happiness. As if happiness could be secured by process of law! But these very marriage laws stand for a precious and costly series of human experience. The individual who ventures to make exceptions from them, especially in his own favor, had better count the cost!

We may seem to have slighted a question which must often occur. Suppose the individual whom society hurts by its general law, whom it drafts as a soldier against his will, whose ancestral homestead it requires for a public use, with whose business its new health laws interfere, cries out in complaint: "You do me injustice. What right have all the men in the world



to take away my property and strike at my happiness?" The question in its numerous phases is analogous to the problem of the right of the individual, as against the passengers and crew, upon a ship in distress. Only the most extravagant anarchist would deny that the individual's goods may be thrown into the sea, and he himself, if he stands in the way, may and must be knocked down at the risk of his life. The appeal of justice here is to the real man at his best. He ought not, and he knows that he ought not, to stand in the way of the safety of his fellows. Their part is to treat him with all the humanity possible. They will not touch or hurt him, or cross his will, if they can reasonably get on otherwise. At the last resort they must prefer the social good, even though the individual unjustly refuses his consent. The injustice in such a case is not in the treatment that the individual has to suffer for the sake of the general good, but in his presumption in setting his own convenience against the good of the others.

It must be frankly confessed that absolute justice can hardly be expected in a growing world. What is more important is the spirit of justice. Everything else is external. That my neighbors shall *wish* to do fairly by me is more for my happiness than that they shall in every instance succeed in their attempt. If they purpose to do justice, they will succeed in the main. This is enough. We expect, indeed, to bear our share in suffering the occasional miscarriage of justice, even at the hands of those who wish to be fair to us, as we expect to suffer inconvenience in a growing town from the inevitable fact that public and private improvements are always going on.

Indeed, the practical process of getting justice done in the world may be likened to the building of a new piece of railway, with its various branches stretching into new territory, hitherto a wilderness. Right up to where the new work begins, it is safe and easy to move; there are precedents and, as it were, time-tables, to show what will happen. But the new road is still a venture, with few travelers upon it. At the end of it men are still at work pioneering. The few rather than the many are here. So with the new issues in determining justice. We are laying blocks of track one by one in advance. Society hardly yet recognizes the need of this work. Pioneers must do it. Surely the highway of justice does not yet stretch across the continent! But those who care for the zest and the rewards (such as they are) of the pioneer work, must not at the same time expect the greater comparative safety, immunities and personal comfort of regular passengers on the established highways.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE DOUBLE STANDARD

WE must not be surprised to discover that there is no rule of thumb in ethics, single and rigorous for all men alike. There is no straight chalk mark upon which you can demand that everyone shall straightway adjust his feet. Moral movement is by the laws of vital growth; its lines are curves. God does not march men in platoons. Each man's course is his own; his moral history is different from every other man on the planet. Right for him is at every step an original deed. Justice, as sure as the man's soul grows, is every day taking on a wider horizon. The life of justice for the child consists in a very small world. The life of justice becomes a new world, with suns and systems, when the man fairly comes to birth, and his eyes open wide enough to see the vastness of the relations which comprise our lives.

There is a "double standard," or rather two different standards, by which men's consciences judge their acts. One standard is that of custom. Statute laws roughly embody it; the laws are sometimes slightly above, or again they may even be in certain respects below, this working standard. What governs the majority of men is the moral opinion of their own small social set. Conscience here, as we have seen, is hardly more than a man's consciousness of the disapproval of his comrades at his daring to break the ranks

with them. Conscience is at first more social than it is moral. In other words, it acts with a narrow view of morality. It works in its lower terms, like the custom of certain labor unions, against the man who does better, as well as against the man who does worse than his company. This lower form of conscience is simply conservative; it serves to keep men as they are; it is timid of moral experiments; it is ready to persecute its heretics and innovators; it does not understand, but is only vaguely apprehensive of, new ideals. How bitter the average Roman citizen could be against those who condemned the gladiatorial games! How pitiless slave-holders were toward the apostles of freedom! How cruel the duellist was against the man of the new code of honor, who dared to refuse to fight! How impossible for the ordinary German immigrant to understand the Maine Liquor Law! Nevertheless, the duellist, and the worshiper of Saint Gambrinus, and the slave-holder, and the Roman, recognized each his own line of ethical duty, to pass which for him was sin and shame and remorse. As we often say: There is honor among thieves.

A second and higher standard to which conscience tends to grow is beyond the custom of the group, the nation, or the sect. It is at the same time individual and universal. Whatever others think or say or do, "This," says conscience, "is right for me." But it is made to be right for me, because profoundly my act belongs to the universe, as I belong to the universe; it is good for all men and for their sake, and not for to-day, but for all time. No one can leave out of account this higher quality of conscience which, in fact, dominates the lower conscience and gives a man twinges of

uneasiness even in the face of his complacency toward customary wrong.

To the mature man there can be but one standard of conduct, namely, "the higher law." There is a curious borderland, however, in ethical growth between the child or the savage, and the domain of the grown and civilized man. It is like the uncomfortable borderland of self-consciousness through which men have to grow up from the innocence and unconsciousness of infancy to the dignity and self-possession of manhood. In this twilight country, between darkness and dawn, men "see double," we say. They obey the laws, because they must, while they are becoming aware that such compulsory obedience is a sort of slavery to a good master. They still imagine that a moderate or enlightened selfishness is necessary, while they are learning daily that selfishness brings less and less satisfaction. They try experiments, now backward toward the gravitation of the animal nature, and then forward and upward in the line of the growth of their humanity.

The world to-day lies largely in the intermediate borderland between mere usage or custom,—the rule of the child or the subject—and the good will of the grown man. Men ripen morally in streaks like the apples, showing all gradations of inconsistency between the old and the new, between selfishness and sympathy. The same man may honestly be a generous philanthropist in New York or Boston, and be morbidly sensitive about his narrow property rights at the seashore or in the Adirondacks. Multitudes are trying to do a little of both things at one and the same time,—to be selfish in part and to behave also as men of humanity,

to hate their enemies while they love their friends; to get the better of their rivals in trade while, driven by a power beyond themselves, they join hands in closer bonds of co-operation and make friends of their rivals.

This is the mixed state of mind to which the old word of the New Testament points: "For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." A man lives in a state of moral disquiet as soon as he feels, and as long as he feels, the pressure of the beautiful new imperative, "Live the life of good will," while yet he resists its motion. In the hour when the man obeys the higher law and yields himself to its movement, the discord ceases and the man stands forth at his best. This fact underlies all so-called experiences of religion, as well as the profoundest records of ethical effort. For morality and religion appear to be one in their roots; they belong to the realm of universal and lasting values.



## CHAPTER VIII

### THE HIGHER LAW

ALL the problems of casuistry hinge upon the conception of what has been called "the higher law." Why had early Christians to go to the stake rather than bow before the image of their emperor? Why had men of sensitive consciences to manumit their slaves, while the society around them derided their conduct? What was it that compelled John Ruskin to put aside his inherited wealth? What bids certain men to do business by the Golden Rule, while the rest of the world still distrust it? This is the Higher Law. "No matter," says this law to the man who has once caught the idea of it, "no matter whether others praise or blame, whether you make gains or losses, whether on occasion you take the risk of life; no matter whether others go with you or you go alone: nevertheless follow me." Take the idea of the higher law out of ethics and you have taken that which gives sanction, zest, dignity and joy out of man's moral life.

What is this higher law? It takes many forms: but what is its essence? We have referred in an earlier chapter to the sense of duty,—the moral imperative. There is a species of pressure upon us or within us which urges us to do the right, whatever the right may be. We readily admit that this is rather vague, as vague as the force of gravitation, but also as real. We cannot exactly define what it is to which this superb inward constraint binds us. We do know that it

is more than and beyond our own individual pleasure. It is more than the pleasure and approval of our friends and neighbors. For we are at times compelled to set aside altogether, not only our own desires, but the wishes and praises of those whose good opinion we care for most, as, for example, in telling an unwelcome truth. A man may even be urged, on occasion, to stand quite alone among his contemporaries and to suffer some kind of martyrdom in his loyalty to duty or right. The higher law is to do whatever this pressure of conscience really bids. The vulgar rule is to consult expediency and to do what will pay. The higher law is to go in the face of expediency, and in the name of justice or truth to take all risks and ventures. We have seen that human progress is involved in the story of the men who have followed the higher law.

Would it be fair to say that we are touching here upon what the greatest religious minds have called "the thought of God?" Without any dogmatism, we may say that this urgency of the higher law behaves as if God were. In the contemplation of the facts of conscience, the world acts as a moral world would be supposed to act. It is as if the individual and the spirit of the universe reacted on one another, or as if the spirit of the universe were making itself felt through the individual consciousness. The conditions, the circumstances, the point of view, the mental and moral equipment is different for each individual, but the pressure is of the same sort. It doubtless manifests itself to the typical child of the twentieth century somewhat otherwise than to the people of the first century. The point of view is different. The

point of view of the mature man of affairs is other than that of the youth. But the spiritual force is one and the same. The man is not a whole and sane man who does not feel its working, nor is he a happy man who does not yield himself to its sway.

The higher law is essentially social. It commands whatever is for the welfare of other beings. It does not leave out of sight the animal creation. The name of humanity covers kindness to man and beast. We have named this force or impulse good will. The most majestic conception of the universe is that which views good will as the supreme and ultimate power. The higher law, then, is the law of good will. At our best this seems as sure as anything in the universe; in any case this is our faith.

Our ethical vigor depends upon the quality and the reach of our faith in the higher law. There is, for example, the low measure of faith of the man who thinks ill of mankind; the world seems hardly better to him than a hospital for incurables. There are appliances in it for making the patients comfortable. There are drugs and opiates. He is prepared to use them for himself and for others. The higher law does not work for him outside of hospital doors. Do what will make the inmates as comfortable as possible. It is hard in such a hospital to go at best beyond the rule of the expedient.

There is the faith of the man who, like Bernard Shaw, thinks of the world as sick unto death, and who yet sees a bare chance of saving it. Let man turn on the skill of science and the golden days of the "superman" may yet come,—far in the future. "This is the faith of humanism." Let each man do his

best for the life of the rest. It is a brave faith, and some there are to whom it has a certain fascination, because it appeals as a sort of "forlorn hope" to men's chivalry. But most men will ask, What is it that gives us the chance to save the world, unless the ruling spirit of the universe is pledged to work in and through our humanism? Humanism rests upon something beyond itself.

There is, thus, the faith of those who believe in the world, not as sick nor as lost, but as growing better; who believe in man as the child of the universe; who actually find in the life of good will here and now the promise and hope of the consummation of age-long processes, working always through things seen and material to the development of beauty, truth, and goodness,—the fruits of an everlasting life. To the men and women of this faith the higher law offers not merely a bare chance and possibility for an elect few, nor a late victory of righteousness achieved at the end of the ages for a remnant of mankind who survive, but a normal, practicable, and altogether democratic, way of life, as good for the average man at this present time as it ever was for a few prophets; mighty and hopeful to appeal to the common mind and heart, full also of chivalrous impulse; good for children of whatever race or nation; already tried and experienced and never found wanting. This faith bids men everywhere do now and toward all men whatever the ever-present good will in them commands. For no man thus acts alone, but all good men are with him, and God is within him, the constant and faithful guarantor of his act.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE LAW: TO GROW

WHY should each individual have a special problem of his own in working out justice? Because each man's circumstances, traditions, education, moral sensitiveness, experiences and ideals differ from every other man's; because ethics is not a science of statics but of dynamics; because the problem at each issue is not the easy one of doing as others do, but of doing one's best, and this means that constant movement, in which moral life consists. The one law of moral life, like every other form of life, is, to grow. That which does not grow any longer tends to die. The fruit that does not ripen decays. Better be a barbarian, and moving upward toward true civilization; better be a new immigrant and hailing the new standards of democracy with delight, than to be born of eight generations of Puritan ancestry and the training of the oldest university, and yet to have begun to decline in moral virility, and to bend one's neck to the temptations of greed, self-indulgence or vulgar ambition. What else is it to be a Pharisee than to have come to the end of one's moral growth!

There is no need now of confusion. Certain clear test questions guide the conduct at every step, and guide it safely. Am I doing the best which I know? Does my act spring out of the animal impulse within me, or does it express my manhood? Does my act mean a step downward or a step upward? Does the

act tend to stunt or to fulfill my manhood? The mysterious higher law thus translates into a most practical form. It is seen to be the law of man's growth, as a man. Does he desire to grow and never to cease growing? Let him obey the higher law. This means certain growth in the stature of his manhood.

The test question is not merely about one's own growth. For myself, I might dare to remain uncivilized and inhuman. But I am bound also to ask, Does my act count for or against the healthy growth of society? For society grows better or worse by the acts of all its humblest members. Does the quality of my act poison the blood of society with deceit, passion, or greed, or again, does the act add power to the moral life forces in the home, the city, or the world?

The true man, therefore, employer or employed, capitalist or working man, poor or possessed of inherited wealth, will conceive himself to be here to take a hand in the growth of society. Social conditions are as yet uncivilized. He is here to promote ideal or civilized relations. The world catches a vision of a nobler industrial, civic and political development than has ever been worked out. The poorest man is here as one of its builders or creators. He is here for what he can get, only as his gettings are incidental to what he can do. No man can say, "Let well enough alone," in the face of the millions who live oppressed lives, in the face of outrageous luxury and ostentation, in the face of dense masses of ignorance and superstition in every part of the world, in the face of a burdensome tide of military expense and wasteful taxation of the poor. A man, if he is a man, must be something of a radical; he must feel the zest of movement,



the joy of seeing inert matter yielding to divine power. Here is the isthmus to be cut through. The man is here, whether as engineer or common laborer, to help work out the job. This is his life. No man knows what his life means till he sees this.

We have found that the famous "higher law" is good will. We shall presently see, in the form of various illustrations, that the law of growth for the individual and for society is identical with the law of good will. Good will is the highest human value. Whatever act, then, proves to increase the growth of good will, proves to be ethical.

We have light thrown here upon a distinction which has often perplexed men. It is the distinction already noticed between real goodness and conventional goodness. The good people, "the best people," often prove very disappointing. They maintain certain standards and keep the laws, but they are frequently ungenerous, arrogant, suspicious of others, unlovely, and selfish beyond measure. On the other hand, as Jesus is said to have found in His time, so now the poor, the strangers, the unconventional, the sailors and the longshoremen, even "the sinners," will show on occasion as much genuine humanity as you find anywhere. The reason is easy and simple and much to the credit of our common human nature. Wherever life is, where growth goes on, under whatever untoward conditions, the appropriate fruitage of life tends to appear under its characteristic forms of "mercy, pity, peace and love." These are not qualities of the very high and sophisticated. They do not come so much by education as by nature; they are the universal qualities. Pride, egotism, greed, avarice, selfishness, the special

vices of a luxurious class, tend to check them as any poison kills life. They only cease when life ceases to put forth fresh leaves and branches. The humblest running vine that puts out new shoots interests us more than the tall pine which is dying at the roots.

Is there no use, then, in the conventional kind of goodness? It is good like seasoned timber, so long as it holds firm. It is useful for society that as many men as possible shall be temperate and clean, and shall keep the laws and proprieties of civilization. But what if the proprieties are outward only, and the spirit of integrity is wanting, as in the case of the respectables in Ibsen's Plays. Let us hope that there are other respectable people besides these among his countrymen! The truth is that there is no valid justice, however proper an appearance it makes, out of which the milk of human kindness has dried away. But this vital element dies hard,—how hard Dickens' Christmas Carol illustrates. The great practical question about goodness is, whether a man's good will is growing in vigor and efficiency?



## PART VII

### PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE

#### CHAPTER I

##### THE NEW MORALITY

WE have seen that society gets on and the world grows better by the constant annexation of new territory to the domain of ethics, or, to change our figure, by the acceptance of new standards of conduct, once seen only by the few, but at last winning the assent of all men. The extent of hitherto wild land in the process of being annexed to the civilized world, the variety of new standards lifting themselves into authority, is very remarkable.

Consider, first, the modern law of work, or of equivalent service, as contrasted with the ancient habit of idleness. The world has commonly thought that any man had a right to live without work if he could. At least the rich had this right, and everyone has the right to become rich if he can. In fact, the man was counted noble who held inherited lands or fortune which enabled him to live without labor.\*

The opinion in favor of the idle rich is still current.

\* Observe, however, that even in early society the nobleman or the gentleman was held to owe certain prescribed public services as a magistrate or a soldier. The peculiarity of the modern man of fortune is that he has no definite public duties.

A multitude of men are striving to acquire property enough to lift their families above the necessity of labor. How many men who spend princely incomes have the slightest twinge of conscience at the fact that they are doing little or nothing for society in return? Nevertheless, there is already beginning to be a conscience, that is, a social urgency or pressure, which irresistibly tends to make men, whether rich or poor, uneasy in living an idle life. This form of new conscience is specially active in America.

Let us examine the reason for this awakening conscience. Where does any rich man's income come from? It does not come by magic, or out of a store of gems and gold. It is derived from the products of the world of men. Bonds, certificates, coupons and checks are only so many orders drawn on the supplies of the world. What each man takes out, leaves so much less for the rest.

Every man now is doing one of two things. He is either contributing in some form to the good, the wealth, the welfare, the learning, the happiness of the world, to compensate for what he draws out; or he must be impoverishing the world. What is the net result of a man's life, upon the whole,—gain or loss? Here is the new issue of justice or right. What right have you to take or get, and not to give at least as much as you take? The law of the world is good will. Do you, on the whole, impoverish the world? Then you break the fundamental law of life and happiness—for yourself as well as for others. You would dispose of a horse or mule that did no better than this!

Let us, however, listen to a single excuse for the idle life. "Suppose," someone says, "my father did good

in excess of all he got, and left me 'works of supererogation' to his credit in the shape of lands and bonds." Does this fact make the issue different? Did your father live a generous life in order that you might lead a mean and selfish one? Does it now become right for you, though wrong for a poor man, to live without rendering an equivalent service? Are you not rather bound, as having inherited ampler opportunities, to do more and not less for the world than the man can do who has nothing but his hands?

Another new rule in the world concerns the telling of truth. Truthfulness, on the whole, is rather a modern virtue. Surveying the world of men, it is evident that there is not yet any general usage, much less law, which forbids untruthfulness. Lying is common with most races; no scruple of conscience seems yet to restrain it. Conscience has not here waked up to a sense of sin, unless in those exceptional cases where falsehood is the expression of malice, or breaks over the sanction of an oath. Thus, no law in the Hebrew code sets up the standard of perfect truth. No law could well have prescribed truthfulness to any people whose business was largely in fighting.

And yet in all English-speaking lands, "Thou shalt tell no falsehoods" is coming to be a part of our decalogue. No well-born child fails to have this teaching. It is hard for us to enter into the consciousness of one of the lying races, the ancient Greeks for instance. It is hard to be patient with the lapses of our own children. We all believe that truth-telling must be one of the laws to the world.

This general fact has a new significance in modern society. Whereas, it was once enough to tell the truth



to one's own tribesmen, we live now under bonds of relationship to millions of people. Not in homes only, but in shops and markets, in schools, in courts, in halls of legislation, the measure of our civilization is the measure by which we can trust each other. The machinery of modern social life moves freely or not, according to the nice and truthful adjustment of human life to life. Treachery, falsehood, broken promises, untruthfulness, inaccuracy, pull men apart, and bring wreck. Truth becomes the universal law, because it is the common bond of society.

Moreover, truthfulness is and always has been the mark of a free man. It was not possible for the slave or the serf or the oppressed peasant. It becomes possible, as it has become necessary, in a democratic society. The free citizen, who still tells falsehoods or breaks his word, betrays a servile origin; he carries the inherited taint of ages of social inferiority and slavishness.

Are there no exceptions to the law of truth? it is asked. Must we tell what another has no right to ask? Cannot we tell conventional "white lies"? Cannot we tell pleasant falsehoods? Cannot the physician tell a falsehood to his patient, for the patient's good? Cannot the diplomat tell falsehoods for the advantage of his country? Was not the good nun in "*Les Misérables*" justified in telling a lie in order that Jean Valjean might escape his pursuers? Here we pass over into the region of perplexity. Men make plausible defenses for one series of falsehoods after another, till presently there is no law of universal truthfulness to be recognized.

The answer to these questions flows out of the gen-

eral principle of Good Will. What shall we do or say in the light of our good will? The appeal is made to universal experience. When did any lasting good come from a falsehood? When did not good finally come from the most perfect truthfulness? The diplomat's lies never saved his country. Such lies demoralize both those who tell them and those also who, hearing them, answer back with falsehood for falsehood. Was lying diplomacy ever worthy of a civilized government?

Why, indeed, was the kind nun's falsehood of even momentary advantage to Jean Valjean? Only because her rigorous habit of truthfulness had established a fund, or reserve, of confidence in her word which now in her stress she drew out. It is not, indeed, her falsehood which we admire; it is her generosity. She thought that this sacred capital of truthful character was her own, and that she could wreck her soul, if she liked, by giving it away. What if it was a fund which belonged, not to her, but to humanity, for which she was a trustee? At any rate, we also admire Jeanie Deans, whom the love of her sister could not tempt to desert the sentinel's post of her faithfulness.

Take the most plausible of cases, that of the physician who tells a falsehood rather than alarm his patient. The fact is, the physician by every such falsehood weakens the bonds of trust on which his whole clientage of patients rest for protection. How can I know when to believe the physician who holds himself at liberty to tell me a lie? Presently, when he perhaps tells me the truth, I find myself at a loss whether to believe him or not.

Let men have the freedom of making exceptions to the law of truth, when they see fit, and all confidence is henceforth shaken. On the contrary, no one can measure how precious thorough and assured truthfulness is, like a great lynch-pin, which holds the timbers of society in their place.\*

The rule to tell the truth may be likened superficially to the purely arbitrary rule of the road: Keep to the right. Arbitrary as this rule is, we teach it without exception to everyone who drives. We do not enter upon the bare possibility of some instance when the rule might conceivably be broken without damage. Whoever breaks the rule does so at his peril.

\* We may play with one another. The element of play in life is not in opposition to the general law of truthfulness, but it constitutes a modification of the law. We do not and ought not always to take each other too seriously. Thus, at Christmas time, friends often playfully deceive one another, and no one thinks of such play as falsity. In the same way a physician, like an author, may on occasion use his wits, and playfully throw his questioner off the track, rather than give a sober answer to an undesirable question. It is clear that one may always refuse to tell what another has no right to know.

## CHAPTER II

### MORALITIES IN PROCESS OF GROWTH

NEW moralities are forever entering the world. Moral courage is one of them. All men, indeed, begin with the animal instinct of physical courage. It goes with health and vigor and growing youth. It is almost as abundant as strength of body is. It rejoices in deeds of prowess, in killing mountain lions and grizzly bears, in the strenuous life of the rough rider. It is supposed to belong specially to the savage man. But there never seems to be any lack of it on account of man's growth in civilization. The occasions for it in the civilized life are more numerous than people imagine. It has daily exercise in ten thousand shops and foundries, on every steamship and railway engine, on farms and ranches, upon life-saving stations, in patrolling lonely leagues of coast. They do not know its sources or the constant wholesale use which the peaceful industrial world makes of it who think that it requires an occasional war for its development. War no longer makes it, but only finds it, and turns it from beneficent use into waste.

It is different with moral courage. This is still and always has been rare in the world. Many a man who kills bears, or kills men without fear, runs away from an unpopular duty, or dares not stand up and be counted with a little minority, who defend or set forth a right. The mother teaches this kind of courage who bids her boy, "Do right because it is right." The

poets teach it who tell us to do right "in scorn of consequence." It is grounded sometimes in pity for the weak, sometimes in an ideal sense of honor, always in a deep conviction that it is well and only well to give one's life at the call of duty. For duty is of God. And what duty bids must be for the gain of all men forever. This faith once grown strong, constitutes a courage which nothing can intimidate. It is a faith in a righteous universe; it is a faith in human progress. The just man is a co-worker with the spirit of the universe acting through him. To the man of consecrated good will there is no fear. No price can buy him. Fill men with the spirit and the ideals of good will, and you have driven fear of every kind out of the world. My point here is, that in a democratic society this law of moral courage, which once held the few, now becomes general. To be a free citizen normally means to possess the courage of one's convictions.

It will be observed that we have here the ready answer to those who imagine goodness to be the character of the weak,—the resource of an emasculated civilization. Doubtless there have been descriptions of the good, so one-sided and deficient in virility that sturdy manhood has reacted from them. The sentimental pictures of Jesus and of the saints, too frequent in the popular religion, have presented an ideal of goodness rather depressing to those who love the wholeness of life. It is no wonder that in the face of such teachings, aristocratic ideals of power, passion, and egotism, survive and win converts among those to whom the beatitude of meekness does not appeal. It is as if men compared the wild rush of a mighty

river with the gentle flow of a meadow brook. But the form of goodness which we now commend is the superb force of the river, translated by skill and intelligence through great dynamos to warm and light the homes of populous cities. Or, to change our figure, we have all the force of the wild horse, once useless, irresponsible, or hurtful, now supplemented with trained intelligence, set to beneficent uses and lifted into a joyous companionship with his rider. The trained creature will go to the gates of death to serve his rider. So will the man who is filled with the over-mastering good will of the universe.

Another rather modern ethical doctrine is the equal law of purity for men as well as for women. People of civilized education hardly understand with how little sense of conscious evil men and women once lived and still live in utter looseness and thoughtlessness of any high moral and domestic values. How much restraint of conscience as yet holds the morality of multitudes of the Southern negroes? How could there be conscience, when, during generations of slavery, the usages and the fidelities of civilized homes were never established?

We think our Anglo-Saxon race chaste among nations. But our ancestors for hundreds of years held women as their servants to obey the husband's pleasure. It is only lately that girls were often forced to marry in obedience to their parents' choice, for money, for power, or for social place. When in the history of the world has the same rule actually held good for the purity of the life of the man as for the woman? How largely has that ever been sin and shame for him, which for her was ruin and death?



What now shall we say that true chastity or purity is? Why do we insist upon the monogamous family, and this in clear sight of its frequent failures? There are those who claim that the institution of the family is merely a survival of the old machinery for getting and maintaining private property. They hint at freer arrangements in the future than those which bind one man to one woman till "death do them part." Men once thought polygamy was right; no law or voice of conscience forbade it to them. How do we know that monogamy will last forever? These questions touch the heart of society. They embrace the history of all peoples. They go back to universal principles, as surely as such principles exist. They concern the education of every boy and girl.

We have laid down the principle that man must do, not that which he pleases, nor what offers to give immediate gratification to his desires or appetites, but whatever good will bids him do; not what the petty and egotistic self wants, but what is good for that generous self which identifies him with all men and with the universe. This law lies at the root of every moral question or issue. It is not very difficult to apply this general law to the delicate subject of love between men and women. What constitutes this love in its highest form, for the man and the woman too? Its simple characteristic is this, that, at its best, it is the kind of love in each which gives itself to the other and seeks the welfare and happiness of the other, as opposed to the selfish love, that only asks for its own indulgence. The purer the love is, the more it seeks to do and give for the other. This is true love on both sides. No code or legislation teaches this order of

love. It is the outgrowth and culmination of all the experience of the long and costly past. There is no love so rich and happy as this, as exemplified in thousands of homes. There is no love that more nobly exalts and fulfills the physical conditions. There is no love which does so much to insure the vigor and the virility, as well as the moral and spiritual power of the children. It imposes its strict but beneficent rules of mutual thoughtfulness and chastity within the marriage relations as well as without.

At its best, there can be no higher type of the ideal relations between men and women than we find in the monogamous home. It is not the least of its merits that it presents a constant discipline in character for both persons, in patience, in gentleness, in sympathy, in noble devotion. Through all this discipline, fairly met, love tends to grow. Happiness comes too, not by running away from obligations, but by facing them. Radical writers who advocate daring experiments in the name of love, or perhaps in a chivalrous impulse to enlarge the scope of freedom for women, forget the deepest laws of life. Love between the sexes can never be selfish and live. It must obey a law of cost and grow through discipline.

Every question of purity and chastity, every question of the form and the duration of the marriage tie, immediately falls under the general question, What kind of conduct or what form of marriage will serve, or else hurt and retard, the development of the true love which binds the men and women of good will?

Certain things become obvious at once. Every honorable man knows with what tenderness and honor he would wish his own mother or daughter or sister

to be treated. Who then dares to treat another man's daughter or sister more meanly than he would wish his own mother or sister to be treated? We have not here a mere personal affair in which the individual may take his own risk. We are considering an act of treason and sacrilege against human society, against all womankind, against our own children, it may be unborn. The truth is, men cannot be barbarians inside the pale of civilization, except with heavier penalties than barbarians incur. As fast as men begin to be men, they revert to beastly acts at the peril of their manhood. A man's vile or loose act, under the conditions of a close civic life, is like an infection and a sore.

See now what the trouble is with polygamy, whether in the legal or illegitimate form. It is evidently the survival of the traditions of a barbarous and militant age. The institution was designed for the few among men rather than for the many. It represents the idea of masculine possession and passion, and feminine submission. It allows to the man what it cannot permit to the woman. It is almost if not utterly incongruous with that higher and more spiritual type of love between a man and a woman which has come to be the ruling civilized standard. Polygamy in every form, legal and illegal, open and concealed, has long been on trial in the world. It has tended everywhere to give way before the monogamous principle. It has never worked for the ennoblement of women, nor for the moral welfare of children. The best men and women have grown to repudiate it, as what it really is—an incomplete, transitional and aristocratic form of the marital relation. It was not wrong for those who once innocently used it. It is not wrong

to-day for tribesmen in Africa. But it has at last risen to consciousness as a degrading evil, and legislation, waiting on conscience, puts a ban upon it throughout Christendom.

Let us now for a moment enter the realm of casuistry and special pleading. We will suppose a man and a woman of strong individuality, and of high-mindedness also, who face one of those issues which characterize human life. They confront marriage laws which seem to them narrow and oppressive. The famous English novelist, "George Eliot," faced such an issue as this. What shall we say? We have laid down the principle in a former paragraph. It is not enough to show that the two persons are doing no wrong to each other, or even doing no wrong to some third person. The larger question is: Are you acting for the lasting good of society? Would you think it well for men and women generally to follow your act? Meantime recollect that no conceivable harm can come to the individual love of two persons who, for the sake of the social good, restrain themselves from the outward fulfillment of their love.

The perplexing questions of divorce belong here. Men wish for an external and infallible authority. Men quote the teaching of the great master of Galilee, and like to believe that their interpretation of his words settles the law of divorce for all time. We have here, however, no simple and easy questions, to be answered by a formula. Does adultery on the part of the wife destroy true wedded union? Does unfaithfulness on the part of the husband? The answer is, Yes. But these things are no more formidable enemies to true union than a dozen other brutal faults

of which we might speak. What if the man has no love for his wife? What if he is cruel and beats her? What if he despises her womanhood and uses her as his slave? Tell us, O ideal Christ of our vision; May a woman put away her husband for one cause, while he still perchance loves her; and must she be bound to him forever, when he never really loved her at all, and though his marriage vow was a mockery? Where true marriage never was, shall the sacred words "Whom God hath joined together" be made an irrevocable bond to hold two bodies, whose souls are not held? They err who think that Jesus ever answered or discussed these new questions, in which our generation has to apply the experience of all ages to blaze its own way onward.

We have only one rule which gives us general direction in solving these perplexing problems. We must do as seems best for all the people in all homes. It is generally agreed to be bad for all homes that men and women shall make careless and transient alliances, and be suffered for a whim, a fancy, or a passion, to desert one another and to marry again. It is cruel to children that men and women shall make irresponsible unions. In a world full of childish people, it is arrogance on the part of a few sophisticated individuals to claim for themselves a freedom of conduct which, as all experience shows, would mean moral chaos for a multitude of their less favored fellows. The State for its own stability must make wholesome restraints against the lapses of savagery. It is ill for society, if light-minded people, careless in wrecking other's lives, shall be set free to make waste and wreck again! It is well for all, if the laws, while not so dras-

tic as to fail to fit our present imperfect social conditions, shall be made to urge people toward patience and steadfastness in maintaining the integrity of the home.

The ideal home, finally, is never the creation of the laws. It is the creation of love and faithfulness. All that the law can do is to encourage the development of society in the way of the ideal family, whose bond is free willingness. It did not come by process of law, and one need never fear that it will be destroyed for want of the protection of law, or because men try perilous experiments beyond its border. "What is excellent, as God lives, is permanent."



## CHAPTER III

### WHY IS GAMBLING WRONG?

WE have to consider another quite new moral standard in the case of gambling. This seems to have been one of the earliest of savage men's pleasures. Was there ever the slightest scruple of conscience among them against it? There has been here a long and strange history. The practice of gambling has had vogue among respectable people; has been made to turn the wheels of charity; has had snug quarters in the cloisters of churches and universities. It still lingers, not in dives and slums and caves of the earth only, but in drawing-rooms and palaces. It takes on new and gigantic forms of speculation in gold mines and lands and stocks. What is the harm of it? Why is it wrong? What has made a sensitiveness of conscience about it, enacting penalties at least against the more vulgar forms of it, forbidding it to poor people and on a small scale, or under its own proper name?

We see here as elsewhere the results of long and painful human experience. Conscience did not at first act against gambling. Religion did not raise its sanctions to forbid it. But observation and reason discovered at last what a nuisance and social mischief gambling was. Men waked up to see that its excitements paralyzed industry and made men unhappy and crazy. They watched its play and found that it translated into greed and selfishness. The gains of one were at the loss and hurt of others. In short, it was

a disease of humanity. When men found this, conscience made men uneasy about it, gave them remorse for it, and forbade their indulging in it. Montaigne says that he had long since left off cards and dice because, "Though I carry my losses as handsomely as another, I was not quiet within." Conscience, as we have seen, is a social force. No wrong stands alone or individual. No wrong concerns two men alone. What is bad for one or two is bad for all. And what is bad for men generally becomes bad for one or two.

This is the answer which reason makes to the special pleading of the fine gentleman or lady who tells us that the winnings of the whist table are small; one can afford to lose them; perhaps they go to charity. Will you do then, because you are rich, what you know is bad for the poor, or for average men? This is the excuse of selfishness raised against the bidding of good will. The man who has a surfeit of pleasures already thus arrogates to himself the right to pleasures which are not good for his fellows. The broad question is, Are you ready to open the floodgates and admit the old barbarism? If you do not wish it to prevail in society, you must not play about the edges of it yourself.

We are aware how plausible the excuses are in favor of the gambling ventures of the stock market. There is, indeed, an element of necessary risk involved in every form of human enterprise. A natural zest and a discipline of skill go with every legitimate venture, whether it be a mine or a new variety of wheat. The miller or the wholesaler who deals in grain must take a legitimate risk with chances of consequent gain or loss. The gambler in stocks or products plays with

this risk and bets upon it. He does not want the investment or the grain. He has no honest place in the market; his idle guesses and bets are not needed to help fix prices; his operations constantly tend to upset and disturb valid business; he always hopes to load his dice with friendly "tips" from those within the charmed circle of high finance. He also lures the weak and foolish to participate in the inflation of the market, with its vast aggregates of unreal transactions.

What is more, the simple natural law of equivalent service, as we have already seen, disposes of all evasive excuses in favor of stock speculation. When you gain, where do your gains come from? And what right have you to them, more than any other gambler, by virtue of any genuine service rendered to society? The gains evidently come out of other men's labor. You have no credit in the name of human welfare, at the end of your gambling venture. All the more shame, then, on the man who, because such winnings are often vast, imagines that they are his own. They belong to society. Some day, the man who holds them as his own will feel that he is a thief.\*

\* One might make an equally forcible statement against gambling on the ground of its folly. The whole body of stock gamblers have to carry the immense expense of the business, as they do at Monte Carlo. The great net result is average loss.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE PROBLEM OF TEMPERANCE

A DIFFICULT and practical modern question meets us as to the use of alcoholic drinks. It was once no moral question at all. No force of conscience acted upon it, unless to forbid abuse and excess. The religion of Christendom makes wine its holiest symbol. There is hardly yet a moral question as to the use of wine in Italy. The question is only lately arising as to the use of beer in Prussia. Nevertheless, what is hardly a matter of conscience at all elsewhere, is one of the most active questions in all Anglo-Saxon States.

The new argument against the use of alcoholic drinks is drawn wholly, as in the other cases which we have considered, from the side of human experience. There is no external authority which settles the question. There is no Bible to be cited *against* rather than *for*. The argument is that mankind has found out, or at least the nervous northern nations have learned, that the alcoholic drinks involve an immense loss and mischief to the physical, the intellectual, and the moral life of their peoples. The saloons where these drinks are dispensed have largely become centers of vice and demoralization. Grant that these drinks afford pleasure. The pleasure is incomparably little by the side of the gross mass of the evil which flows from them. In short, the alcoholic drinks, on the whole, constitute a serious drain on the physical and moral life of society.

If we think thus, we are bound to act accordingly. Good will, or the social conscience, constrains us not to do that for our mere personal pleasure which is generally hurtful to men to do. No human act stands alone. It is the act of the individual as related to every other individual. There is a larger and nobler self. I must not act at the whim of the petty egotistic self. I can only do that which the larger or universal self bids.

The point of honest ethical controversy here touches the question of the greatest possible richness of life. Man rightly wants to enjoy the best that life offers. Will the man who goes without a certain favorite article of diet enjoy as rich a life as he who uses it temperately? Is it not more manly to command and control the use of any given thing than to take the ascetic path of renunciation? More than two thousand years ago Plato undertook the answer to our question in a famous passage in the Second Book of his "Laws." He held that no youth should touch wine, nor any soldier on duty, nor any man with serious business upon his hands, and, in fact, that the only reasonable use of wine was for mature men at their feasts. In other words he practically reserved it for *quasi* sacramental purposes. This was in a vine growing country, in view of a relatively rather temperate people, and long before the strong drinks had been brought into cheap and wholesale use. Plato's rather advanced doctrine has actually come to be the customary rule of an increasing number of the most thoughtful and progressive people of the modern world.

Plato's answer proceeded from the side of human

efficiency. The life is undoubtedly richest which can accomplish its part best. It is richest when all its faculties are in full play. For this fruitfulness in efficiency a necessary condition is that a man should curb appetites and passions. In other words, in all matters pertaining to the bodily senses, a certain measure of sacrifice is essential to success. The rower, the athlete, the orator, the writer, the man of affairs, must, on occasion, sharply deny his appetite for food and drink, or else he cannot be at his best in the accomplishment of his larger ends. The element of renunciation, and even asceticism, enters into and becomes a part of the richest, fullest, and happiest life. We all know this by experience. The pure joy of self-control could not be without this fact. It is on the side of manly efficiency, then, that Plato recommends almost total abstinence from the use of wine. Every superintendent of a mill or a railroad to-day preaches the same rule.

We are more interested to-day than Plato was in human welfare. Our question to-day is not merely of individual efficiency, or even personal happiness. We find ourselves under a law to serve the common or social good. While, then, we each justly desire fullness of satisfaction and richness of life, we are unable to find satisfaction when our fellows are wretched or when social conditions are bad. There is thus in our judgment of the use of the alcoholic drinks an element of humanity, besides the old question of efficiency. Grant that in the use of alcohol there is a titillation of certain sensory nerves and the quickened flow of the blood to the brain. But there is no net added richness of life and joy from this fact, when a man once asso-



ciates it with the sorrow, the filth, the shame, the crime, the insanity, the disease, and the deaths that group themselves under the head of the modern liquor traffic. On the contrary, the richness of life, especially of human life, actually belongs on the side of the man who, with a deepening social sense and comradeship, and with the thought of the general good, lets a petty appetite or a doubtful habit go unsatisfied. The fact is, that the man may be thus far better satisfied, and even feel a new flow of life from the unseen forces of his being.

We raised the question whether it may not be more manly to command and to conquer the use of a thing than to go without it. We answer that the most manly course is to do, even at the displeasure of a passing appetite, whatever seems to make for the general welfare. The inflow of the good will, which makes life rich and full, is involved in this type of action. Moreover, we act for the common welfare when we do that which we believe it would be well for men generally to do, and not merely that which we personally may afford to be strong enough to do, by way of exception from the conduct of others. Our rule is based on a democratic ideal of life.

The problem of temperance has two aspects. The first concerns the duty of the individual in ordering his own habits. He is bound on any theory to be temperate. He may well feel bound also, in view of the tremendous physical perils of the drink habit, to be a total abstainer. He has another social duty, as a citizen, in adjusting the laws to fit the needs of modern civilized life. He is bound, if he can, to help minimize social evils. On the one hand, there must be

some regulation of a traffic that doubtless doubles the cost of courts and police and hospitals, borne by all the people. On the other hand, laws can only proceed along with the growth of public opinion and the social conscience. The laws tacitly assume the consent or acquiescence of the people who must obey them.

Now the larger part of the male population in most American cities see no wrong at present in the use of alcoholic drinks. Even if a majority wished to close every saloon and brewery, it would be a very grave question whether they would do right to enact a prohibitory law in the face of a considerable and unwilling minority. This is specially true in a democracy. It is a bad law, that is, a law not fitted to the needs of a people, which compels men's consciences, provokes to resistance and largely tempts to hypocrisy.

There are those who, when they see a moral ideal, straightway imagine they must make their ideal into a law for others to obey. This is not the legitimate use of law. Law is for the social convenience. It expresses, not mutual antagonism, but the will of the people to act together.

A principle, however, comes into play here which at times seems to demand drastic and radical legislation. It is the law of self-preservation. A social evil will sometimes become so bad—the fever in the blood goes so high—that at least for a while extraordinary remedies must be sought. Thus almost a whole population, stirred by some tragedy, like the bloody riot in the city of Atlanta, sometimes cries out against the liquor traffic as unbearable. When this is the case, it does not constitute an exception to the rule which we have already laid down. The

conscience of a whole people in such a case answers to the drastic law and calls for its enforcement. The law then is good, as long as it represents the social consciousness of urgent necessity. The mischief with such laws is, when the public opinion which made them has ceased to act, when maybe the very men who had cheaply enacted the law by casting their ballots for it prove themselves to wish to violate the spirit if not the letter of their own law, when judges and attorneys, whose duty it is to enforce the law against selling liquor, notoriously buy and drink the very liquor for selling which they punish others. Here is a form of hypocrisy more subtly pernicious and demoralizing than the use of alcohol.

## CHAPTER V

### PERSONAL RIGHTS

WE have already touched the edge of a very grave problem. It is the relation of the individual to society, and especially to the State. The evident considerations on one side are personal liberty, moral courage, independence of character, and the opportunity for everyone to follow his own bent, to seek his own happiness, and to develop his energies in the most fruitful way. Every energetic life desires to make experiments for itself, to put out its branches in every direction. A real man wants to be free to think for himself and to utter his thoughts. He wants to live his own life, not merely to follow some Spartan or Puritan or other Procrustean plan of a life more or less alien to him. He wants his freedom to make mistakes, and even, perhaps, to do wrong, and to learn for himself and not by other people's testimony that it is really wrong. Our ideal of a strong and real man is not of one who has been formed and turned out in a mould, but of one who sees, understands, chooses and altogether desires to do justly and humanely. He keeps the laws because he believes in them, and he would keep them if they were not enforced by any penalty.

On the other hand, we have the consideration of the common safety, comfort, happiness, possibly the life, of society. These considerations have had a history

of unknown antiquity. They began on the plane of almost animal necessity. The early rule was self-preservation. The men of the family or the tribe combined their rude forces to this end. In times of barbarous turbulence, there could be no academic discussion over the legitimacy of the death penalty. The condition of human life is a certain measure of order, and this order must be maintained. We only need to recollect the circumstances of a panic, a riot, a conflagration, or a shipwreck, to know that quick and short, firm, and even rude, justice is kinder and more humane than to allow misrule to acquire its terrible momentum. We are doubtless on the way up from a primitive period of arbitrary law, of which we still have numerous survivals, toward a quite new ideal, hardly understood yet, of the liberty of willing obedience. We are working out a problem in which the tendency in man to individualism and anarchism is to be harmonized with the equally necessary tendency to close and somewhat conventional social organization. What are the lines of this development?

The answer is twofold. Let the individual alone as much as possible; let him grow and work out his own happiness, as long as his growth and his liberty do not interfere with the growth and equal liberty of others alongside of him. On the other hand, let him appreciate as early as he can the rights of his fellows. His case is like that of one who walks or drives in the streets. Let him go as fast and as freely as he likes, but let him never go so fast, even if he is wealthy enough to possess an automobile, as

to hinder the use of the streets for his fellows, and much less to run over them. They are not his streets, but common streets.

Thus there are individual experiments which are so notoriously bad that we cannot afford to let anyone go on repeating them. We must on occasion save a man from himself. We certainly must do this to some extent for children. There might be an infant Borgia or Napoleon growing up in a neighborhood. We could not afford to allow his eccentricities to flourish. The problem is where to draw the line of the least social interference with individual liberty. This problem is harder, or rather more delicate and complicated, than it ever was. We are trying, as men never could have tried before, on an unexampled scale, to combine the ideal of the personal and the public welfare. Two different streams of activity are running at the same time. One is the old-world movement to order everything by rule. Sometimes it is the "good people," who, having established a certain standard for themselves, for example, for the maintenance of property rights, or for marital purity, desire to compel all the people of the earth at once to conform to it. Sometimes it is the labor unions, who, catching a sense of the power of majorities, wish to compel certain more or less desirable modes of action upon all the workers of the world. Sometimes it is the socialists, who would like to make the government the instrument for establishing a new industrial régime to which all men should be obliged to conform. Sometimes it is a great religious organization, like the Catholic Church (a tremendous example of the



will of the few, or of a vast society ruled by the few!) who would like to enforce a common set of opinions, a ritual and a single code of conduct upon the world.

The peril of every such attempt is obviously to crush out individual effort, energy, enterprise, courage and thought. No one knows how precious socially, and how rare as yet this rather modern development of personal freedom is. It gives to society its initiative in business, in politics, in reform. It is involved with our ideals and our faith in progress. Few people understand how tyrannical public opinion may become even now, in a college, in a village, in a factory, in a lodge, in a labor union, in a church, in a political party, to bear down and overwhelm individual men and women who have a mind of their own, and finally to stop all wholesome movement in the whole body.

We love to think that we are free in the United States. But there are many persons in the land who never feel free to say what they think, or do what they deem best. They fear the oppressive weight of an unfriendly and intolerant public opinion. It is possible that more harm befalls society to-day from the fear of its members to say frankly what they believe, than comes from the breaking of the laws. Many would not break the laws, if their friends and fellows dared to say what they thought of their conduct. Let no one suppose that the spirit of persecution has yet ceased out of the world. Officers of the government and the police easily become arrogant in their conduct, and go beyond the laws in seeking to repress unpopular opinions. Thus the name of "anarchist" is like a red rag to many hysterical

officials, who, having in themselves a vein of actual anarchism, really know nothing about the ideas which they condemn.

The right of the public to interfere and restrain the individual is a matter of continual and fresh experimentation. The public sometimes interferes too much and again too little. Curious inconsistencies also appear. At the very moment when a man may subject himself to arrest for spitting in the street, he may be at liberty to take over as his own a great area of public lands, or the unearned increment of a whole city block. Society feels its way only a step at a time in setting up laws and barriers for the preservation of the common life and property.

The most important point here to be noted is that all laws should be the laws of the people who live under them, and not laws made and enforced by others. It is impossible to be properly loyal and obedient to an alien government. This is almost a new idea in legislation. The largest part of the lawlessness and crime is committed by those, perhaps strangers, perhaps youth, who have never had a hand or a voice in making the laws. They fall under laws which other people have made. They are practically outsiders as regards their attitude to the laws. Witness the lawlessness of the Southern States under the reconstruction laws passed by Congress after the Civil War. The attitude of Socrates toward the laws of Athens,\*—doubtless the ideal attitude of every citizen to the laws of his state—has never occurred to multitudes of American citizens or to their legislators.

The principle of good will is the active solvent in all such problems as we have touched. Give us plenty

\* See Plato's *Apology*.

of good will and a little saving humor, in the village or the labor union, and the individual will have his fair chance, whether to vote alone, or to dress as he likes, or to persuade others to adopt a new religion. The world is slowly finding out that there is no such safeguard against erroneous opinions as to allow them ventilation and sunlight. Give us also good will rather than self-will in the individual, and he will think twice before he will inflict his private nuisance of noise or disfiguring advertisements upon the public. Possess the anarchist with the spirit of good will, show him that the laws are for him and not against him, show him that government is a method of securing the common welfare, and he will even desire to make his contribution both of obedience and of money, and the taxes will cease to seem to him a means of oppression. Possess the most radical socialist with increasing good will, and he will hesitate to compel his economic doctrine, any more than his religion, upon a reluctant minority. The method of good will is essentially persuasive and reasonable, and not the dictation of superior force. It flourishes best in an atmosphere of sunshine, confidence, mutual trust, and personal freedom.

It will be objected that we are giving no rough and ready formula which will answer for all cases. The truth is that life is too fine and complex to admit one wholesale mode of treatment, good equally for the British Government in India and for the teacher of a kindergarten. The eternal challenge of humanity to those who undertake its problems calls for intelligence, for delicate tact, for generous sympathy, for the gift of wisdom. Our proposition is that all rules

and methods, at their best, are the expression of good will; that the more good will is insisted upon, the better will the delicate problem be handled; that the same man, with good will, whether parent, teacher, foreman, city marshal, or governor general of India, will be wiser and more effective than he can be without this universal solvent of all human conditions.

## CHAPTER VI

### NEW POLITICAL RIGHTS

WHAT an enormous reach upwards mankind has made since Plato and Aristotle built their ideal States upon a basis of slavery! It is a new sense of conscience which demands equal suffrage for all men. The ideal itself is involved with a certain conception of the nature of mankind. It is fundamentally religious. What if men's sole business is to struggle to survive? What if the best people is the race which can fight most successfully? Deny that in some true sense men are all of "one blood" and children of God; deny that the fittest to survive are the men of good will; deny that good will is the supreme form of the life of the universe: why then should there not be inferior men, not worthy to be citizens, and inferior races, either doomed to extinction or else to some form of slavery or dependence, as Aristotle maintained? Democracy, although an actual trial in the form of institutions, is still a sublime flight of faith rather than an actual and demonstrated reality.

Observe now, however, the basis of facts and history upon which the "rights of man" rest. There has been a continuous process of experimentation which already warrants our faith in our new ideas of political justice. Tyranny did not work; aristocracy did not work. Every system of government which has tried to build upon the superiority of a class has

proved to be in unstable equilibrium, and growingly so. Democracy, even though yet very imperfect, already challenges every other system of government. It not only meets a new ideal of manhood, but it succeeds very respectably, in comparison with any other method, in administration. This result is not alone the contribution of the United States of North America to the wisdom of the world. Every other nation which has tried the experiment makes the same contribution. This is true even in Mexico, in Chili, and in Japan. Did ever any of these States have better or more humane administration under arbitrary and undemocratic régimes than it has under its present merely tentative form of democracy?

This is the more obvious, when we reflect that there are two ends to be reached in all government. One is in respect to the machinery and the economics of civilization. It is measured by the efficiency of public service, in the honesty of officials, in the equitable levying and expenditure of money. Many imagine that they would be satisfied with any government, a German bureaucracy, for example, if it merely administered the taxes economically. But what if a government in no way served to develop the manhood of its people? What if it were only paternal, while the multitudes remained children forever. The chief end of the government must evidently be to promote the well-being, the happiness, the humanity of its people, and of all of them. It must serve, not merely to help them enjoy existence and get health and comfort, but to enlarge their capacities and their opportunities. It must afford the chance to express their manhood, to enter into the heritage of the noblest traditions and



ideals of mankind, and to win for themselves the high satisfaction of the life of good will.

Herein the democratic method is different from the most ideal scheme of an aristocratic régime. Here is the reason why we believe in democracy. Here is the grand test which we apply to its working. It treats men as men; it works to bring out manhood. It is good like the ideal monogamous marriage, not merely because it yields happiness, but also because it develops character. Treat man as a slave and he remains slavish; treat him as an inferior, and it is hard for him not to behave as an inferior. Treat him as you would wish to be treated yourself, believe in him, expect the best in him, trust him, and a deep law of all education lifts him to be what you believe in. The facts meet the theory. The doctrine tends to work in practice. True, it does not work without cost or patience. But the greater the cost expended upon it, the better it works.

The basis of the claim of equality of political privileges for women lies in the same conception which underlies manhood suffrage and the democracy. It goes back to a religious or ideal thought of personality. A man is a person, and not a thing or merely an animal. A woman is also a person, and not less so, if she happens to be married. That she does not fight surely does not make her less a person. Why should not any person have a voice in the government of the country of which he or she is a citizen? Is there any reason, except in precedents and traditions, inherited from barbarism and heathenism, why a woman should be artificially barred from the expression of her intelligence and her ideals about the government

of her city or her country? Men doubtless grow on the whole more humane for being treated as citizens; this process of civilization for men is worth its risks and cost. Why, then, should not the same process serve to lift and dignify womanhood? We still believe in the process, even though it fails as yet with multitudes of men. It is no good reason against its extension, if it proves not to benefit all women immediately alike. It is good for a man's manhood to be recognized, and bad for it to be denied. It is equally good to recognize a woman's personality, and it is a bad object lesson to every boy and every brutal man to put a ban upon it.

I am aware that there are certain questions upon the fringes of our subject, as in the case of every ethical movement. What conditions or qualifications shall be imposed upon the young, the ignorant, the vicious, the unfit? One can easily make needless confusion and difficulty with such questions. They find ready solution just so far as, in asking them, we keep in mind the simple principle which governs all political justice. This principle is to act so as to express our own good will or manhood, and to develop, likewise, the manhood or character of all men. Doubting or forgetting our aim, we shall make serious mistakes. Trusting this principle, even our mistakes will serve to promote our aim.

For example, the weak point in the present working of democratic government is in municipal administration. This difficulty is complicated by the baleful and corrupting influence of national party politics. The business of cities ought to have nothing to do with the issues of national parties. The problem of good

city government is also made difficult by the presence of large numbers of people admitted to citizenship without possessing knowledge of city affairs or any interest in them. They are invited to help rule a city, the vast cost of which they are not aware of helping to share. They constitute only the raw material of citizenship. It would be perfectly fair if we required some more valid test than a mere brief residence in a city before hastily giving newcomers the duties and privileges of municipal citizenship. Nevertheless, the way of democracy is not backward but forward. The doctrine of good will bids us trust our new citizens, ignorant as they often are; bids us make friends of them; bids us educate them, in other words, develop their social sense and train them, through an awakening regard for the common good and for the welfare of their own children, to help and not hinder the cause of honest and efficient civic administration. This may be a long task, but it is a worthy one; it is a splendid discipline in humanity so long as it goes on; it requires the healthy co-operation of the best elements in all the racial stocks out of which our nation is building its future. Already promising signs appear in many a great city, in Chicago, in New York, in Cleveland, to show that the best is practicable, and that the average man is human enough to know the best when he comes to see it, and, moreover, to be willing to take a hand in securing the best.

Is it not possible, however, to imagine a political situation so abnormal, or so barbarous, that, for the time at least, the old primitive rule of necessity and self-preservation would seem to have sway? Can we

not justify a "vigilance committee" in a mining camp? Shall we not even justify Bonaparte in taking command of the wild forces of the French Revolution and reducing them to order? May we not say that at times the strong man must come to the front? We still hold the clew to answer these questions. The first obvious fact is, that the anomalous or uncivilized condition arises, not from the inability of good will to meet the necessity (for the good will has not really been tried in such a case), but from the lack of the men of good will. The despot on horseback rides in because there are not yet strong men of good will to take the lead and establish a better order than that of the tyrant. The vigilance committee seems to be necessary, only because there are not enough strong men of good will in the mining camp to summon the people to make their own laws work. The disfranchisement of the negro seems plausible, not because the negro is not as human as the white man in his ability to respond to the appeals of justice, but because there are not enough men of good will as yet among the whites, strong and patient enough to stand for impartial justice and to make the needed appeal to white and negro manhood.

Even granting the exceptional necessity, on occasion, of dropping to the primitive rule of force, to the use, as it were, of political surgery, the doctrine of good will even then would assert itself. It would not allow anyone, upon whatever provocation, to be cruel, or to play the rôle of a despot, or to despise others. It would never allow the building up of a Napoleonic dynasty or a Czardom. It would not allow the permanent holding of any disfranchised population

or subject nation. It would insist upon the speediest possible resumption of the normal conditions of liberty and equality. The strong man, or the strong group of men, would have to bend their energies to make their sovereignty over other men unnecessary. In short, they would act as the good teacher acts, who aims to make his pupils, as early as possible, independent of his services.

It will be seen that, in their ends, individualism, or even "anarchism," and socialism tend to approach. The good socialist aims so to order society and to make such co-operative arrangement of its forces that the welfare of all the people shall be secured, and no one shall be permitted to harm the others. The good individualist is bound to say in reply: I wish also to secure the highest welfare of each and all. What you would do by force of law, I wish to do from free choice. The anarchist adds: And I object to being compelled by law to do what I choose to do without law. All men, in fact, who trust in human progress, must wish to use law as a means for the developing of men and women of a good will, with whom, therefore, the inner law and the outward are one.

The new social conscience does not stop with the consideration of mere political democracy. It goes on to raise a fresh class of questions in the realm of industry. The organization of industry has largely remained aristocratic, monarchical, or autocratic. It has even grown in the direction of a subtle tyranny of the few in command over the armies of workers. Society cannot remain democratic in its political forms, and aristocratic in its industrial development. The

many must come into their right of expression and their freedom of action in industry as well as in government. It is essential to the very life of society that men shall breathe an atmosphere of willingness in their daily work, as well as in their obedience to their own laws. How this will come about, no one may exactly say; sometimes by profit-sharing, sometimes by co-operative enterprises, sometimes in forms yet to be devised, whereby the workers will be given a voice in the management of the great plants in which they labor.

The mischief in the present industrial régime is not so much in the fact that men compete together (it has already been shown that they may do this in the terms of emulation), but rather that multitudes seem to be laboring for the enrichment of others, while they remain poor themselves. Though by a deep law all men really are made to work for one another, and, on the whole, for the enrichment of the great body of society, this fact is not on the surface. Many are suffered to remain altogether idle. A small number draw more sustenance than is good for them and many are actually depleted, having less food and clothing than is requisite for health and efficiency. All society is becoming aware of its responsibility, that is, the responsibility of all of us, for this painful inequality of distribution. We shall cure it, partly by the removal of the monopolies which tax all, and quite depress the poor. We shall cure it partly by better hygiene and education, whereby there will be fewer inefficient and unemployed people. We shall cure it partly by a more thorough morality, which will not let men be content to enjoy at others' expense what others must



go without. We shall doubtless use a juster system for the tenure of land. We shall sometime learn that it is well for all, and not merely for the few, to inherit out of the commonwealth of mankind some such minimum, as, for example, a home, rent free.

As regards the form of the coming social and industrial organization, it is evident that no one knows enough at present to insist dogmatically upon any outward machinery as a certain cure of social ills. The social ills themselves represent our present infirmity or comparative childishness. They remind us painfully that we are not yet civilized. If thorough-going State Socialism were the ideal condition for mankind, we are not good enough yet to make it work. If the philosophic anarchists were right, few of them are good enough to carry their theory into effect. It is well if we are ready, like Socrates, to go wherever the guiding spirit of good will may lead. The happy life may be found to consist, not so much in arriving at a prescribed goal, as in going heartily with the motion of the noblest ethical life.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE ETHICS OF THE SWORD

I HAVE to speak of one more new or modern standard of justice. It touches militarism. Jesus and other great teachers have enunciated it, and have slowly brought to birth a disquieting conscience about it. You can trace the steps of man's growth in the new direction. The law to commit no murder came early in human history. No man, the law said, might take upon himself the revenge of private wrongs. This law made its way slowly. It waited for trustworthy courts and incorruptible judges. But it holds now wherever men are as much as half civilized.

Meanwhile, the code of "honor" and the duel survived. Two men might, on occasion, in the presence of their chosen friends and upon deliberate agreement, fight out a wrong or insult. How slowly this ancient practice has disappeared even in the presence of crosses and churches! What harm was there, men urged, if both agreed and wished to use this time-honored issue of battle? A new conscience, however, rising as if by impulse from a higher life, and in the face of all tradition, has, in Anglo-Saxondom at least, set the brand of Cain upon the duel. This new conscience is hardly a hundred years old, and yet it holds millions of men. Once an inspiration, like the thought of an inventor, it has become a part of the social consciousness.

Now appear all over the world the signs of a new

moral issue. Private revenge is brutal, inhumane, demoralizing. It was always the chosen opportunity of injustice. It left hate behind it. What shall we say, then, of war? Who can defend it? Not the just but the unjust have most relied on it, and had recourse to it. The innocent have most often reaped the reward of its terrible harvests. What baleful doctrine of greed and distrust turns Europe into a series of armed camps, and taxes the nations beyond all that they spend for substantial civilization? What canals might be dug between the seas; what deserts might be irrigated; what slums of great capitals might be turned into children's playgrounds; what ignorant populations might be enlightened with schools, if the thousands of millions which men vote to perpetuate barbarity could be turned to serve humanity!

We think righteous courts are the mark of our civilization. Why are courts good everywhere else, and why are not courts good between nations? Why trust and obey courts, even when courts are fallible, and not trust such a High Court, chosen from the wisest men of the earth, as the Congress at The Hague has actually recommended to the world?

And now come the sophisticators, with their special pleas blurring the edge of our conscience. War always has been, they cry. It is the school of hardihood. Liberties have been purchased by war. Great nations have been centralized into empires. The barbarous and inferior nations must yet be subdued. Other nations hate our nation and wait to fly at its throat. Armies and navies are the precursors of civilization. They protect our commerce.

So speak fear and prejudice; so speak the vested interests of the sword and the shoulder strap; so speak the businesses which thrive on making steel plate and army supplies; so speak priests and bishops, whose religion lies in the past and not in the future; so speaks the pride of race superiority and race antipathy. But what say the men of good will? What say those who believe in and love the people? What says any man at his highest, or when he is most completely a man? And what say history and human experience?

The fact is, there was never an age in which the teaching of the hard facts rendered war so damnable as it is coming now to be recognized. Recent history is sickening the world with its ghastly abominations and its futility. America fought, she said, to punish Spanish atrocities in Cuba, and presently she was herself burning villages, establishing *reconcentrado* camps, and killing thousands of people in the Philippine Islands, who had never done Americans any wrong. In two years she had spent for war what would have bought out and extinguished Spain's title in Cuba over and over again. England fought the Boers to secure certain supposed rights for her subjects, and presently she had filled South Africa with fire and blood. The nations had wronged and trodden on China till they stirred a wave of ancient hate and retaliation. Presently they were disgracing the faith of Christendom with their abominations and savagery. Where, now, are the clergy and the bishops of the God of war?

The futility of war has now three fresh illustrations. The war between Russia and Japan would never have

been fought if Russia had merely brought civilization and trade into Manchuria. But her huge and wasteful fortresses and her threatening battleships at Port Arthur goaded the Japanese people to fight. The terrible Boer war settled no principle. A few days of good tempered discussion, such as followed the war, would have prevented the need of it. On the very eve of the declaration of the Cuban war, Spain stood ready to grant every reasonable claim of the United States.

It is noteworthy that none of these wars came, as in old times, by the force of racial or national hatred. Such hatred is dying out all over the world. The Spaniards and Americans had no grudge or quarrel against one another. The British people did not hate the Dutch. The toiling Russian people scarcely knew where Japan was. These wars did not spring from the will of the peoples involved. On the contrary, wise leadership on the part of the government, the educated men, and the popular journals, would have easily averted the war in every case. The growing international good will of the world only needs now to establish some simple rule, requiring the parties to a threatened difference to pause long enough to accept the mediation of friendly Powers, and there could hardly be any more wars between the civilized peoples. The chief source of peril to-day is not any longer (if it ever was) from the desire of the masses of any nation to go to war with their neighbors, but rather from the great armaments and navies always ready, like so much incendiary material, to be set in motion by hot-headed and arrogant officials, or to be called into use in the interest of unscrupulous bond-

holders. Do the people desire safety and peace? Let them not spend money to store up dynamite.

Moreover, the world is coming into sight of a quite new consideration. Whereas the bias or presumption of the past has been in favor of letting combatants fight, of giving them an arena, of standing by to watch the struggle or perhaps to join in it, like so many schoolboys; and whereas once there was plenty of room for a free fight, the lands were open for marauders, and the sea was a clear space for pirates; to-day the modern industrial world finds itself without a convenient place for war to go on. War has no standing ground in the presence of civilization. It is as if we were asked to suffer free fights to be carried on in the crowded streets of a town. Suppose the combatants are willing to take risks and be killed. There are ten times as many others who have no interest in the fight. They cannot afford to let their windows be broken and their houses destroyed and their children maimed. So stand all the neutral nations whenever such a war as that between Russia and Japan is going on. Every war now becomes a menace to the safety of the world, to the commerce of all nations, to the wealth which millions of people have created together. We are waking up to discover that the world cannot afford to give up its common shores or its oceans, the common highway for all peoples, to the mischievous uses of militarism.

War was once a rude means of getting justice for quarreling peoples. Was justice ever furthered this way? A new problem of justice now intervenes, namely: What right have two or more nations to break the peace of the world, and endanger the eco-



nomic and moral welfare of all other peoples? If ever there was need of this species of anarchical self-assertion, the need has passed away. There is no nation to-day, despite all prejudices to the contrary, which may not fairly expect to get and keep its rights by the appeal to the good offices of its neighbors, through established and honorable methods of recourse, more surely than it can get or hold its rights by the sword. At this point war ceases henceforth to be just. It becomes an assertion of distrust, suspicion, and the intent to be ready to do wrong.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE FIXED PRINCIPLES

WE have seen that good will is the essential driving power of the ethical life. The sense of duty is the inward urgency which keeps us at work, even when we cannot for the time see what good our action does. The question arises, what fixed principles, if any, are there, to which we must yield allegiance under all circumstances? Principles, we answer, are the general modes of conduct through which an intelligent and enlightened good will effectively expresses itself. There is no need of supposing laws revealed from Heaven, or of assuming a set of hard and fast rules equally rigorous over all consciences at all times. The experience of mankind through generations, acting as if under the pressure of a vital power from within the depths of being, urging all men toward moral growth and richness of social life, has developed and discovered certain channels or modes of utterance, through the use of which moral life rises to its maximum and the individual personality gets fulfillment.

These general principles are very few and simple. They may be summed up in the most direct and personal form, somewhat as follows: I must be just; that is, I must give to every man what belongs to him. I must pay my debts; I must do my neighbor no injury; I must not take what is his. Good will is the spirit of justice. I must not even desire what may not fairly be mine.

I must live a clean life, clean in body, clean in language, clean in thought and desire. The spirit of good will gives me an unquiet conscience if I live otherwise.

I must show courage. That is, I must never run away from any task or duty for fear of being hurt or of suffering loss. There is, in fact, nothing in the world that a determined and intelligent good will has really to fear, except the loss of its own integrity. Good will always grows strong by acting in the face of risk or danger.

I must be faithful to trusts. In other words I must bear my willing part or share in society. For instance, I must pay my taxes in the state. I must evade none of the social duties such as others like me are bound to render. Good will, in fact, requires more than this. It requires me to do my best for the betterment and enrichment of society.

I must therefore be generous. I must often cheerfully do more than what the law or custom may require. Good will delights to do to the uttermost. There is, indeed, a certain infinite element of efficiency in enlightened good will.

I must be true and therefore truthful. I must do nothing in the doing of which my manhood will have to stoop or cringe. A good will is a frank, straightforward will.

I must be modest. The good will is teachable, hospitable, respectful to others, regardful of the scale of the world in which each man only bears a part, quick to admire excellence in other men.

The beauty of these principles is that they are not fixed. They are the manifestation of a wholesome and

normal moral life. Nothing vital can be fixed. They cannot easily be separated from one another. They all involve and supplement and require one another. They may be stated in different forms. They may be drawn out into a longer number of articles. Each one of them branches out into innumerable sub-heads and varieties.

Thus, justice touches not only matters of property, but also requires delicate personal appreciation. I am never just if I only pay the due wages to my neighbor, and never give him a word or a smile betokening my friendly regard for his services. To live a clean life does not mean merely outward decency, or the control of a single appetite; it means various kinds of temperance and self-control through which a man maintains a vigorous, active, serviceable body, and the largest and happiest use of his faculties.

Animal daring or pugnacity is only the raw material of courage. Courage takes quite as many fine forms of daring, enterprise, persistence and heroism in an age of peace as in a military age. It may require the highest courage to oppose war.

Professor Josiah Royce has founded all virtues in the one article of loyalty, which is another name for faithfulness. This is to say that faithfulness or loyalty has innumerable forms. It rises from fidelity to one's kin, one's tribe, one's friends, one's church, one's city or nation, to a species of willing allegiance and devotion to the welfare of man universally, and therefore to every cause of liberty, of justice, of education, of good religion or philosophy through which man may be better served. This is doubtless akin to the idea of utter devotion to the will of God, conceived as

the ultimate goodness. "Whatever the good will of the universe bids I will do." This is the highest form of loyalty. It is another illustration of the fact that every ethical principle is a form of the working of good will.

To be generous, again, becomes at once a rule of multiform application. It is not only the giving of money or things, but the giving of time and intelligence and painstaking service. It is to be magnanimous and large-hearted and not to bear a grudge; it is to hold reserves of good will ready to be ordered into use.

There are, likewise, no limits to the beautiful forms which truth takes. There is truth in word, truth in workmanship, truth in art or music, truth in friendship and patriotism, wherein truth goes over into disinterestedness, loyalty, and devotion. The ideal of truth, to the man who grows in truthfulness, rises before him like the great mountains.

Modesty is as varied and interesting in its manifestations as any of the other vital principles through which the essential good will flows. It has sometimes been limited to the life of womankind and even to a single form of womanly conduct. A man, it is said, should be aggressive and self-assertive. But some of the best and most effective men the world has ever seen have been altogether modest. Their modesty has been the supplement of their energy and their courage. They have actually loved to do things and bring about results, to make discoveries, to serve human welfare, more than to be talked about, petted, praised, or paid. This seems, indeed, to be the attitude of any grown man. He prefers reality to the show of things. The

expression of good will becomes to him the one greatest and most satisfying reality: As Kant, quoted by Thomas Hill Green, says, "Nothing can be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, but a good will." This ideal, while full of stimulus and joy, takes all personal conceit out of the man who follows it.

The foregoing seems quite smooth and easy to say. Few who think about human conduct at all would deny the general principles which underlie all ethical systems. If a certain modern school of writers sometimes seem to be trying experiments in the direction of an egotistic scheme of ethics, their program is so obviously a retrogression toward the weary road of barbarism over which mankind has already made its way, that only the few, not actual degenerates, may be expected to find anything more than temporary fascination in its incoherent appeal to their pride and self-will, not to say their selfishness and their passions. The real perplexity with most thoughtful men and women arises in the occasional apparent conflict of principles.

Thus we have said that we must never do an injustice to anyone. No, we easily say, ten thousand men together must not do an act of injustice to a single man. But suppose the case of a man who owns a house which stands in the way of some public improvement. He will not part with his property at any price. He may be a Ruskin and not believe that the coming railroad is a public good. He may cherish ancestral sentiments about his house. May the ten thousand men together who constitute the citizenship of the town do what no one person surely could do?



Here is the public good *versus* a private right. Here is even possibly the good will of the citizenship of the town *versus* an individual will, and possibly also a good will. Of course we know that law and usage allow the State to take the man's place and to pay him accordingly. But this is to force his will.

There is, however, in this case no real conflict of principles. The appeal is to the largest and most intelligent good will, both of the citizens and the individual. The fact is, no individual has a right to his house, or even his life, as against the evident welfare of the society to which he belongs. His right is that his desire and his will should be generously considered; his right is that his fellow-citizens should treat him as well as they would ask to be treated in a similar case; his right is that it shall be a very clear case of the requirement of the public welfare; in short, his right is that, in being dispossessed of his house, he should be able to believe (sometime, if not now in his hour of self-will and passion) that his sacrifice does a public service to his fellows, at least, that it is another installment of his share of the cost through which the life of society goes on. This case is typical of numerous cases which may occur to us. It is on this ground that society on occasion shuts up a dangerous or demoralizing kind of business, like a liquor saloon.

We shall have occasion to refer to this method of treatment again under the chapter on Compromise. The method of appeal will always be the same. It is the appeal from the decision of a small, or personal, or partisan, or embittered will, to the view of a large, generous, friendly and enlightened good will. Doubtless, at times, the appeal would involve a delay of ac-

tion in favor of the individual, sometimes a different form of action, sometimes even a complete reconsideration of the action. But so far as it involves at last the overruling of the individual will, it would be simply because the many have rights which the individual or the few have no right permanently to contravene. Moreover, the nature of our appeal is such that the public, who reluctantly and sympathetically have overruled the will and the assumed right of an individual for the larger good of the many, may hope that eventually the man himself will be won over to the higher point of view. The appeal will be from its lower self to the nobler and more social self.

It needs to be reaffirmed here that no man who lives in society has any business to expect that he will never suffer injustice. In a world that grows, where men are building new cities and institutions, and repairing the old, where men are not yet altogether well-educated or civilized, we have to expect the possibility of some hurt and suffering as a "part of the day's work." It may be only accidental, it may arise out of misunderstanding and folly, it may even seem to be premeditated. It is almost impossible, for example, to levy taxes, or make any general police regulations, which may not work harshly in individual cases. This is incidental to a world in which no one yet has attained to perfectness either of enlightenment or good will. Our rule is to bear with men, and to do our best not to inflict injustice on anyone else.

## CHAPTER IX

### SOCIAL GROUPS

GOOD WILL, wherever it is present, tends to group men together. The first social pressure to act together is the dawn of good will. We see this in the family or the tribe, the earliest forms of social organization. The first tendency of men is to come together: the closer they come, the warmer their sense of union, the more loyal and hearty their fellow feeling is, the greater become their power and efficiency. The strongest man, standing alone, *minus* good will, is comparatively helpless. The average man, *plus* a strong good will, binding him with groups of his fellows, at once becomes strong, as if some new force had been added to his life. The strong man, thus reinforced, grows mighty and becomes a leader, a savior, a captain of new forms of industry like Robert Owen, a statesman like Lincoln or Gladstone.

A new set of moral issues and questions, however, arises in our time from the extraordinary number and variety of the social groups to which the same man may belong. He is at the same time a citizen and the member of a labor union. He is the director of a street railway and a voter in the city where his company desires privileges. He is the member of a church which enjoys immunity from taxation, and perhaps desires public aid in support of its schools or hospitals, and he is the member of a State which in theory can show no favor to the people of any particular religion. His local citizenship may involve

him in antagonism with his own State government, when conducted under a hostile political party, or inclined to arrogate to itself a centralized authority to the injury of local self-government. The issue of the Civil War was fought over the question whether a man owed his first allegiance to his State or to the Nation. In a later case of secession, affecting the interests of the little state of Panama, the government of the United States has thrown the weight of its influence in favor of the State and against the Nation. This raises a doubt upon what principle, other than expediency or force of arms, the allegiance of a citizen in this form of issue depends. Evidently it could not be expedient permanently to inflict the will of the larger political group upon the smaller, supposing the latter to remain unconvinced and reluctant.

There are various other groups and associations of which one thinks, all giving rise to their own form of possible ethical entanglement. A man, for instance, is bound as a scholar with all the scholars of the world to find and publish the truth. But what shall he do if the authorities of his church condemn his truth and forbid him, like Galileo, to make it known? What shall the members of a Peace Society do when their own nation may be actually engaged in what they deem an unjustifiable war? These questions begin as early as childhood.

Such questions become the more difficult on account of the vast modern aggregation of numbers. A hundred thousand men, mostly strangers to one another, vote at a single election in many a city in America. A Federation of Labor or a political party may enroll millions of men. The national organization of government is so vast and so distant from the average

citizen as scarcely to be compassed by the imagination. How must not allegiance become attenuated under such weight of numbers! No wonder that the individual seems almost helpless, if he happens to differ from his fellows, from his party, from the generality of his countrymen.

Hence one finds that the same good habits, or the same conscience, which keeps a man true to his family, to his friend, to his neighborhood, to his local union, fails to keep him honest toward a railway corporation, toward the national government, or even toward his own city. The same man will be honest, personally, while he is quite dishonest politically. He may have been brought up in some foreign country, under such oppressive rule as to believe that the government is against him, and therefore to blind his eyes to the fact that in looting it, he is robbing his neighbors. The same kind of man may have come from an early American ancestry, and yet never have developed a public conscience.

The answer to the difficulties which arise from the complication of our modern social, industrial, and political groupings is partly in a more effective moral education, beginning with every child in the home and in the primary school. But this better type of education itself is only the enforcement, the amplification, and the development of the law of a good will. "Be fair, be kind, be faithful, be true, be generous, be modest; establish habits of kindness, of humanity, of fidelity, of truthfulness, of willingness to be taught; be a loyal member of your club, your society, your school, your church, or whatever else you belong to. You are here to carry on the work of good will in the

world. Do not forget it." The good parent and the good teacher are forever by deed or word saying these things to the youth. We need more parents and teachers to be saying and doing these things.

When, now, issues and questions arise, everyone who has caught the idea of good will has a working solvent to use and apply. No one can say in detail just how this solvent will work. The one needful thing is to use it: "Act in good will. Do nothing that you cannot do with good will. Join hands with other men of good will. Confer with them at least, and hear what they have to offer. Broaden and enlighten your good will with full information. Put yourselves in the place of the men who differ from you, even if you finally have to speak, or vote, or act against them."

This general rule of action will of itself put an end to most of the evils that arise between rival or opposing social groups. It will not let any man cheat his own government; it will not let him use its means or its offices for private or partisan ends. It will not let any man hurt or cheat, by as much as a nickel, the corporation that he serves or uses. It will hold back any union man from the inhumanity of industrial war on either employers or non-union men. It will bid him cheerfully give honest service wherever he works. It will equally forbid employers or corporations from preferring dividends to the welfare of their own people. It will forbid lawyers of decent repute to take retainers for helping predatory capitalists to make or evade the laws in favor of getting or keeping any form of privilege. In fact, it will draw such a line as to make every species and method of business disgraceful that does not carry with it a distinct social service.



## CHAPTER X

### RIGHT AND WRONG KINDS OF COMPROMISE

WE have now virtually answered the difficult question of compromise. What shall a man do, when caught in the toils of a system of society which he inherited but did not make? What shall the early Christian do with his polygamous household? What shall Washington do with his slaves? What shall a son or heir do with "tainted money"? What shall the thinker, Galileo, do with ideas in advance of his age? What shall Dr. Crapsey and others like him do with the formularies that consign little children to hell? Problems of compromise touch us on every side. Society exists in strata, all in motion, perhaps, but at various rates of movement. Shall the individual move at his own rate, ahead of the rest, and regardless of what others are willing to say and do with him? Or, shall he wait for the rest, and cease to utter himself till others are ready to march with him? Luther answered this question in one way, and Erasmus in another. Wendell Phillips and Garrison answered it in one way, and Daniel Webster in the opposite way.

There are two senses in which we use compromise. One is a bad sense. A man stoops from what he knows is best to do what is worse. He sees an ideal, and he denies it or refuses to give it expression. He conforms to a standard in vogue, lower than his own, against which his conscience protests. He goes from a non-slaveholding State, for example, and becomes

an owner of slaves. He lets others pay bribes to purchase his election to Congress, though he scorns bribes for himself. He compromises his principles for gain, or ambition, or fear of social or ecclesiastical consequences. This sort of compromise stunts a man's soul; his manhood must have utterance or die. A man usually knows whether any particular compromise threatens to drain his life. It is not generally a doubtful question with him whether he is about to do wrong. He knows in advance if he will have to stoop or crawl in order to get his ends.

On the other hand, we are bound up together in society in such ways that we often are obliged to act together, or else we cannot act at all. A man is a citizen with millions of others. A man is engaged in co-operative enterprises of party, or industry, or business, or the social system. A man lives to-day in a competitive world, whether he believes in it or not. He shares in profits, in interest on loans, in the results and products of methods of business, with the ordering and management of which he has only the most remote connection. He buys or sells in various relations with the very Trusts that he may denounce. In the days before the war the North as well as the South lived upon the profits of cotton.

A man cannot cut himself off from the human race, because he sees ideals, invisible as yet to others. He cannot well cease to be a citizen because majorities do not vote with him. He cannot withdraw from business, because a multitude of people seek selfish profit from business. He cannot throw "tainted money" (if money ever is tainted) into the sea. Neither must a man always hold himself guilty of the bad acts or

practices of men with whom he is associated. The only question is whether they are the acts of his own volition? The question follows, if the practices are wrong, whether *he is doing what he can* to forbid or correct them? Is the inheritor of slaves honestly trying to put an end to slavery? We cannot prescribe the method that he might take in a State which had forbidden manumission. He might be a slave owner against his will. But he might, and ought also, to be working for the undermining of the system of slavery. So a man might find himself the owner of land, while disapproving private ownership, and working to put an end to it. Because a man associates with his fellows on the worthy and decent sides of their activity, he does not necessarily compromise his principles by reason of his present inability to compel them to correct the seamy side of their lives. The man of good will does not cease to be a free man because men around him live in bondage to greed or selfishness. He may surely co-operate with a dishonest neighbor in an act of benevolence, when he would have to refuse to participate in his neighbor's conduct of business, for instance, in keeping a liquor saloon. In fact, it is largely by virtue of the sympathy of virtuous men with men of unstable character, by the willingness to work with others wherever they are disposed for even a short time to do good, that the weak and selfish get encouragement to better living. Must you wait till the child is altogether a grown man before you will give him your aid and support? Good compromise is thus simply good pedagogy.

The problem of righteous compromise may be likened to the working of the resultant of forces. There

is a certain direction in which you wish to move a load. Other men associated with you, however, pulling also at the same load, point in various directions from your pole-star. Are you not glad if by your united efforts the load moves, whether Northeast, or Northwest, provided on the whole it makes a distinct northing? Will you stand aloof and do nothing, and see the load only move to one side or the other? "I do not wait," said a Chicago politician, "to hitch my wagon to a star. I hitch it to anything that goes my way." This conduct was not necessarily immoral. It is fair compromise, that is, co-operation, if we insist upon pressing, through the co-operative activity of all, as far and as fast as we can toward our goal. That is fair compromise, in which a man does not retract, nor retreat, nor falsify his manhood. For the rule of the good Emperor, "Whatever anyone does or says, I must be emerald and keep my color," is not merely for the sake of the individual, in order that he may "save his own soul"; it is for the sake of the social structure, for the preservation of which it is essential that each individual screw and bolt shall hold fast.

The question is often asked whether we may not on occasion do evil—a little evil—that good may come. If by "evil" is meant, as it usually is, the work of ill-will, or of the men of ill-will, that is, some kind of dishonor, falsity, injury, avarice or passion, one answer only is possible.

We have already substantially answered the question, whether a man may ever do evil—a little evil—that good may come. There are too many people ready to do evil, who do not yet know that it is evil,

without adding more evil at the hands of those who know better. The special work of those—too few—who see and know good is to declare and do it, and not add weight to the volume of evil. Moreover, while little blame attaches to those who do evil in ignorance, those who, knowing better, do evil, stultify and brutalize themselves, and speedily dull their consciences. Most of the tragedies of history have indeed been committed by men who deserted their post and ventured to do evil in order, they said by way of jesuitical excuse, “to purchase the good.” But the good is never purchased by evil, but only by good. The Dreyfus case in France was a tremendous illustration, both of the mischief that the good do when they lie down before evil, and of the power that a few stalwart men wield who stand up for principle. American public life is full of instances of men who have degraded fine abilities into the ranks of mediocrity for the lack of the backbone to vote with their convictions.

Nevertheless, men say, we do arrive at the goal, even by the crooked way of deceit, corruption, and blood. War seems to be a means for winning liberty. Through the martyrdom of the saviors of men, faith and love do come into the world. That this is true seems to show that goodness, overcoming evil, and ordering all sorts of processes to its ends, is at the heart of the world. But it never proves that it is well to do evil, once seen to be evil. A conflagration, doubtless, may lead to the rebuilding of a better city: you do not, therefore, defend incendiarism. An outbreak of fever may lead to an improved system of sewage and

develop the fidelity of nurses and doctors, but you do not pray for more fever. Neither do you rightly ally yourself with those who vote for war, because a time of war brings patriotism to the surface. Teach your young citizens how they may live for their country.

We ought to see now what it means when the idealists cry, "Do right in scorn of consequence." We will accept the word. It does not mean a blind heedlessness. It means faith that on the whole good consequences certainly follow the doing of right. You speak your honest opinion, you vote as you believe, you use just weights and keep your promises. You do not thus defy consequences; you express your faith in beneficent consequences, even if your course only serves to purchase them for others to enjoy, while you are cut off from sharing them.

One thing more on this point: Every step in moral discipline teaches mercy, modesty, and kindly judgment. We may applaud the action of Luther, but we need not be censorious at the conduct of Erasmus. We may disapprove, but we may not dare to condemn, the megatheriums of an old-world system, whether of slavery or of commercialism. The creatures and the men of each age were such as their social conditions brought into being. In their own time "they had their reward," a vile reward, as it now seems to us, like that of wolves or foxes. If new conditions now pronounce their doom, they may deserve our pity as much as our censure. Who knows but their children, being educated to a new environment and nobler ideals, may prove leaders of the world's progress? It is as much as anyone can do to keep his own integrity,



without sitting a needless hour in judgment on men who may have striven in their own way in miasma and darkness toward the very light which we see dawning. Have we splendid visions of the ideal man and the true social order? So much more gentle ought we to be toward multitudes of men who have had to live without ideals or visions.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE PROBLEM OF THE REFORMER

THE question of the attitude of the reformer and radical—the man who definitely seeks social betterment—toward the men who are hostile or indifferent to his aims, involves some of the most perplexing problems that ever come to those who love their fellows or follow ideal interests. We live in an age full of the survivals of respectable barbarism. Unsocial methods of business prevail. The ideal democracy is yet in the future. The rule of cities and states is often in the hands of those who scoff at the Golden Rule as “an iridescent dream.” Christendom, baptized only by water or by blood,—but never yet by the spirit,—spends more of its public treasure for building navies than it spends for its poor. Our own nation is urgently pushed to join the hosts of military, if not predatory, governments. There is an easy process of sophistication for the defense, at least for the present, of every vested abuse or injustice. What can the man do, who on the one hand does not wish to be a participator in injustice, nor on the other hand to be forever denouncing the conduct of his neighbors and countrymen; who desires to obey his ideals, and at the same time to live in fellowship with the people of his age? It will be the best possible test of the validity of our philosophy of ethics if it will help answer this problem.

Let us then remind ourselves just what our philosophy says by way of explanation of the moral and immoral facts of a given period. It is a philosophy of evolution or growth. It assures us that the world is growing better and not worse. It cites a wonderful record of human history to show how far mankind has climbed upward. It assures us that "the stars in their courses" move together for the furtherance of the kingdom of righteousness. It tells the story of one new law after another, which the Master of the school of life has set for men to learn. It shows us how good has been compelled to rise out of evil, and more love has been bought by pain. It traces a profound principle known in religion as "the law of atonement," through which the sufferings of the innocent have never been in vain.

The same philosophy shows us how and why we have to-day all the various phases of human development, from the men of the stone age to the most advanced type of the men of good will—all living together within the compass of the same city. All standards, all moralities and immoralities, are together in London or New York. This constitutes the problem of the modern ethical teacher. The problem is like that of the good architect who knows the value and uses and the relative strength of all kinds of material. The problem is that of the great educator, who is in sympathy at one and the same time with the little ones in the kindergarten and the men in the university; yes, with the children in the school for feeble-minded, in the blind asylum, and in the reform school. There is work to be done for them all. There is sympathy likewise for all. There is little or no use for the denun-

ciation of men, but only of the evils from which men suffer. Moral or spiritual pride becomes as heinous an offense as any other kind of egotism. The everlasting call is for energy, effectiveness, a steady purpose, a good *will*.

## CHAPTER XII

### AN OBJECTION

THERE may be some who are still impatient at the doctrine of good will on the ground of its seeming vagueness. We want precision and definite rules, they complain. You do not tell us in any case exactly what to do. We feel the lack of authority in your teaching.

This is really a complaint against the conditions of human life. While in one sense we are all under the same laws of moral as of physical growth, yet, in another sense, each individual has to work out his own course alone and establish the law of his own life. As each ship on the sea meets its own conditions of wind and tide, with its own equipment of sailing and steaming gear, so each man confronts his own moral problems which no other man's are exactly like. The zest and interest of life depend largely on this fact.

No pope or priest or book or majority can therefore say exactly what each man must do in each new turn and issue of his course. They may well say, "Thou shalt not steal." But what a man is puzzled about is whether the thing he is pressed to do,—taking a share of profit, for example, from a stock-watering deal,—is stealing.

Our doctrine simply is that the man at each issue or hour of temptation must act in good will. The social spirit must prevail with him. We do not and cannot insist that he shall accept our opinion or adopt our

course of action. We put it to his conscience that he must act with, and not against, his own humanity.

We do not believe it possible to convert men everywhere to any particular party, platform, sect, or ethical standard. We do not expect at once to convert owners of property to adopt novel steps to relieve their children from the burden of excessive inheritances, or even to limit their present freedom of bequest. We do not feel sanguine about persuading the advocates of protective tariffs immediately to break down their time-honored barricades. We apprehend that excited white men in the South will be slow to extend thoroughly humane treatment to their negro neighbors. What we ask and believe is that men will be converted to a new and better social will. This is in the natural line of their development as men. They shall commit themselves to do whatever is shown them to be for the welfare of all of us. They shall will to move as far and as fast as we can show them that their humanity requires. If the rebate proves to be against the public interest they will give it up. If the proposed new land tax is righteous they will accept it. If the negro deserves the suffrage he shall have it. If sincerity and the growth of a man's own soul demand that he shall change his party or his creed, he will proceed to change it, cost what it may. If good will bids him become a "heretic," whether in religion or in political opinion, a heretic he will become.

This does not mean the easy doctrine that a good purpose or a good heart makes an act good. This is no more true than that a good intent will make an arrow hit the mark. A man needs intelligence, skill, practice, in order to hit the mark anywhere. What



we mean is that, without a good purpose, a good heart, a good will, no act can be right. That you hit the mark by accident, or when someone else holds your hands, does not make it a good shot for you. That you do right through fear or favor does not make an act good. Only a good will behind it gives it ethical character. I do not thank you for giving me good measure, if the only reason for it is that the official sealer has just corrected your scales. On the other hand, I can acknowledge your good will, even when, by an error in the counting, you happened unwittingly to give me the wrong change. I depend on your good will to make the needful correction and not to repeat the mistake.

One fact can never be too strongly emphasized. It is always safe, and only safe, to reach and stretch up toward the ideal, whatever the ideal may be. The artist may not attain to his vision, but he must try to attain. So the just man may not, in the complex dealings of modern business, succeed at once and at every point in reaching his standard. Other men may not allow him to do so. But he begins to go wrong the moment he neglects to try to reach the standard. All the noble deeds of history which make human life rich have been the outcome of the highest intent of true men to reach their ideal. The fact that ideal aims exist, alters human conduct daily for the better. The fact that men are strenuous, earnest, faithful in the pursuit of ideal aims is as concrete as are the facts of granite ledges or oak timbers. No one ever yet made a mistake who stood up to the height of his ideals, though the effort may have seemed to be the venture of his life.

This is no less true at the beginning of the moral life, in childhood or in youth, than in adult maturity. In fact, there is no absolute maturity in goodness. The growth always proceeds upward. The man's ideal, always above him, like the child's, is that which keeps his soul alive. To follow his ideal, whether child or man, is the normal law of his life. It is difficult, only so far as it is difficult to be well. It is painful, only as on occasion it is painful to exert oneself. But it is never so painful as to be ill and do ill. It is delightful, as it is to be well, in proportion as the youth or the man keeps the standard of his integrity.

## CHAPTER XIII

### IS MAN IMPROVABLE?

OUR doctrine throughout depends on a faith that man is improvable. We hold that no man yet more than begins to utilize the forces and powers wrapped up in his nature. Experience and observation reveal daily glimpses of possibility and resource stored away in the depths of the consciousness of average men. They can be stirred to feats of physical strength and endurance: they have in them capacities for art, skill, poetry, idealism, devotion. You never can tell when these gleams of a higher life may not shine out. These gleams and sparks are to be seen in the humblest places. Wake a man up, give him a hope, set a great purpose before him, let him feel the thrill of the heart beats of his fellows working, fighting, struggling, co-operating with him, and he becomes a new man.

This is not to say, in denial of the teaching of the biologists, that any special change has been wrought in the basal facts of human nature. We do not claim that the average modern man is necessarily better born than his predecessors of the stone age. We only say that men have always had more capabilities in them than have been used. We call attention to the fact that new forces are now playing upon them to bring their nature to maturity. We maintain that this process is going on. The black man in Alabama, born of generations of fetish worshipers, is actually learning the application of science to soils and catching the

ideas of Isaiah and Jesus, of Franklin and Lincoln. The immigrant from Poland or Armenia, ground down under the oppression of centuries, is straightening his back and learning what kind of a universe he lives in. Intellectual and spiritual influences, everywhere at work in the modern world, felt through numberless books and newspapers, tend to change character and to work wonderful conversions in the thoughts and aims of common men. They become tender and brave, lovers of liberty, men of good will. They help to make a common atmosphere in which stunted souls can grow and ripen.

The fact is, good will wakes and stirs a man's soul: good will gives a man hope and an object to live for; good will binds him close to his fellows and seems to ally him to the innermost soul of the universe. Who was ever touched by good will for an hour without becoming, as long as the good will was in him, cheerful, happy, restful, and strong? Now all men are susceptible to the play of the power of good will. Possess a community or a people with this power, and they must inevitably realize a higher kind of social conduct. Educate children in an atmosphere of good will, and to the natural habitudes of good will, and presently cruelty, meanness, greed, hate, become almost impossible. All this has been tried on the small scale of the family and neighborhood life repeatedly with ample success. The principle is the same in the large or the small.

Much depends in mechanics on the style and nature of the gearing of a machine. What if the gearing slips and the power is lost? It will often happen that a machine, otherwise of excellent material, needs noth-

ing else than a change in the gearing. This is a parable of human life. Good will is a special type of spiritual gearing. Adapt this gearing, adjust men's lives, homes, shops, markets, courts, and parliament houses to this form of gearing, and every human product will be transformed. Man is made for the use of this kind of gearing. The general adoption of it will constitute the next step of his development in humanity.

It needs to be added that the law of progress does not involve the idea of some future fixed condition of universal attainment—a sort of millennium, in which mankind will have nothing to do but enjoy itself within its safe institutions. On the contrary, we have insisted that human welfare does not consist in rest or sleep or feasting, but in the willing, hearty, and fruitful expression of all men's normal activities, physical, intellectual, social, or spiritual. A man's true happiness, then, is not somewhere else or at some distant time, but it is here, in so far as he has caught the secret of the life of good will. There is no finite limit to this form of life. It is always growing richer and more satisfying. But the man, or woman, or child, who is doing his work to-day in a schoolhouse, in a factory, in a field of corn, in a kitchen, may possess as full a cup of joy in his work, as any saint or seraph ever pictured in heaven.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE LAW OF PROGRESS

It is not strange that, with a superficial view, or in a mood of despondency, men sometimes doubt whether there is, or has ever been, any essential progress in human welfare. Ambassador Bryce, the author of "The American Commonwealth," recently raised this question in an address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Harvard University. The fact is that the conditions which make progress are very complex. The path goes like a mountain road, which turns upon itself in zigzag cuts or in spiral curves, so that even when you have ascended to a new height, you may seem to see before you substantially the same scenery as when you were on the parallel line below. The locomotive, also, though on the new level, strains as before at its task of lifting the train. So mankind may behold some of the same disheartening human environment in London or New York as was seen in Babylon or Memphis. The prophets still denounce the same perennial iniquities. Can anyone doubt, however, that the word of the prophets now goes further, is more hopeful and intelligent, and addresses itself to an almost infinitely larger host of attentive hearers than in the days of Rameses or Xerxes?

The points where the work of efficient civilization goes on, moreover, have shifted in twenty centuries. This gives the appearance of seeming lapse at those



points where the torchlights earlier blaze. The populations of Egypt, of Asia Minor, of Palestine, of Spain, of Greece, have relatively dropped behind. They are not necessarily worse off, they may be actually far better off, they may have higher possibilities to be yet realized, than when we catch sight of them in the period of their pristine historical glory. Those were the days of the glory of the few, of here and there a prince, a captain, an artist, a priest, or a solitary prophet, who may have given his life to emphasize his message. Those were never great times for the people. Meantime, the new civilization, moving from the South and East, broadens out into the vast areas of the temperate zones. The new promise is for the people, the monotony of whose lives in earlier days was never recorded, who never entered before now, nor could enter, into the great heritage of the thoughts, the discoveries, the ideals, the hopes of their leaders.

It has been objected that new powers of nature, inventions, wealth, comforts and luxuries do not make men happy; they bring fresh discontent to those who always desire more than they possess; they multiply the needs of men and demand armies of laborers. But progress comes in two ways. It is partly outward, in the structure and machinery of society, in better defenses against hunger and plague, in civilized institutions of justice, in the disuse of war, in the closer federation of the world, in the ever-increasing supplies of commodities, and in the means of fairer distribution of the supply to those who create it. Progress on this side is largely physical and economic. Grant at once that if this were all it would not be enough, even at its highest development, to satisfy human desire. Say,

rather, that this outward development is impossible without a corresponding change in men themselves.

Besides the great physical and economic forces, making for the exterior growth of society, are the everlasting inward conditions that tend to make men human. Give men decent homes and reasonable hours of work, and you have done little for the man, unless he grows, not only more clean, but more just, faithful, chaste, and honorable. Give him a higher ideal of his personal life, clear him of the desire for "graft," show him that the idle life is a public tax, and you straightway promote the general social efficiency, whose fruit shows itself in increased supplies of visible goods. There is forever an interplay between the outward and the inward forces, between economic conditions and the moral law. The end and outcome of development and progress is the making of men of good will. A world of such men will be a rich world; far better, it will be a just and therefore a happy world. There can be no doubt that good will, that is, sympathy, friendliness, humanity, has been enormously increased within even a few generations. It is everywhere at work, as never before. If this does not constitute human progress, the word has no meaning. Many forms of oppression and cruelty are disappearing from sight, as slavery has disappeared. There is an everlasting push of the universe bringing evil practices to nought, and slowly, but surely, making the better things to prevail.

It is objected that the great men are fewer in our time, and that society, which has, in the opinion of many, largely depended for its advancement upon the energy and genius of its eminent leaders, tends hence-

forth to mediocrity. Granting that this complaint is true (which is a debatable issue) it is quite possible, nevertheless, that the continuance of social progress does not depend any longer upon the appearance of single personalities overtopping their fellows. The actual demand of our time is not greatly for exceptional genius, for more Napoleons or Shakespeares, or even for more Christs, if by "Christ" is meant a man so far above all others in goodness that the fact of his existence discourages average men from the hope of attainment. The great modern need is rather for normal and all-round men, for men such as we often already see in the conduct of business, on ships and railways, in shops and offices, and even in the public service, in all professions, especially in the work of education and science, trustworthy, faithful, friendly, devoted, courageous, efficient. We suffer at the hands of men who are as yet children, careless, slovenly, irresponsible, feeble, timid. Give us plenty of grown-up men, and we can live well enough, and if no new geniuses come, we still have the works of genius of all the ages to refresh and stimulate our souls. What if it is the business of the future to lift all the people to worthy manhood, rather than to glorify a few princes, prophets and saviors? Why not, henceforth, expect noble character in men, and take it for granted, as we expect excellent apples in our orchards? Who shall say that genius, also, will not shine forth again to sing and build and paint and write?

We have already suggested that modern progress goes on through the organization of groups and associations and business companies. The power of individualism, and often of great organizing genius, is thus

incorporated and often obscured from the common view. There was surely never seen in any period before this a larger aggregate display of all kinds of progressive ability making for the betterment of mankind, both for the outward and the spiritual life. The threads of intercommunication, binding the nations of the world, are being woven together, at the very time when the ideas of the best lovers of their race are disseminated under the direction of innumerable publishing agencies and philanthropic societies, as if on the wings of the wind.

It is not strange that the motion of progress reveals men's inconsistencies. Men cannot learn all the points of their mighty lesson in one sitting. But the inconsistent people may be getting on. The same man who breaks the laws of justice in Wall Street may have learned to obey rigorously the rules of the Stock Exchange. That is, he has attained a sense of real honor in at least one point, before he has learned honor in all things. So a man may have learned justice, before he has got the control of his temper. Or he may actually have become kind to animals, before he has become altogether kind in his own home. Society, likewise, progresses in one direction at a time. It takes up one moral problem after another and is rarely consistent with itself. Thus, it allows war long after it has practically abolished the death penalty. We need not be disheartened at the sight of these inconsistencies. They do not necessarily prove that all men are hypocrites. They only mark the customary way of nature, which shows here and there blossoms before it is ready to fill the whole tree with its bloom.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE RELIGION OF GOOD WILL

ALL that we have said makes a demand for a more social and democratic type of religion. The church, in the largest sense of the word, including the synagogue, is the only institution which we know that is set apart for the fostering and development of the ideal interests of man. It stands properly for a faith in the reality and lasting worth of justice, truth, and goodness. It stands for a conviction that the universe itself is founded in righteousness and love.

We cannot blame the church greatly, or be at all surprised, because its ideas, its methods and customs, its spirit, and its ethical teachings have been moulded and colored in every age by the general type of the men who made society, did business, fought wars, ruled subjects, and, therefore, constituted the church. The church of a militant or competitive society could not be very different from the society out of which it grew. Its leaders, its priests, its ministers, its builders of cathedrals, the givers to its charities, with noble exceptions,—Francis of Assisi, Taüler, Wesley,—have been the same kind of men who dominated in the State, the market, or the camp of a half-civilized militant age.

The religion of the churches, therefore, has largely been a form of practical dualism, exclusiveness, and antagonism. Theoretically, the church was a brotherhood, but it was always harsh toward outsider or heathen. Theoretically, the church was a universal

spiritual society. In fact, it cursed the larger part of mankind, and made Chinese or Hindus the enemies of its God. Hear church people, even now, talk about Negroes, Italian immigrants, or Orientals! Practically church people have not wished to associate with any other men, except their own little social group.

Modern society seems at last to be getting ready for a type of church that will fit and express a religion of good will and humanity. The social spirit is in the air as never before. Even sectarians and partisans own that exclusiveness is wrong and unworthy of good men. Christians and Jews reach out their hands to each other. Christians find the lines of a religion of humanity, deeper than changing creeds, in the heart of India, in Japan, in the land of Confucius.

There is need enough to adjust homes and shops to the new gearing of the power of good will. The call is far louder to adjust the church to bear and use the new form of power. The church has felt the power of love in all the great periods of its history. At the worst and in its dreariest ages, the power was working, though narrowed and hampered, in the hearts of the few. The church has never yet organized itself and adapted its means, its order, its ornamentation and symbolism, its service, its teaching, to the one great end that alone justifies its continuance in the world. It must teach, foster, serve, develop, and carry to the ends of the world, the life of good will. It must commit its members to this type of life, whatever else they may believe or doubt; it must commit them to choose good will as the law of their being; it must create faith in good will as the veritable faith in God; it must bring up its children to become men and



women of good will, using the storehouse of all noble literature for its Bible; it must translate all its modes of worship to mean a new reverence, namely, respect for every humblest child or poorest man; to mean a new communion, namely, the fellowship of all just and friendly people in every race and nation; to mean a new and nobler sense of God, namely, the spirit of good will, which is at the same time the token and the essential presence of God in the life of man. Where good will acts, God acts through His children; where good will is, morality and religion are one, mighty, irresistible, victorious.

THE END







